

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THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

Exegete and Theologian

BY

ROWAN A. GREER

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FOREWORD

MY many friendly contacts with the Episcopal Church in the United States and with its great Universities, Yale in particular, makes me specially glad to commend to the British public the work of a young American priest of exceptional promise. I have read this essay with interest and appreciation. Those more competent to speak than I tell me that in the world of scholarship the star of Theodore is rising. No longer is he regarded as a 'Nestorius before Nestorius': but rather he seems to be resuming the venerable status as a great Antiochene, which he enjoyed before the Fifth General Council. Mr. Greer's highly readable work bears this out.

FREDERIC HOOD
Canon and Chancellor of S. Paul's Cathedral, London

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INTRODUCTION

WITHIN the last century the discovery of several Syriac translations of the works of Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia from 392–428, has led to considerable interest in the Antiochene school of Biblical criticism and theology. Since Nestorius' background was Antiochene, and since his teacher (whether in person or through the written word) was Theodore, discussion of the Mopsuestian theology has tended to centre upon the question of whether or no Theodore was in fact a Nestorian before Nestorius. Not only has this approach been fairly exhaustively used, but it is also an ultimately fruitless one in the opinion of this writer. The fact that Theodore's thought marks the immediate background for the Nestorian controversy is an important one; and the relationship of Theodore to Nestorius sheds considerable light both upon the controversy itself and upon Theodore's own position. But the attempt to measure Theodore by a standard set almost a quarter of a century after his death must perforce be fundamentally anachronistic. Therefore, this essay will not directly consider Theodore's 'orthodoxy.' Nor will it attempt more than a brief survey of the theological and philosophical assumptions which lie at the heart of Theodore's thought. Rather it will tend toward some assessment of Theodore's theology from the point of view of Biblical criticism. More particularly, the final part of the essay will deal with Theodore's *Commentary on Saint John.* The *Commentary* is certainly representative of Theodore's critical and exegetical method; it is also indicative of Theodore's general theological position. Furthermore, the Mopsuestian's exegesis of the Gospel most closely associated with the Alexandrians should illuminate from a new vantage point the very basic differences in the Antiochene and Alexandrian approaches.

In dealing with Theodore's writings, one is forced to make certain critical assumptions. Inasmuch as Theodore's writings were condemned in 553, a very small proportion of his work exists in the original Greek. And a century ago most of his extant works (in Greek or in Latin translations) were to be found in hostile sources—the Acta of the Second Council of Constantinople, the *Constitutum Vigilii,* the *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum* of Cyril of Alexandria (preserved largely in the works of Severus of Antioch), the *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* of Leontius of Byzantium. These sources

apparently utilized 'hostile florilegia' of Theodore's theological position, and the basic critical question is whether these hostile florilegia represent Theodore with any degree of accuracy. A good deal of the debate on this question seems to be coloured by scholars' attempts to prove Theodore 'orthodox' or heretical. The debate itself was precipitated by the publication of an old Latin translation of the *Commentary on Psalms*, and of the Syriac translations of the *Commentary on John* and the *Catechetical Homilies*. Swete also published what was extant of the *Commentary on the Epistles of Saint Paul*. The Syriac manuscript of a translation of the *De Incarnatione* was discovered, but unfortunately was lost before it could be published. These latter sources, especially the Syriac ones, are obviously more friendly than those based upon the hostile florilegia. Sullivan in his *Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* discusses the critical problems involved in the use of these sources in what must be considered a definitive way. His conclusion is, generally speaking, that the hostile florilegia are reliable so far as the text itself is concerned, and that the only kind of falsification seems to be that of quoting out of context. So far as the Syriac translations go, Sullivan argues that they are also accurate to a great enough degree to warrant their use as a source for Theodore's position. But they are still translations, and too much may not be allowed to depend on particular passages. In one respect Sullivan claims the Syriac translations are at fault. In a number of places the translations add the words 'and *hupostasis*' after Theodore's description of the person of our Lord as 'one *prosōpon*.' Sullivan believes that this addition is false both to the texts as we can discern them and to Theodore's thought. The critical position thus outlined is the one adopted in this essay.

Generally speaking, this essay will attempt to approach its aim in two ways. First, a sketch of Theodore's theology will be given. This sketch will examine the theology both in general and from the viewpoint of the Nestorian controversy and that of Theodore's conception of the Christian life within the context of the sacraments. This part of the essay will attempt to assess Theodore's place in the history of theology and give an interpretation of Theodore's own theological position. In the second part, Theodore's Biblical criticism will be used as an approach to his theology. The discussion here will lead to a particular appraisal of Theodore's *Commentary on John*. In all of this several contentions will be made. First, it will be maintained that Theodore was first of all the 'Interpreter.' That is, he was a Biblical critic first, and a theologian from that basis. Second, Theodore's study of Scripture colours his theology

and modifies his philosophical assumptions. Third, the interaction of Theodore's theology and the Fourth Gospel produces two interesting effects. An interpretation of the Fourth Gospel strikingly different from that of the Alexandrians is presented, and, to a certain extent, the Fourth Gospel effects a subtle change in Theodore's theology. This last effect is not meant to be overemphasized. Rather, it is meant to be an illustration of how Theodore's theology springs from the very text of the Scriptures.

CHAPTER 1

THEODORE'S THEOLOGY IN GENERAL

THE first task of this essay must be to set forth in some interpretative order the outline of Theodore's theological position. Of course, the basic issue involved in that position is the Christology. For this reason discussion of Theodore's Christology will be reserved for the next two chapters, and an exposition of Theodore's conception of the saving work of Christ both in itself and in regard to the Church and the Sacraments will constitute the fourth chapter. Here we shall be concerned with Theodore's general background, his doctrine of man, and his teaching concerning the Trinity—and more especially, the Father and the Holy Ghost.

The theological writings of the early Church stand against what may be called a 'Platonic' background. When the word 'Platonic' is used in this sense, it refers to a series of assumptions about man and the world in which he lives, rather than to any coherent philosophical system. The Platonic background for Theodore's theology was simply the particular *Weltanschauung* common to the Hellenistic age. One might say with some justification that the chief characteristic of Hellenistic thought is its eclecticism. The various schools of philosophy exchanged ideas to the point where it becomes possible, for example, to speak of 'Stoicizing Platonists' or 'Platonizing Stoics.' In its popular form this philosophy led men to hold that man was an immortal soul in a mortal body, that man's problem was essentially his imprisonment in matter, and that man's destiny was to escape his body and have his soul released so as to be reunified with the divine stuff from which it had proceeded.[1] In Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* Scipio Africanus appears in a dream and explains the nature of man and his destiny in language which gives particular expression to the generalizations that have just been set forth[2]:

'"Not so, my son," he replied; "unless that God, whose temple is all this which you behold, shall free you from this imprisonment in the body, you can have no admission to this place: for men have been created under this condition, that they should keep that globe called earth which you see in the middle of this temple. And a soul has been supplied to them from those eternal fires which you call constellations and stars, . . ."'

'"Do so strive," replied he, "and do not consider yourself, but your body, to be mortal. For you are not the being which this corporeal figure evinces; but the soul of every man is the man, and not that form which may be delineated with a finger. Know also that you are a god, if a god is that which lives, perceives, remembers, foresees, and which rules, governs, and moves the body over which it is set, just as the Supreme God rules the universe."'

These two passages are largely Stoic in their meaning. They involve the notion of the soul as a divine spark, of man as participating in the Logos, and of the cosmic speculation which led to the doctrine of the conflagration. But despite these distinctly Stoic notes, the general tenor of what Cicero says would have been acceptable to any one. Because of this, the Church Fathers possessed a network of assumptions about man which were really foreign to the witness of Scripture, as well as to the Christian understanding of God. It is important to see how these Platonic assumptions subtly find their way into the very basic formulations of Christian theology. Perhaps it might be stated with some degree of accuracy that the 'Platonic' world view raised two particular difficulties—a dualistic view of the universe, and a notion of salvation contrary, if not contradictory, to the notion of the resurrection of the body. The problem of dualism was fairly easily solved; at least a dualistic view of things had been resoundingly rejected by the Church a century before Theodore's time. The so-called gnostics held such a dualistic view in one form or another. But, in opposition to such doctrines, the main stream of Christianity held fast to the belief that God had created the world, including matter, and that the body was good. Even though it was admitted by all Christians that the creation was not evil in itself, this admission was often made grudgingly; and matter never seems to have been entirely liberated from dualistic associations. However, the real problem caused by the Platonic world view involved the expression of redemption through Christ in terms of man's soul, heavenly origin, and destiny. Christians could readily accept the Platonic view that man's soul is immortal. They could also believe that the soul was in some sense 'fallen,' though the danger of dualism had to be scrupulously avoided here. And, finally, they could conceive of man's redemption as a return to the soul's place of origin. This scheme of things is most clearly to be seen in Origen's system; but in its general outlines it was common to the majority of the Fathers. Perhaps the *locus classicus* for the scheme is to be found in the *De Incarnatione* of Athanasius[3]:

'For the Word, perceiving that not otherwise could the corrup-

tion of men be undone save by death as a necessary condition, while it was impossible for the Word to suffer death, being immortal, and Son of the Father; to this end he takes to himself a body capable of death, that it, by partaking of the Word who is above all, might be worthy to die in the stead of all, and might, because of the Word which was come to dwell in it, remain incorruptible, and that thenceforth corruption might be stayed from all by the grace of the resurrection.'

'For he was made man (*enênthrôpêsen*) that we might be made God (*theopoiêthômen*).'

The soul is immortal, but involved with mortality. Its redemption consists in a return to a state of immortality. There is nothing in this way of describing redemption that is directly contradictory to the notion of creation and of re-creation through resurrection. And yet it involves a number of concepts which are contrary. For example, the soul of man cannot be considered as simply a spark of the divine. If it be so considered, the distinction between Creator and created quickly vanishes. Further, the redemption of the body, of the creation itself, is in no sense required by this Platonic soteriology. It was Theodore's greatest insight to realize the difficulties involved in this notion of redemption as 'divinization.'

So far we have been speaking of a more or less Platonic way of looking at man, a way which the majority of the Fathers adopted in a form only slightly modified from that discernible, for example, in Cicero. Theodore sought to avoid saying that man's redemption consisted in being divinized. He was successful in the main. However, it is only fair to point out that he was quite understandably unable entirely to reject the assumptions of his age. Though he never seems to have spoken of man as being divinized, he certainly did express man's salvation in the usual Platonic sense of overcoming *genesia* (in the sense of mutability and mortality). Man's predicament is still thought of as arising from his mortality and mutability, and his salvation in terms of the contrary categories[4]:

'Human soul differs from that of animals in the fact that the latter has no distinct person (*kenôma, hupostasis*) of the soul except in the (material) composition of the animal, . . . The soul of men, however, is not like this, but it resides in its own person and is much higher than the body, as the body is mortal and acquires its life from the soul and dies and perishes whenever the soul happens to leave it. As to the soul, when it goes out it remains and does not perish but lasts for ever in its own person because it is immortal. . . . . anything that is immortal in its nature and dwells in an imperishable life is also truly rational and endowed with reason.'

This passage is but one of many which reproduce much of the complex of Platonic thinking about man.

However, far more important for the purpose of this essay are the modifications Theodore imposes upon the Platonic view. It must be admitted that these modifications are not completely consistent ones, nor can Theodore escape a certain dichotomy in his thinking. But they are important changes, and certainly point to the predominant tendency in the Antiochene 'school.' In his commentary on *Genesis* Theodore modifies the Platonic view of man by linking mutability, moral freedom, and rationality. In the usual thinking of the time, man's rationality was something he shared with the divine by virtue of his possession of an immortal soul. This idea did not necessarily have to be expressed in terms of the spermatic logos, but that is what the Stoic doctrine is getting at. A number of passages in Theodore's work reflect this connection of rationality with immortality. In fact, in the passage just cited he speaks of the soul as immortal and therefore 'truly rational and endowed with reason.' But in the *Genesis* commentary, Theodore tries to show that God endowed man with the possibility of sinning (*peccato aditum*) because He knew it would be 'useful.' God separated history into two ages that man might be led from mortality and mutability to immortality and immutability in the new age. The fundamental reason Theodore gives for this divine *paideia* is that rationality and mutability are dependent on one another[5]:

'For if, as it happened, he had made us immortal and immutable to begin with, we would be differentiated in no way from the irrational creation, since we would have no knowledge of our own good (*proprium bonum*). For, being ignorant of our mutability, we would be ignorant of the good of immutability. . . . . having no knowledge of the experience of evils, we would not be able to deserve knowledge of those good things. . . .'

We are still in the world of Platonic mutability and immutability; but Theodore is no longer thinking in terms of a mortal body and an immortal soul. Rather he is considering man as a whole, as a creature. Man has fallen in the sense that he chose the way to sin that was open to him. This choice and the knowledge of good and evil was necessary if man were to be rational. In other words, man's dignity, his highest faculty, is dependent upon his being mutable and responsible for freedom of choice. The connection of rationality with immortality has not, however, disappeared completely from Theodore's notion. The destiny of immortality in the second

age is possible only through the rational functioning of the human being in this age.

If the first modification Theodore imposes upon the Platonic doctrine of man involves linking the rationality of the soul with mutability, the second involves thinking of man not only in a philosophical way, but also in an ethical way. Mutability for Theodore is not simply a Platonic category; it describes more than the flux in which man is placed. Mutability almost always has an ethical ring about it, for it is really man's freedom of choice that Theodore is reading into the term. Mutability in its pejorative sense is the result of the wrong use of that ethical freedom [6]:

'. . . for the Lord made us rational, and wished to help that very rationality to be effective in us, because in no other way could it be made manifest except by the choice of contraries (*discretione contrariorum*). From among these, the choice of the better (*meliorum electio*) can be reached—for this is the highest rational attainment (*cognitio*) of every rational being.'

This modification of the Platonic anthropology gives man a dignity, and creation an inherent goodness. Man's rationality is exercised in the *discretio contrariorum*; and while the *discretio* or choice can and often does involve us in pain, our mutability can also be exercised in the *meliorum electio* and in the right course of life. And so our lives in this age become a sort of training to prepare us for the perfect obedience and immutability of the age to come. Such obedience and immutability is possible only if men are first given a freedom of choice. That this is so is hardly demonstrable in philosophic terms, but it represents an insight into human relationships (and by analogy, man's relationship to God) that is possible to all.

The final way in which Theodore modifies the Platonic anthropology is one which may be seen to govern all his modifications—the notion of God as Creator and man in his entirety as created. For most people of the time, as has been said, man's soul represented a spark of the divine. But for Christians man was first of all a creature. For many of the Fathers the first of these two views tended to creep in the back door; and as has been seen, man's redemption was seen in terms of his divinization. Theodore everywhere emphasizes man's creatureliness. Man, including his soul, is *genêtos,* while only God Himself is *agenêtos.* This denies neither the immortality of the soul, nor man's immutable destiny; but it does draw the distinction between redemption as a union with the Godhead and as a communion with God. The creation is described by Theodore as 'one body' [7]:

'God made the entire creation one body (*hen sôma*); because of this the sum of everything, whether visible or invisible, is called *côsmos*.'

Using this definition, even the principalities, powers, and other spiritual beings are created. The definition was common to all Christians, but Theodore alone seems to have seen its implications for the doctrine of man and redemption.

Something more must be said concerning Theodore's view of man and God as related by being, respectively, *genêtos* and *agenêtos*. The terms themselves reflect the general Platonic background; but their meaning is determined by Theodore's strong doctrine of creation. In his *Catechetical Homily* on the Nicene Creed Theodore speaks of God and man as follows[8]:

'It is well known that the one who is eternal and the one whose existence has a beginning are greatly separated from each other, and the gulf found between them is unbridgeable. The one who is eternal has no limits, while the one whose existence has a beginning, his very existence is limited, and the one the beginning of whose existence is limited, the time that elapsed before he came into existence is also limited. It is not possible to limit and define the chasm that exists between the one who is from eternity and the one who began to exist at a time when he was not.'

Yet in spite of this 'chasm' Theodore also asserts that the *genêtos* and *agenêtos* have a community one with another. This community exists first of all because God is the ground of being for all creation. In a passage from the *De Incarnatione* Theodore argues that the indwelling of the Word in the *homo assumptus* cannot have taken place by 'substance,' since God dwells substantially in all things[9]:

'Therefore, to say that God indwells (the man who was assumed) by substance (*ousia*) is most inappropriate. For it would be necessary that His substance encompass only those in whom He would be said to dwell. And He would be outside (*ektos*) all the rest, which is an absurd statement because of the boundless nature of a (substance) present everywhere and circumscribed by no place. Or (contrariwise), by saying God is present everywhere on account of His substance, it would be meant that everything would share Him and His indwelling—no longer just men, but also things without reason and even inanimate things.'

God's *ousia* is boundless and uncircumscribed; and by *ousia* God may be said to dwell in all creation, including sticks and stones. The passage just quoted is remarkable for the skill with which Theodore

uses the argument of the Alexandrians against describing the union in Christ as 'indwelling' as a basis for his refutation of a union by *ousia*. But for the moment, the passage is cited in order to show that God and the creation are not unrelated so far as Theodore is concerned. This relationship is a particularly close one with regard to man, for man was created in the image of God. Thus, the relationship of God and man as *genêtos-agenêtos* is qualified by describing it as the relationship of an original to a copy [10]:

'I, 26. L'homme créé à l'image de Dieu (oeuvre du sixième jour). Un long fragment conservé par les chaînes, plusieurs de moindre ampleur insérés par Philopon dans son ouvrage, nous rendent l'interprétation de Théodore sur ce texte.

'De même, explique-t-il, qu'un roi qui a bâti une vaste cité et l'a enrichie d'une multitude d'ouvrages de toute sorte, veut, à leur achêvement, qu'un digne monument reproduisant son image soit érigé en plein centre pour être honoré par les citoyens à l'égal de lui-même, ainsi Dieu auteur de la création a-t-il voulu que l'homme, qui en est l'achèvement, reste au milieu de celle-ci comme son image, et que toute créature en demeurant à son service, rende par là au Maître suprême l'hommage qui lui est dû.'

Not only is man related to God in this intimate way by virtue of creation, but also by means of the redemption effected in Christ. Christ is *the* man, and as such is the perfect expression of the 'image of God.' [11]

Some sort of summary of what has been said so far is in order. Theodore was influenced by the Platonic or Hellenistic notion of man as an immortal soul in a mortal body. But he held so high a doctrine of God as the Creator that he was forced to modify his anthropology. Thus, Theodore saw man as primarily a creature, endowed with a rational, but mutable soul. This mutability, further, was thought of not only in pejorative terms, but also in terms of man's ethical freedom of choice. Such a view of creation and man led Theodore to draw the line between *genêtos-agenêtos* very heavily. Man's salvation, therefore, was not to be described as his divinization, but rather as the fulfilment of the community of man and God that was man's by virtue of creation. This fulfilment was thought of as being brought about by Christ, the perfect image of God. What has been said summarizes the way in which Theodore used and modified his background of thought. However, something by way of interpretation must be added. What was it that led Theodore to make these revisions? The answer to this question must be a generalization, and as such, subject to qualification. A part of that answer

probably lies in the tradition of which Theodore was a partaker. A part of it undoubtedly lies in the genius with which Theodore was endowed; he saw some of the limitations of his age's *Zeitgeist* and sought to overcome them in his theology. But it may not be too daring to suggest that the prime impetus for Theodore's adjustment of the Platonic world view was the result of the fact that Theodore was primarily an exegete. And what is more, as will be seen later, he was a particular kind of exegete—one that sought the primary and original meaning of the text and abhorred the allegorical methods of Alexandria. We have seen something of the difficulty that Christians met when attempting to apply their assumptions to any kind of expression of Christian theological truths. Try as one will to avoid it, there is a real dichotomy between the Hellenistic *Weltanschauung* and the view implicit in the Old Testament and in the New Testament. This dichotomy has often been exploited in an unjust way. In fact, one almost flinches every time the usual Greek-Jew contradictions are drawn forth. The contradiction is not between the Greeks and the Jews, so much as it is between the philosophical, conceptual way the Hellenistic world (Greek or Jew) had of thinking, and the more primitive, pictorial view embodied not only in the Old Testament, but in the events of Christ's life and the interpretation of those events in the New Testament as well. There is no time to devote to presenting a detailed brief for this generalization. However, it is possible to see that from a careful reading of the Old Testament at least three notions come home with striking clarity, notions that are not significantly present in the bulk of Hellenistic thought. First, there is a strong emphasis upon the good life, and upon that life as leading to God Himself. This emphasis is quite different from the hopeless feeling left by the Stoic ethic, for example. Second, there is a notion of history—history not in any nineteenth century, pseudo-scientific sense, but in the sense that events form a meaningful order and are providentially governed by God Himself. Third, there is the concept of God as Creator and, consequently, of the creation as worthwhile. In dealing with Scripture Theodore managed to avoid to a great extent reading his own assumptions into the texts, and thus allowed these three notions to spring forth and take form in his theology. We have seen how they shape his anthropology. We shall later see how they affect his notion of the Christian life, of salvation in the age to come, and ultimately of Christology.

The remaining portion of this chapter must be devoted to filling in the outline of Theodore's doctrine of man, of the Fall, of God, of creation, and of the Trinity and the Holy Ghost. As has been

said, the Christology and soteriology will be reserved for more detailed study later. It has already been seen that Theodore looks upon man as a creature, endowed with an immortal but rational and mutable soul and destined for immortality and immutability in the second age. But something more can be said about Theodore's doctrine of man. Man is a sort of keystone in creation; he is that which holds the 'one body' of the created order together[12]:

'God made the entire creation one body (*hen sôma*) . . . he made man (a creature) on the one hand allied with the visible creation because of his body which is in kinship with the phenomenal creation (for it consists of earth, air, water, and fire), but on the other hand, (allied with) the invisible creation, because of his soul which is in kinship with the invisible creation.'

Man is thus related both to the visible and to the invisible creations. This relationship has the effect of binding the whole creation into one body[13]:

'. . . so to speak as one body, composed from many members, so much of rational orders as of sensible. Moreover, He made one animal, that is, man, who both would prove his nearness to the invisible natures by his soul, and would be joined by his body to the visible natures. For from four simple elements—I mean, earth, air, water, and fire—He made our body. And, as a kind of pledge for the harmony of the entire creation (*pignus amicitiae*) He made man to exist so that there was a uniting together of all things in him. . . . But death was brought into (this scheme) when we sinned; moreover, from this there resulted a kind of separation of the two orders of creation. For the soul was separated from the body; and the body, separated, suffered a far-reaching dissolution. Therefore, after this, the harmonious union of the creation began to be dissolved.'

Man, therefore, is the *amicitiae pignus*, the pledge or token of the harmony of the universal order. Yet that pledge was taken away by sin, and is restored only through Christ. This doctrine of man is certainly related to the notion of man made in God's image. There is a subtle shifting from man as the corporate image to man as an individual, and eventually to Christ, who embodies both the individual and corporate aspects. The dissolution of the *pignus* resulted in death, that is, the separation of body and soul. Death in the individual resulted in a corresponding cosmic dissolution, viz., the dissolution of the visible and the invisible orders of creation. Order became chaos. In Christ the relationship is restored, first for

the *homo assumptus,* and then by participation for the whole of creation. In this scheme of things the fundamentally Platonic notion of death as separation of body and soul is modified by Theodore's doctrine of creation. Harmony in man as a creature involves harmony in the whole created order. The disharmony wrought in Adam is corrected in Christ. And that harmony in Christ acts as a nucleus to which all creation is drawn. Thus, redemption is begun and is in process of establishing the *amicitia* God originally intended. In all of this Theodore seems to have taken the Stoic doctrine of the unity of the *cosmos* through the world soul, and refashioned it in terms of the sacred history of creation and redemption. Parts of the treatise of Nemesius of Emesa (possibly a near contemporary of Theodore's) reflect much the same sort of use of the Stoic doctrine. One such passage is worth citing [14]:

'It follows from these considerations that man's being is on the boundary between the intelligible order and the phenomenal order. As touching his body and its faculties, he is on a par with the irrational animate, and with the inanimate, creatures. As touching his rational faculties he claims kinship, as we said, with incorporeal beings. It would seem that the Creator linked up each several order of creation with the next, so as to make the whole universe one and akin.'

We have already touched upon Theodore's notion of the Fall, but some more attention must be given to his view. The basic issue is whether man was created perfect or imperfect. The two views are found side by side throughout the Patristic period. Tatian, the Apologist, held that man was created perfect, fell, and in Christ was restored to his original state. Irenaeus often speaks in this same vein [15]:

'Nor would he (Christ) have truly redeemed us by his blood if he had not been truly made man, restoring again to his own creation what was said (of it) in the beginning, . . .'

This doctrine is the usual way Irenaeus speaks of the *anakephalaiôsis.* Christ's perfect obedience is parallel to Adam's disobedience. The doctrine is based upon the typological relationship of Adam and Christ, a relationship which is to be found noted not only in the Fathers and Saint Paul, but also in Jewish speculation.[16] But another view of the Adam-Christ typology is also to be found in Irenaeus' thought. In this scheme, Christ represents not so much a recapitulation of Adam, but rather a perfector of Adam's imper-

fection. Inasmuch as Adam is the shadow of the perfect image to come, according to a typological mode of thought, this scheme is implicit in the comparison of Adam and Christ. But it is by no means the predominant one. In fact, the notion of man created imperfect and ready to be redeemed by *paideia* from imperfection to perfection is quite rare in patristic thought. That this is so is undoubtedly because of the usual Platonic conception of man's heavenly origin, and of his destined restoration to that place of origin. Yet this second notion of man as created imperfect would seem to be the more prominent of the two in Theodore's thought. For this reason it is worth while to cite two earlier patristic statements of the doctrine. Theophilus of Antioch stated the doctrine perhaps as early as any one [17]:

'For man was born in the middle, neither absolutely mortal, nor completely immortal, but capable of receiving both. . . . But in his actual age Adam was still innocent (*nêpios*); therefore, he was not able rightly to receive knowledge. For even now when a child is born, he cannot eat bread, but must first be nourished by milk, and then as he grows older he comes to eat solid food. It was just the same for Adam.'

This same view is to be found in Irenaeus side by side with the *anakephalaiôsis* doctrine. Christ is described (especially in Books IV and V) as the Teacher, who leads man to perfection [18]:

'It was necessary for man first to be born, and being born to grow up, and growing up to attain manhood, and having attained manhood to be fulfilled, and being fulfilled to hold fast, and holding fast to be glorified, and once glorified to behold his own Master; for God is the one who will be seen; and the vision of God is the attainment of incorruptibility; and incorruptibility makes for nearness to God.'

Theodore has a strong tendency to think of man as created innocent (*nêpios*), and yet in a passage like the following it is possible to detect vestiges of the first view, that man's salvation consists in restoration to his original state [19]:

'Our Lord God made man from dust in His image and honoured him with many other things. He especially honoured him by calling him His image, from which man alone became worthy to be called God and Son of God, and if he had been wise he would have remained with the One who was to him the source of all good things, which he truly possessed, but he accepted and completed

the image of the Devil. . . . And from the above sin death entered, and this death weakened (human) nature and generated in it a great inclination towards sin. Both of these grew side by side, while the inexorable death strengthened and multiplied sin. . . .'

In this passage Theodore speaks of 'completing the image of the Devil.' Such language would seem to imply that man was created free to choose which image he would 'complete.' The Fall would then be thought of, not in terms of a fall from perfection, but a falling short or failure to obey the call of destiny. Yet in the same passage there are phrases which would tend to controvert this Theophilan view. Man 'should have remained with the One who was to him the source of all good things.' In other words, man's origin was in heaven, and originally man dwelt in perfect harmony with God. The Fall, as implied by this language, would have to be a falling from that state. Redemption would then be a restoration, thought of in terms of the Tatian-Irenaean tradition. The additional phrase 'which he truly possessed' leaves little doubt that Theodore is echoing the more 'Platonic' of the two views. That this was not his primary view can be seen not only by the influence of the Theophilan doctrine in this particular passage, but also elsewhere in passages that describe man as originally innocent, in no uncertain terms [20] :

'And inasmuch as the one who is born of a woman has potentially in him the faculty of speaking, hearing, walking and working with his hands, but is very weak to perform all these acts in reality till the time in which God has decreed for him to perform them, so also is the case here in connection with the one who is born of baptism. This one has indeed in him and possesses potentially all the faculties of an immortal and incorruptible nature, but is not now in a position to make use of them. . . .'

'It is indeed known that the One who at the beginning willed and made us mortal, is the One who is now pleased to make us immortal, and the One who at the beginning made us corruptible is the One who now makes us incorruptible. He willed at the beginning and made us passible and changeable, and at the end He will make us impassible and unchangeable. He is the Lord, and has power to accomplish both. He rightly and justly leads us from low to high things, so that by this transference from small to great things we may perceptibly feel that our Maker and the cause of all our good things, who at the beginning made us as He wished and willed, and who at the end brought us to perfection, did do so in order to teach us to consider Him as the cause also of our first state, and thus to think that since we were in need to be trans-

ferred to perfection, we could not have existed at the beginning if He had not brought us into existence.'

These two passages show how Theodore links man's original state to his present and ultimate ones. Man is gradually brought to perfection, both corporately and individually. Baptism marks the beginning of this process within the Christian Church, and the second age marks its completion. Two reasons may be adduced for Theodore's adoption of this view of man and the Fall. In the first place, it may well be that the Theophilan view was traditional in Antioch. Second and more important, the same sort of modification we saw operating upon the anthropology can be seen to have its effect on Theodore's doctrine of the Fall. As has been seen, taking creation and time seriously led Theodore to adopt the notion of man as a creature with a free, rational, and mutable soul. Salvation was still thought of in terms of immortality and immutability, but this destiny was possible only provided man exercised his freedom of choice. This exercise of choice must involve mutability. The doctrine of man as *nêpios* certainly fits better into the anthropology than the other view of the Fall. Another point to be made concerning Theodore's use of the Theophilan doctrine is that it makes a considerable point of the ethical life. Everything hinges upon man's moral freedom. Mutability and rationality are possible only because of this freedom. In point of fact, man has made the wrong choice and has taken the path leading to disobedience rather than obedience. Christ has come as the perfect image of obedience, and Christian people must strive to follow Him down that path by the exercise of their own moral freedom in the direction of that perfect freedom which is God's service. The path of obedience leads to immutability and immortality. We do not know what the end of the road is like except that it has been revealed to us in Christ, for we are destined to become what He in His human nature is.

We must now turn to a brief statement of Theodore's doctrine of God and creation. The two belong together, since Theodore thinks of God primarily as the Creator[21]:

'Divine nature cannot indeed fall within the notion of creation.'
'All the created things rightly attribute their existence to their Creator who is God. . . .'

If this is the first way Theodore thinks of God, there is another way. And that is by the use of commonly accepted Platonic categories. God is one, eternal, *agenêtos,* invisible, immortal, immutable.

According to both of these ways of describing God, He is transcendent. And yet, as has been seen, God, for Theodore, is present in the created order. He is the ground of being for creation. And more than that, God is so present in the world that we can reason from the world to God. Of course, Theodore does not express this relationship in terms of the medieval proofs for God; but he does express it in terms of seeing God in the world, and particularly in Christ [22]:

'Since we were created in the image of God, we picture to ourselves the higher things that are said of God through an image taken from the things that belong to us.'

Thus, God is the Creator, and is separate from, but not out of relationship with, His creation. One particular problem with creation is dismissed by Theodore as already solved. That problem is the relationship between the generation of the Word and that of the world. As early as Tertullian [23] the two had been so closely connected as to be confused. God is often thought of as having generated the Word expressly for the purpose of creation, so that the generation of the Word and creation become almost one and the same thing. This is most clearly to be seen in Origen's *De Principiis* [24]:

'Now as one cannot be a father apart from having a son, nor a lord apart from holding a possession or a slave, so we cannot even call God almighty if there are none over whom He can exercise His power. Accordingly, to prove that God is almighty we must assume the existence of the universe.'

'. . . the title of Almighty cannot be older in God than that of Father, for it is through the Son that the Father is almighty.'

The Arians could easily pick this up and say that since the world was a creature, and since the Logos was generated at the same time as the world, therefore, the Logos also was a creature (*ktisis*). The solution adopted by the majority of Christians is expressed in the twenty-fourth chapter of Gregory of Nyssa's *De Hominis Opificio*. Gregory asserts the eternal generation of the Word (*aiei genêtos*), but the temporal generation of the world. The solution is not, strictly speaking, a logical one. But it was one forced upon theology, and had to be made if the divinity of the Word were to be preserved. Theodore follows the solution adopted by Gregory, and expresses it in terms which look almost like a refutation of the passages quoted from Origen [25]:

'It is not because He is Father that He is also Creator, and it is not because He is Creator that He is also Father.'

'He is the Father of the Son and the Creator of the creatures. The creatures were created later while the Son was from the beginning with Him and from Him. This is the difference between Father and Creator.'

Theodore's doctrines of man, of the Fall, of God, and of creation have been sketched. We must now turn to his doctrines of the Trinity and of the Holy Ghost. These doctrines contain little that is peculiar to Theodore, and yet, for the sake of completeness, a brief outline is necessary. So far as the Trinity is concerned, Theodore asserts the accepted formula, 'three persons in one substance.' God is first of all one. Only by such a confession can the errors of pagan polytheism be avoided [26]:

'Because the Gentiles had previously taught the doctrine of the plurality of gods, who were numerous and different in youth and old age, in weakness and strength, so that some of them were able to do this and some others that—Christ ordered His disciples against this to teach all the nations to turn from all the error of paganism, and to believe in the unity of nature in the Godhead, as was the case with the doctrine first taught to mankind, from which the knowledge of religion was received; and also to learn that the one who is from eternity and is the cause of everything is one Divine nature known in the three persons of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. . . . Each one of these persons is a true God, but the Divine nature of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit which we believe to be eternal and the cause of everything, is one.'

It is difficult to make very much of passages like this. Theodore had no need to be concerned with formulating a doctrine of the Trinity. Rather he had only to reassert the dogmatic formula. There are only two particular points to be made about his statement of that formula. The first is that Theodore thinks of the Father as the *archê*.[27] The second is that Theodore does not confine himself to speaking of one *ousia* and three *hupostases*. So far as the first point is concerned, the notion of the Father as the source within the Trinity seems to be pretty well shared by the Greek Fathers, though its real emergence as an issue may be thought of as occurring at the time of the *filioque* controversy. So far as the second point goes, the use of terms in speaking of the Trinity can shed some light on Theodore's use of *prosôpon* in his Christology. In the passage quoted above, he speaks of one *nature* rather than

one substance. And in a passage in his *Commentary on Haggai* Theodore uses *prosôpon* both in conjunction with, and in place of, *hupostasis* [28]:

'. . . from this passage (Matthew 28 : 19) we learn that the Father has His own *prosôpon,* and the Son His own *prosôpon* and the Holy Spirit His own *prosôpon,* and we believe that each of them is equally of the divine and eternal substance. . . . But the Old Testament, as was said, did not apprehend the Holy Spirit in His own *prosôpon* (*en idiôi prosâpôi*) and His own *hupostasis* as separated from God (*tou Theou*).'

In this last passage Theodore is discussing the use of the word 'Spirit' in *Haggai* and the Old Testament. He asserts that the New Testament reveals to us that God exists in three *prosôpa,* but that the Old Testament contains only the revelation that God is one *ousia.* From a critical point of view, this marks a remarkable faithfulness to the text of the Old Testament—a faithfulness which refused to find the Trinity lurking allegorically on every other page of the Hebrew Scriptures. For our present purpose the passage demonstrates Theodore's use of *prosôpon* in the Trinitarian formula. *Prosôpon* seems to be an approximate equivalent of *hupostasis.* This equivalence will be discussed later in connection with the Christology, where it will be found to be a qualified equivalence. In the passage under consideration, it would seem to this writer that the two words are equivalent in the sense that they both are used to describe the 'separatenesses' (*hekastoi*) of the one Godhead. However, Theodore seems to use *hupostasis* as a strictly ontological word to describe what the Godhead really is. Contrariwise, *prosôpon* seems everywhere linked with the revelation and man's apprehension of it. This impression is given throughout the section from which quotation has just been made. That section begins with a fairly clear use of *prosôpon* in this sense [29]:

'At that time, to be sure, the men of the Old Testament did not understand the Holy Spirit's own *hupostasis* as distinguished (*gnôrizomenên*) in its own *prosôpon* from God.'

The operative word in this sentence is 'distinguished' (*gnôrizomenên*). God exists in three *hupostases,* and is *recognized* in three *prosôpa.* The word *prosôpon,* for Theodore as for Nestorius, refers to something definite. That is, a *prosôpon* is an existing thing or entity and not simply an abstraction; and *prosôpon* always seems to have this supra-ontological sense of recognition. However, too

much must not be made of the particular words Theodore uses. In the first place, the original texts are so hard to uncover as in many cases to make recovery of the exact wording impossible. And in the second place, it is the contention of this essay, at any rate, that Theodore was not really interested in fashioning a technical, philosophical vocabulary. Rather it is the tendency of his thought to fashion a theology built of Biblical, pictorial images.

Theodore's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, like that of the Trinity, never comes up for detailed discussion. We have seen from the *Commentary on Haggai* that Theodore takes a sound critical view of the pre-New Testament operation of the Holy Spirit. There is no question in his mind that the Spirit existed as an eternal *hupostasis,* and as such was in operation, 'speaking by the Prophets.' But this operation is not to be found recognized as separate from God in the Old Testament. Theodore's doctrine of the Spirit is perhaps best summarized in Chapter X of his *Catechetical Homily* on the Nicene Creed. There he asserts that the Spirit is an *hupostasis* of the Godhead, that the Spirit is pre-eminently the 'Spirit of Truth,' that He 'proceeds from the Father,' and that He is the 'Giver of Life.' There is nothing in this that cannot be found implicitly in the Creed, save perhaps the strong emphasis upon the Father as *archê.* However, Theodore is not content to derive his doctrine of the Spirit from the Creed alone. He says [30]:

'Each one of us is baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, according to the doctrine of our Fathers, which is derived from the teaching of our Lord, so that it should be made clear and manifest to all that our blessed Fathers handed down to us the doctrine of the true faith by following the order of Christ. Even the words of the creed contain nothing but an explanation and interpretation of the words found in the teaching of our Lord.'

The Scriptural foundation of Theodore's teaching on this subject is evident not only in the fact that he grounds the Creed in Scripture. It is also evident in his association of the Spirit, first with the 'gifts of grace' and second with Christ Himself. One has only to thumb through a Concordance of the New Testament to realize how often the 'gifts of the Spirit' or the 'spirit of Christ' are spoken of. Two passages from Theodore will demonstrate how this Scriptural emphasis is reflected in his works [31]:

'He (John 7 : 38–9) did not speak of the person or of the nature of the Holy Spirit (John 7 : 38) that they were not yet, when he

said that Jesus was not yet glorified, because He was eternally before all creation, but He (*sic*) said it of the gifts of the Holy Spirit which after the ascension of our Lord into heaven was poured and seen on the blessed Apostles and on those who were with them.'

'He shows by his words (1 Cor. 15 : 45) that Christ our Lord was changed in His body, at the resurrection from the dead, to immortality by the power of the Holy Spirit.'

This Scriptural influence is to be detected throughout Theodore's theology. We have seen it at work modifying his Platonic preconceptions, and governing his anthropology. We have seen it in terms of his doctrines of the Fall and creation. We have seen it in his doctrine of the Spirit. And even the doctrine of the Trinity for Theodore is related to the revelation contained in the apprehension Scripture has of God. In the next three chapters we shall see Theodore's foundation in Scripture expressing itself in his Christology and in his doctrines of the Church and sacraments. Having observed this foundation in operation throughout Theodore's theological thinking, we shall then be in a position to make some evaluation of that foundation in Scripture itself and to turn to its particular expression in the *Commentary on John*.

CHAPTER 2

THE NESTORIAN CONTROVERSY

THE first half of the fifth century saw the consolidation of Eastern Christianity in its Constantinopolitan-Nicene form. The Cappadocian theology seems pretty much to have triumphed, though Arianism and other heretical forms of Christianity undoubtedly continued to exist. The Origenist controversy, and the dismal fate of John Chrysostom, occupied the East in the early years of the century. The West was gradually breaking down politically and socially; Rome was sacked by Alaric in 410. The Pelagian controversy none the less came in for consideration in the West, as in the East. These first few years of the fifth century are the years in which the stage was occupied by Innocent I, Jerome, Rufinus, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, and, ominously for the future, by Cyril of Alexandria. Everything was ready for the appearance of Nestorius. The movement that led to the condemnation of the Three Chapters in 553 linked Theodore's name to the two heresiarchs, Pelagius and Nestorius. His connection with Pelagius is tenuous, to say the least; and certainly there is no very good case to be made for presenting Theodore as a proto-Pelagius.[1] However, Theodore's connection with Nestorius is a very close one. In point of fact, the Nestorian controversy serves to draw forth the implications of both Theodore's and the Alexandrians' Christologies. For this reason, a brief study of the controversy will serve to expose the bare bones of Theodore's Christology. After this study we may turn in the next chapter to a more detailed study of Theodore's Christology, as well as the motivation and background thereof.

In the year 428, the very year of Theodore's death, Nestorius, a monk from Antioch, succeeded to the patriarchate of Constantinople. Nestorius, as has been stated, was trained in the theological viewpoint of Theodore, Diodore of Tarsus, Eustathios, and of Theodore's fellow student, John Chrysostom. Nestorius began preaching against what he regarded as the superstitious title, 'Theotokos.' To call the Virgin 'Theotokos' was, he felt, inaccurate theologically, and could only lead to a debasement of the Christian faith.[2] Cyril of Alexandria, as Mary's champion, appeared to do battle. Motivated quite probably by the growing influence of Constantinople (New Rome), as well as by an abhorrence of the Antiochene brand of theology. Cyril began to stir up opposition to

Nestorius in Constantinople. Appeals from Cyril's party were sent to Pope Coelestine I and to the emperor, Theodosius II, for a general council to anathematize the views of Nestorius. Cyril began a lively correspondence in opposition to Nestorius, and in 430 managed to get Coelestine to condemn the patriarch of Constantinople, and give him (Cyril) a commission to proceed against Nestorius in the East. Cyril wrote to John of Antioch and Juvenal of Jerusalem of his intentions. John begged Nestorius to concede the use of 'Theotokos,' but the patriarch was adamant. Eventually, an imperial summons went out, convening a council at Ephesus in 431. Cyril dispatched his Twelve Anathemata against Nestorius, and contracted an alliance with Memnon of Ephesus. Nestorius replied with counter-anathemata, and managed to win over to his side John of Antioch, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, and Andrew of Samosata. The Council of Ephesus which then met can be said to be ecumenical only in the sense that the deposition of Nestorius was finally recognized. But the council was in fact two councils, one formed from each of the two parties. Theodosius, after much hesitation, chose to depose everybody. Then, in August of 431 the Orientals drew up the Formulary of Reunion, which specified a 'union of two natures' (which was Cyril's phrase), agreed to the Theotokos provided it were understood that Mary was not the source of our Lord's divinity; but the Orientals refused to give up Nestorius. Negotiations were opened with Cyril on this basis, Paul of Emesa representing a synod of Antioch (which took place in 432) to Cyril. Agreement was made between Cyril and Paul in 432 to abide by the Nicene Creed, without Cyril's Anathemata; but Nestorius was to be deposed. The next year John of Antioch agreed to this union; but Theodoret, Andrew, and John of Germanicia refused to abandon Nestorius. At the Synod of Zeugma they determined to recognize Cyril, but not his deposition of Nestorius. In 434 an imperial edict ordered the Orientals to give up their opposition to Cyril and John of Antioch. The next year the Tome of Proclus to the Armenians was issued. Though Proclus apparently attempted to avoid the issue, the Tome was received by some as a condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia among others. Imperial action was taken against the 'eighteen irreconcilables.' The uneasy union was sure to break up under the combined pressure of more extreme Cyrillian views, the consolidation of Antiochene opinion, and the loss of what little moderation Cyril himself had been able to effect, as Cyril died in 444. In 436 Nestorius was banished to Arabia, but for some reason landed in upper Egypt. Nestorianism spread rapidly in the Far East, being excluded from

the Empire. Thus, the first phase of the Nestorian controversy ended with the victory of Cyril. The second phase began with agitation by Cyril's successor, Dioscorus, against Theodoret, and by Eutyches' complaint to Leo I of Nestorianism in Constantinople. But the inheritors of Cyril's position had gone too far, and the old Nestorian tradition had at least a partial justification. In 448 at a synod in Constantinople, Eutyches was condemned by Flavian the patriarch. Eutyches promptly appealed to Leo and Dioscorus, to the latter successfully. Leo replied with his Tome. But the Eutychians were not idle; they condemned Ibas of Edessa, and held the Latrocinium at Ephesus in 449. Flavian died from wounds received in the fray. Eutyches was restored and the Twelve Anathemata were ratified; but Ibas, Irenaeus, Theodoret, and Domnus of Antioch were deposed. Such a course of events appalled Leo, but there is small chance that anything would have been done to check the course of the extreme Alexandrian views had not their staunch supporter, the emperor Theodosius II, fallen off his horse and been killed. The Council of Chalcedon was held the next year, 451. While the council's decision by no means represents a victory for Nestorius' party, it does represent a check to any extreme statement of Cyril's views. And yet by and large Cyril's doctrine of the hypostatic union prevailed. Dioscorus became the defendant. Theodoret was admitted to the council; Nicaea was accepted, together with the so-called Chalcedonian definition. Gibbon's opinion is worth citing[3]:

'In the name of the fourth general council, the Christ in one person, but *in* two natures, was announced to the Catholic world: an invisible line was drawn between the heresy of Apollinaris and the faith of S. Cyril; and the road to paradise, a bridge as sharp as a razor, was suspended over the abyss by the master-hand of the theological artist. During ten centuries of blindness and servitude, Europe received her religious opinions from the oracle of the Vatican; and the same doctrine, already varnished with the rust of antiquity, was admitted without dispute into the creed of the reformers.'

Poor Nestorius, not vindicated as was Flavian at Chalcedon, suffered what must seem to all an undeserved fate. Banished to upper Egypt, he was subject to all manner of vicissitude, and eventually died, apparently with the knowledge of Leo's Tome and with an invitation to Chalcedon in his pocket. The Jacobites still throw stones at his grave and refuse to admit that it ever rains upon it.

We must turn from this historical sketch to a consideration of the theological aspect of the Nestorian controversy, and we shall then be able to discuss Theodore's Christology and its involvement in the controversy in the years prior to the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. Perhaps one of the easiest ways of approaching the Nestorian controversy would be to compare Cyril's Twelve Anathemata with Theodoret's refutation of them and with his dialogue *Eranistes*. Theodore's works are, of course, prior to the controversy; and Nestorius' *Bazaar of Heracleides* is so hopelessly confusing as to be of little use so far as clarifying the controversy goes. Discussion of it will be reserved for the end of this chapter. Cyril anathematized all those who failed to agree to the following propositions[4]:

1. The holy Virgin is Theotokos.
2. The Word is God is united in *hupostasis* to flesh, and is one Christ with His own flesh, being at once both God and man.
3. There is one *hupostasis* after the union, according to natural union.
4. It is impossible to divide between two persons or *hupostases* the expressions used in the writings of evangelists and apostles.
5. Christ is God in truth and not man bearing God.
6. Christ was at once both God and man, the Word being made flesh; and the Word was not God or Lord of the Christ.
7. It is impossible to think that Jesus was energized as man by God the Word.
8. We ought to worship Emmanuel in one doxology, in that He is the Word made flesh, and not maintain that the ascended man ought to be worshipped together with the divine Word.
9. The Spirit is Jesus' own and not a foreign power by which He is glorified.
10. Christ was made our High Priest in the sense that the Word was made flesh, and not in the sense that another was made High Priest; nor did He offer the sacrifice on His own behalf.
11. The Word's flesh is proper to Himself, and not that of another united to Him only in dignity and by divine indwelling.
12. The Word of God suffered in flesh.

These Twelve Anathemata are simply changes rung on a few themes. They are perhaps best understood in terms of four pro-

positions, all of which are dependent on one another. (1) The Virgin is to be called Theotokos. This proposition attained its importance only because of devotional practices, and because it was the *casus belli* of the controversy. The real point embodied in the Theotokos proposition was the assertion (2) of the *communicatio idiomatum*. After the union of God and man in the Word made flesh there could be no separation of attributes. All attributes were to be attributed to the Word, the only distinction being made by attributing those things properly divine to the Word *kata phusin*, by nature. The *communicatio idiomatum* was a necessary corollary to the kind of union envisaged between the human and divine natures. (3) That union was described as a 'physical' union (*henôsis phusikê*), from two natures, (*ek duo phuseôn*), and as taking place in the *hupostasis* (*kath' hupostasin*). Christ was the *theanthrôpos*, the Word become flesh. The last point (4) to be taken from the Twelve Anathemata is that the Word suffered, but that suffering was to be described by the phrase 'impassibly suffered' (*apathôs pathei*). This conclusion followed of necessity from (2) and (3). The basis of all these points lies in the Alexandrian understanding of the way in which redemption was effected in Christ. Their prime doctrine was the one advanced by Athanasius, 'God became man, that man might be divinized.' And behind this soteriological conception lies the notion that man's redemption must be thought of in terms of a reunification with the divine source of his being. Thus, for redemption to take place God and man must be perfectly united. The human nature of Christ must be divinized so that the 'divine humanity' thus effected might be made universal. And this merging of the human and divine natures in the *henôsis phusikê* meant there could be but one subject of predication in Christ and that some sort of explanation had to be found for the human attributes of Christ which would still secure that single predication to the Logos. The notion of such a union is made necessary by the Alexandrian soteriology. It was only so far as the Antiochenes could modify that soteriology that they were justified in rejecting its implications for Christ's person and the union of the two natures. Essentially, the Alexandrian doctrine was a Platonic way of thinking.

We must now examine Theodoret's opposition platform, the position adopted by the Antiochenes in general. The *Eranistes* is divided into three sections. The first seeks to demonstrate that the divine nature is immutable. In effect such a statement denies Cyril's statement of the Theotokos and the *communicatio idiomatum*—points (1) and (2) above. The divine nature cannot change; only those things proper to divine nature can be attributed

to the Word. Thus, Mary can be said to be Theotokos not in the sense that she bore God, but only in the sense that God the Word indwelt her child Jesus. The second section of the *Eranistes* seeks to show that the two natures exist unconfounded in Christ. Origen's image of a lump of iron in fire is used to show that true union does not necessarily involve the disappearance of either of the two substances brought into union [5]:

'Then the nature of the iron was not damaged by contact with the fire. If then, in natural bodies, instances may be found of an unconfounded mixture, it is sheer folly in the case of the nature which knows neither corruption nor change to entertain the idea of confusion and destruction of the assumed nature, and all the more so when this nature was assumed to bring blessing on the race.'

This section of the *Eranistes* strikes at the heart of point (3) above. The union of the two natures is admitted, but that union cannot be described, according to the Antiochenes, as *phusikê* or *kath' hupostasin*. If such words are used, the union is described in terms which obliterate the distinction of the two original natures, and one is left with a *tertium quid* or a loss of the human nature into the divine. It was this last point that had marked the unorthodoxy of Apollinaris, and it was for this very reason that the Antiochenes thought the Alexandrians were reviving Apollinarianism. They saw no reason to describe the union in terms of *phusis*, since other kinds of unions existed which were true unions. The third part of the *Eranistes* is designed to show that God the Word is impassible. Orthodoxus (one of the characters in the dialogue) states the typical Antiochene approach of attributing the divine attributes to the Logos and the human attributes to the *homo assumptus*. Eranistes falls back on the Alexandrian distinction between those attributes which are and those which are not *kata phusin*. (This is point 4 under the discussion of Cyril.) But Orthodoxus thinks this is just weasle-wording, and expresses his contempt for Eranistes, who is a bit simple-minded for the purpose of the polemical dialogue [6]:

'*Eran.*: We say that He underwent the passion impassibly.
'*Orth.*: And what man in his senses would ever put up with such ridiculous riddles? Who ever heard of an impassible passion, or of an immortal immortality? The impassible has never undergone passion, and what has undergone passion could not possibly be impassible.'

The key to understanding the opposition represented in Cyril's

Anathemata and Theodoret's *Eranistes* lies in an understanding of the two school's anthropologies. All Christians agreed in drawing the line between created and Creator. But only the Antiochenes' doctrine of man, in so far as it avoided the Platonic scheme, was able to preserve this distinction in terms of man himself and his redemption. Only the Antiochenes could reject the notion that man was divinized, and that, therefore, God had to become man in the sense of becoming the *theanthrôpos*. The Antiochenes objected to this latter view precisely because of the popular theological crudities to which it inevitably led. They were afraid that Cyril's views really did mean that God was metamorphosed into man. On the other hand, because of their anthropology the Antiochenes could think of salvation as the perfection of man's communion with his Creator and could dispense with any need for a *henôsis phusikê*.

Before turning to Theodore's Christology, it will be necessary to speak of Nestorius' position and thus to conclude consideration of the Nestorian controversy itself. It is fair to say that the opposition of Cyril and Nestorius has been sketched with reasonable accuracy by discussing the Anathemata and Theodoret's *Eranistes*. Both sides agreed that Christ was divine and human, and that the two natures were somehow in union. But there was a really basic struggle not only between the two sets of terminology, but also between two very different views of man, salvation, and Christ. We have seen this struggle largely in terms of Antiochene refutation of Cyril's position. We must now examine, in brief order, Nestorius' positive platform. Like Theodoret and the balance of the Orientals, Nestorius objected to the Alexandrian Christology because, in his opinion, it made the immutable and impassible deity both mutable and passible, and because it confounded the two natures of Christ. Whatever system of Christological doctrine can be found in the *Bazaar of Heracleides* seems to this writer to be grounded in the positive side of the coin of which the objections just cited are the obverse. That is to say, Nestorius draws a very heavy line between Creator and creation, between the *agenêtos* and the *genêtos*. It is this view of things that dictates Nestorius' Christological conclusions. Nestorius expresses this absolute and fundamental distinction as follows[7]:

'For the word and the idea of divinity are one thing and that of humanity another, since things which are distinguishable are distinguishable.'

Nestorius, quite rightly, reasoned that since the Alexandrians posited the *communicatio idiomatum* and attributed all predica-

tion to the divinity in Christ, this doctrine meant that any real distinction between the human (*genêtos*) and divine (*agenêtos*) was made difficult, if not impossible. Not only was it necessary, according to this view, to speak of the *agenêtos* in such a way that it was no longer truly *agenêtos* (immutable and impassible), but it was also necessary to undermine the human side of things. The natural union put forth by Cyril meant not only a mutation of the *agenêtos,* but a real loss of the reality of the *genêtos*. The natural union, first of all, meant a loss of human freedom. The divinity, according to Nestorius' rendering of Cyril's views, acted as a *Deus ex machina* in Christ. There was no exercise of freedom in the life of our Lord; God manipulated it all [8]:

'If thou thus predicatest the *hypostatic* union of the nature, thou sayest, as the Arians, that it is natural and not voluntary, because he suffered with a natural passibility. He suffered as a result of the natural union, for the sufferings of the soul are the sufferings of the body in the natural composition.'

If the union be described as natural, then it had nothing to do with Christ's human will and freedom. Furthermore, Nestorius claims that the tendency of this Alexandrian way of thought is to deny the humanity of our Lord. Like Apollinaris, Cyril runs the risk of denying autonomy or reality to the will and soul of Christ, and substituting for the exercise of these human faculties the automatic rule of the divinity [9]:

'But what is (this) whole man who neither acts nor is acted upon in accordance with the nature of man? In name indeed alone is he man and in name body and in name rational soul, he who is not moved to and fro in the nature of his being, neither as soul by purpose and will nor again as body by sensibility of soul, but (in whom) God the Word has been established to become the will and the purpose and the sensibility in the body and in the soul in such wise that God the Word should act and suffer sensibly these bodily (sensations) and those of the soul: . . .'

Nestorius firmly states that the divine nature and the human nature in Christ are separate and autonomous. The Deity is immutable [10]:

'He indeed who changes the divine nature into human nature brings about its suppression, and he who changes human nature into the divine nature makes a mock of it and makes of it a nature unmade, in declaring a nature (which is) made unmade, which cannot be.'

The Deity is furthermore, impassible[11]:

'. . . for he, who by nature is impassible and unchangeable and invariable, does not even suffer in any manner in the human nature, since it is not his to suffer in his nature. But if thou sayest that the one, whose it is not to suffer in his nature, has suffered in nature, it is a folly to say that he has suffered in another nature; but he who comes to folly surely deceives, and like the Manichæans makes our very salvation to have taken place in deception.'

And finally, just as the Creator and His creation must always be distinguished, so the divine and the human aspects of Christ are always distinguishable[12]:

'How can he who in the union speaks of one Son, one Christ, one Lord, distinctly speak apart of one Son, God, and one other, and thus of two sons? For again that would not be called a union but each one of the natures (by itself) in its own *ousia*. For neither is God the Word said to have become flesh in his own *ousia* but by union with the flesh, nor is the flesh called Son apart from the union with the Son of God. For this reason there is one flesh in them both and one Son in them both. For he whose it is by the union to exist and to be spoken of neither exists nor is spoken of in the definition and the distinction (of each) from one another. As God the Word is by his nature God incorporeal, nevertheless in the union with the flesh he is called flesh, and the flesh which is in its nature bodily frame and in its *ousia* also bodily frame, is yet God and Son by the union with God the Word the Son of God. There are said to be neither two fleshes nor again two sons: those which are distinct by nature and exist by the union of the natures.'

This is all quite confusing; but Nestorius, nevertheless, is clear that the two natures are *distinct*. If the distinction between the *genêtos* and the *agenêtos* is the basis of Nestorius' Christology, one prime result of this distinction is that the Atonement is a work of man (the *genêtos*), as well as a work of the Uncreate. Christ is *homoousios* with man not only so far as philosophical categories go, but also because He struggled against temptation and Satan even as we struggle[13]:

'. . . for, when he (i.e., Satan) could obey, he obeyed not but rose up against God by means of the *schêma* of a man and slandered God before man as jealous, and man before God as ungrateful; and he is the enemy of all and has received a just judgment and has been openly convicted. He has in fact been conquered by Christ through his humanity. . . .'

In all of this Nestorius preserves the same careful doctrine of creation that we have seen worked out in detail by Theodore. However, it would seem to this writer that Nestorius never fully understands the soteriological ramifications of this view. That is, the tendency of Theodore's thought is to deny that the notion of redemption can be described in the categories of 'Platonic' metaphysics. The separation of Creator and created (at least so far as denying any substantial identity is concerned) is so complete for him, that while redemption is thought of as a community between God and man, that community is quite seldom described in any way but in terms of Biblical images. Thus, the community of God and man in Christ, as we shall see, is never described in any really technical way. However, Nestorius, while perfectly prepared to draw the line between Creator and created, was unable to draw it so finally in Christ's person. Salvation, even to Nestorius, was dependent upon some philosophically describable union of the two natures. Unable to see the wisdom of Theodore's eschewal of the usual Platonic categories at this point in his theology, Nestorius cast about for some word which would allow him to maintain the Creator-created distinction and yet assert some kind of substantial union in Christ's person. It is the contention of this essay that Nestorius, by failing to follow consistently the consequences of his *genêtos-agenêtos* distinction and by allowing himself to deal in the categories of the Alexandrians, brought his theology into Alexandrian lists, where judged by their Platonic categories, it was doomed to failure. All of this is really by way of general conclusion. However, it is important at this juncture to make perfectly clear the point that Nestorius seems to abandon the basic *genêtos-agenêtos* distinction in the soteriological (and hence, Christological) part of his thinking.

We have seen the groundwork of Nestorius' Christology. That foundation brings to the fore the central problem thereof. Let us briefly examine several aspects of this problem, as well as the ways employed by Nestorius of dealing with it. From this consideration we may turn to an elaboration of the generalization just ventured in the last paragraph. Perhaps the first difficulty that comes up for detailed discussion in the *Bazaar* is that of the addition of a *quartum quid* to the Trinity. Sophronius (the anti-Nestorian speaker of the dialogue) states the objection as follows[14]:

'*Sophronius.* And he had not so received the incarnation, but (if it) took place in another human nature and not from the *ousia* of God, how does the Trinity not accept an addition in (its) nature,

since it has accepted the *ousia* of another? Or how is this God of the nature of men and not of the *ousia* of God?'

Nestorius disposes of the objection in the following way[15]:

'Nor did he receive any addition of the *ousia,* because the *ousias* remain without change. For then there is an addition in the *ousia* when it accepts another *ousia,* an equal *ousia.* But also he received not an addition to the *prosôpon,* in that he took his own *prosôpon* and not another, not for distinction but for the union of his own *prosôpon* and that in which he became incarnate; and also his *prosôpon* is in him and not in another. For he is clothed in the likeness of a servant, and by it he emptied himself and has clothed it with his *prosôpon* and has exalted his name above all names. In the *prosôpon* then of the divinity is he adored and in no other, and in consequence of this the *prosôpon* is one and the name of the Son (is one).'

Has Nestorius really solved the problem? The Alexandrians sought to avoid the difficulty of an addition to the Trinity by speaking of one *hupostasis* of the Incarnate Word. Nestorius refuses to admit that sort of unity, and denies that the human *hupostasis* was merged into the divine. However, he allows that the human *prosôpon* and the divine are somehow merged. One can hardly help feeling that Nestorius has simply transferred the problem from one metaphysical term to another. It seems clear that this problem of an addition to the Trinity must arise in any good Christology, for there is no question that the Second Person of the Trinity is not absolutely co-terminal with the Incarnate Deity and Perfect Man Jesus Christ.

That the problem just outlined comes up with any force in Nestorius' Christology is undoubtedly due to the central problem of the Antiochene Christology, viz., the double predication of Christ's attributes to two subjects—one human and one divine. The Alexandrians, of course, attributing everything to the divine nature, distinguished only between those things proper to Him by nature and those not. The doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* in effect states exactly this. But Nestorius, by following Theodore's refusal to allow any merging of the two *ousiai* and *hupostases,* denied the *communicatio idiomatum*[16]:

'Wherein do you blame these things, O calumniators and wise men? Because I have said that, even as we call God the creator of all and Moses a god, so also (have we called) our Lord Christ God of all and Maker? But, because Moses is called a god and Christ

God and moreover, Creator, we do not speak of Moses himself as of Christ. . . . For community of names constitutes not community of honour and equality.'

However, in this aspect of his Christology just as in the problem regarding the Trinity, Nestorius seems to this writer to transfer the problem from one metaphysical term to another. That is, the *communicatio idiomatum* does not take place in the *ousia* or the *hupostasis* or the *phusis*—but rather in the *prosôpon*. Nestorius' basic position is stated as follows [17]:

'But (there is only) one *prosôpon* in the union but in the natures the one and the other, as from the common *prosôpon* it is known that he took the flesh, the likeness of a servant, for his own *prosôpon,* and thereby he spoke in teaching and working and acting; and he gave his own likeness to the likeness of a servant and thereby he speaks as by his own *prosôpon* and by the divinity. For the *prosôpon* is common, one and the same. The likeness of the servant belongs unto the divinity and the likeness of the divinity unto the humanity. One and the same is the *prosôpon* but not the *ousia*. For the *ousia* of the likeness of God and the *ousia* of the likeness of the servant remain in their *hupostases*.'

There are two natures, *hupostases,* and *ousiai* in Christ, but only one *prosôpon* of union. And despite this double predication, Nestorius vehemently denies that he separates the natures [18]:

'Where then have I said that Christ was a mere man or two Christs and that there was not one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, of the union of the two natures one *prosôpon?*'

In what has been said so far it has become more and more apparent that an interpretation of Nestorius' Christology depends on an interpretation of the terms he uses, especially of the word *prosôpon*. This does not seem to be so for Theodore, as we shall later see. But at every turn of the way in the maze that is the *Bazaar of Heracleides,* Nestorius puts the entire burden of the Christology upon the word *prosôpon*. He disallows the hypostatic union, but solves the same problems that were meant to be solved by that means, in terms of his own prosopic union. We must, therefore, examine what Nestorius means by *prosôpon,* and by the other terms he uses. To begin with, *ousia* for Nestorius refers to some definite, existing substance or thing, rather than to any kind of ideal form or abstraction [19]:

'. . . since one *ousia,* if it be recognized in two *ousiai,* in the one is *ousia* but (is) in the other in *schêma* or in falsehood and in illusion.'

This passage shows that Nestorius thinks of *ousia* as indicating something quite definite. Thus, the two *ousiai* in Christ are two definite subjects in which the two natures find hypostatic expression. Furthermore, *ousia* and *hupostasis* seem to be for Nestorius terms that are pretty well synonomous. The technical distinction which had been evolved for the Trinitarian definition does not seem to transfer itself to Nestorius' Christology [20]:

'Thou dost censure me . . . because I distinguish the properties of the union which belongs to each of the natures, in such wise that each one of them subsists in its *hupostasis,* and I say not that they are referred to God the Word as one who is both of them in *ousia*; or that the (properties) of the flesh were taken upon God without (their) *hupostasis.* . . . But in name alone he has a body, without *hupostasis* and without activity; and for this reason thou callest him man as something superfluous only in word and in name, in that thou art not content to predicate the *ousia* and activity of man or the existence of two natures, each of them with properties and *hupostases* and *ousia.*'

The passage just cited would seem to this writer to indicate that for Nestorius, *hupostasis* almost equates *ousia,* and that a nature must subsist in a definite *hupostasis.* The Antiochenes seem unable to allow for much Platonic realism in these terms and insist upon avoiding abstractions wherever possible. Therefore, the union between Christ's humanity and his divinity cannot take place in the nature, the *ousia,* or the *hupostasis.* Given Nestorius' use of the terms, any union of natures, *hupostases,* or *ousiai* would change or destroy the original natures, *hupostases,* and *ousiai.*

Two other terms, however, are to be found in Nestorius' vocabulary—*schêma* and *prosôpon.* Both terms have to do with the outward manifestation or appearance of the *ousia, hupostasis,* and nature. *Schêma* refers to that manifestation in so far as it is only or largely appearance [21]:

'I say therefore that they (running water and ice) have no distinction in nature; and things which have no distinction in nature and are distinguished are distinct in the *prosôpon.* But (to be distinguished) by the *prosôpon* without nature is a *schêma* without *hupostasis* in another *schêma.*'

It is difficult to tell exactly what was intended by this passage, but the point seems to be that the *schêma* does not necessarily have anything to do with the reality of a thing, whereas the *prosôpon* does. But, while the *prosôpon* is tied to the reality of a thing, it is not coequal with that reality. Thus, the union of the two realities in Christ's person may be described as a union in one *prosôpon*. This union is described in the following passage in terms of Philippians 2[22]:

'This in fact is the chief greatness of the nature of humanity: that, since he remains in the nature of humanity, he accepts *a name which is more excellent than all names*; neither in consequence of moral progress nor in consequence of knowledge and faith, but therein by virtue of his readiness to accept (it) has it come about that it should become his *eikôn* and his *prosôpon* in such wise that his *prosôpon* is also the *prosôpon* of the other. And he is both God and man, and the likeness of God in condescension and in *kenôsis* and in *schêma,* (and) the likeness of the flesh as man; and the man is by exaltation what God is, through the name which is above all names. Consequently in the *kenôsis* he humbled himself *unto death, even death upon the cross,* in that he made use of the *prosôpon* of him who died and was crucified as his own *prosôpon*. . . .'

The point seems to be that there are two *prosôpa* united in one *prosôpon* of union. The human and divine natures, *ousiai,* and *hupostases* each have a *prosôpon*; but there is still but one *prosôpon* after the union. This union is described in terms of an exchange of *prosôpa.* The divine *prosôpon* condescends to the human; the human is raised to the divine. To proceed one step further, Nestorius' doctrine of the prosopic union is given real point and content by his notion of the 'image of God.' Since perfect man is the image of God, and since perfect God must be revealed to man in an image of God *ad modum recipientis,* the divine and human natures and *hupostases* of Christ's person find their union in this *imago Dei,* an image that perfectly expresses what God and man ideally are, and which displays to all the perfect community of God and man[23]:

'*The Holy Spirit will come and the power of the Most High shall overshadow* (*thee*)—denoting the Creator. *Therefore he who shall be born shall be called the son of God*—that is the Holy One who is to be created; so that in the creation he calls (him) "holy" and "Son," denoting the image and the likeness which the first man received in the Creation and which he kept not. For, as the image of God, he ought to have kept himself for God without spot and

without blemish, and that by willing what God wills, since he had the *prosôpon* of God. For (to have) the *prosôpon* of God is to will what God wills, whose *prosôpon* he has. Consequently the second man was created by the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High. . . .'

The Atonement is thus described in terms of the renewal of the image of God by Christ.[24] At this point Nestorius' thought reaches what this writer considers its high water mark. Refusing to destroy the distinction between the two natures and *hupostases,* Nestorius turns to the notion of the image of God as an explanation of the union of the two in Christ. God reveals Himself in a perfect man; perfect man is by definition the image of God. The two are distinct, and yet employ the same *prosôpon.*

What can be said by way of conclusion? Nestorius certainly follows Theodore's basic line, and at certain points (especially *re* the image of God) reveals a penetrating insight into that line. However, he fails, in this writer's opinion, to see the really fundamental aspect of Theodore's thought, viz. his attempt to frame a theology in Biblical images rather than in strict definitions taken from Platonic metaphysics. How far Nestorius has departed from Theodore is probably made clear by the following passage[25]:

'For the word and the idea of divinity are one thing and that of humanity another, since things which are distinguishable are distinguishable. But I predicate two natures, that he indeed who is clothed is one and he wherewith he is clothed another, and these two *prosôpa* of him who is clothed and of him wherewith he is clothed. But thou also confessest "of two natures." Neither of them is known without *prosôpon* and without *hupostasis* in the diversities of the natures. There are not two *prosôpa* of the sons conceived nor again two *prosôpa* of the men, but of one man who is moved in the same manner even by the other. For the union of the *prosôpa* took place for the *prosôpon* and not for the *ousia* and the nature. It is not indeed that one *ousia* without *hupostasis* should be conceived, as if by union into one *ousia* and there were no *prosôpon* of one *ousia,* but the natures subsist in their *prosôpa* and in their natures and in the *prosôpon* of the union. For in respect to the natural *prosôpon* of the one the other also makes use of the same on account of the union; and thus (there is) one *prosôpon* of the two natures. The *prosôpon* of the one *ousia* makes use of the *prosôpon* of the other *ousia* in the same (way).'

It is difficult to know quite what to make of this. Is it an attempt to frame an ontological formula which will describe the mode of

union? The phrase 'subsist in' (a) natures, (b) two *prosôpa,* and (c) one *prosôpon* of union, suggests that it is. The word 'ontological' is here being used in a sense limiting the word to the Platonic categories which can be applied to being. With specific reference to Christology, by an ontological description is meant one that seeks strictly philosophical terms like substance, nature, or *hupostasis* for its purposes. It is the contention of this writer that Theodore rejected such ontological modes of description precisely because he saw they implied the Platonic notion of man and God. But Nestorius, at least in this passage, seems to be abandoning Theodore's platform and to be looking around for some ontological formula which will express the union, but still refute Cyril's formula. Nestorius finds Theodore speaking of the '*prosôpon* of union,' and the passage just cited shows us Nestorius putting Theodore's concept (which, as we shall see, was framed to avoid any ontological categories) into an ontological mode. At least this is the opinion ventured in this essay. In other words, it is submitted that Nestorius fights his Christological battle on Alexandrian ground, and confuses the issue by introducing into the more Semitic, mythopœic Antiochene thought the rigid Platonic metaphysics of the school of Alexandria. Thus, when Theodore's basic position is taken out of its Biblical context and brought into an argument conducted in terms of what was essentially Platonic metaphysics, it no longer makes sense and tends to dissolve as mist in the sun, or as (in Bergson's image) the sand dredged from the bottom dries and disintegrates. The prosopic union, as rooted in Biblical ideas, makes sense; but as a metaphysical solution counter to Cyril's hypostatic union, it fails of its end. It must be our next task to turn to Theodore's own Christology. The contrast with Nestorius must then appear clear. And if Theodore's Christology can be thought of as illuminative of the Nestorian controversy, it must also be realized that the Nestorian statement of Theodore's position does reveal what could be done to Theodore's system when read in terms of Alexandrian concepts.

It was because the Alexandrians failed to understand the source of Theodore's Christology—Biblical images in large measure—that Theodore was posthumously drawn into the Nestorian controversy which has been the major subject of discussion in this chapter. The Alexandrians were utterly unable to read their concepts into Theodore's works, and as a result considered him to have been heretical even if unintentionally. The sordid story of how the extreme inheritors of Cyril's views began the campaign against Theodore's works and reputation is told in great detail in

Devreesse's *Essai*. We may well end this chapter as we began it, with the citation of Gibbon. The history of Theodore's condemnation in 553, over a century after his death, is told so remarkably well by Gibbon that his language will excuse a rather lengthy quotation [26]:

'The fathers had listened without impatience to the praise of Theodore of Mopsuestia; and their justice or indulgence had restored both Theodoret of Cyrrhus, and Ibas of Edessa, to the communion of the church. But the characters of these Oriental bishops were tainted with the reproach of heresy; the first had been the master, the two others were the friends, of Nestorius: their most suspicious passages were accused under the title of the *three chapters*; and the condemnation of their memory must involve the honour of a synod, whose name was pronounced with sincere or affected reverence by the Catholic world. If these bishops, whether innocent or guilty, were annihilated in the sleep of death, they would not probably be awakened by the clamour which, after a hundred years, was raised over their grave. If they were already in the fangs of the dæmon, their torments could neither be aggravated nor assuaged by human industry. If in the company of saints and angels they enjoyed the rewards of piety, they must have smiled at the idle fury of the theological insects who still crawled on the surface of the earth. The foremost of these insects, the emperor of the Romans (Justinian), darted his sting, and distilled his venom, perhaps without discerning the true motives of Theodora and her ecclesiastical faction. The victims were no longer subject to his power, and the vehement style of his edicts could only proclaim their damnation, and invite the clergy of the East to join in a full chorus of curses and anathemas. The East, with some hesitation, consented to the voice of her sovereign: the fifth general council, of three patriarchs and one hundred and sixty-five bishops, was held at Constantinople; and the authors, as well as the defenders, of the three chapters were separated from the communion of the saints, and solemnly delivered to the prince of darkness. But the Latin churches were more jealous of the honour of Leo and the synod of Chalcedon: and if they had fought as they usually did under the standard of Rome, they might have prevailed in the cause of reason and humanity. But their chief (Pope Vigilius) was a prisoner in the hands of the enemy; the throne of S. Peter, which had been disgraced by the simony, was betrayed by the cowardice of Vigilius, who yielded, after a long and inconsistent struggle, to the despotism of Justinian and the sophistry of the Greeks. His apostasy provoked the indignation of the Latins, and no more than two bishops could be found who would impose their hands on his deacon and successor Pelagius. Yet the perseverance of the popes insensibly transferred to their adversaries the appellation of schismatics. . . .'

CHAPTER 3

THEODORE'S CHRISTOLOGY

CONSIDERABLE time has been spent examining the issues and the course of the Nestorian controversy. The arguments adduced by each side, as was stated earlier, serve to bring out the implications and tendencies inherent in the two rival Christologies. Of course, neither Theodore nor the earlier Alexandrians (or even Cyril, for that matter) were committed to the extremists' views. However, having seen what could be made of Theodore's Christology by those less subtle than he and by those who sought only to refute the Antiochene viewpoint, we may now turn to Theodore's own statement of his position. We must strive to avoid judgment of that position in terms of what was made of it during the Nestorian controversy. What will be attempted, on the contrary, is a frankly sympathetic exposition of Theodore's Christology in terms of its relationship to the total framework of the Antiochene theology. Theodore's point of departure can best be understood as his soteriology; and, historically speaking, it can be seen from the Arian controversy. The Arians stated that the Word was a creature (*ktisis*)[1]:

'There were two possible ways of meeting this argument against the divinity of the Word. In order to indicate these possibilities more clearly, we may state the Arian argument in the form of a syllogism:

'Maj.: The Word is the subject even of the human operations and sufferings of Christ.

'Min.: But whatever is predicated of the Word, must be predicated of him *kata phusin*.

'Ergo: The nature of the Word is limited and effected by the human operations and sufferings of Christ.

'In replying to this reasoning, one solution would be to detect and expose the fallacy in the minor premise, by distinguishing between what is proper to the Word by his divine nature, and what belongs to him by the appropriation of human nature in the Incarnation. This was the solution of Athanasius. By virtue of this distinction in the minor, he could maintain the major premise in all its vigour.'

This analysis of the roots of the Christological differences between

Antioch and Alexandria is a good one. The Alexandrians concentrated on the minor premise of Sullivan's syllogism; the Antiochenes denied the major premise. In other words, the Alexandrians posited predication of the human attributes to Christ in a way not *kata phusin,* while the Antiochenes forthrightly denied that the Word could in any way be considered the subject of the human attributes. But Sullivan's analysis doesn't seem to go any deeper. He simply thinks the Antiochenes were obtuse not to understand the Alexandrians' attack on the minor and to persist in their rejection of the attribution of the human characteristics and sufferings of Christ to the divine Word. The true explanation seems to this writer to lie in the Antiochene reaction to Apollinarianism, which was closely related to the Alexandrian way of thought. Such a reaction was inevitable among the orthodox of a city such as Antioch, a strong centre of the heresy. The Antiochenes thought that the distinction made by the Alexandrians in the attack upon the Arian minor premise was essentially an artificial one. They also believed that to assert the major premise was equivalent to Apollinarianism. If the Word was the subject of Christ's human activities, then what became of Christ's humanity? Surely He could have had no moral freedom, no autonomous humanity. The humanity is, in fact, swallowed up like Gregory of Nyssa's drop of vinegar. According to the Antiochenes, the humanity must have its own subject and autonomy. But, at the opposite pole, the Alexandrians were forced to assert the major premise because of their soteriology. God must, so to speak, become one with man substantially; hence, only one subject of the Incarnate Word is possible. Only thus can redemption in terms of a divinization of manhood be effected. The Antiochenes utterly rejected this view. Theodore's doctrine of man did not require it, nor did his doctrine of salvation. Therefore, the Antiochene attack on the Arian syllogism could take place in the major premise; there was no necessity for inventing some theological device for making attack on the minor premise possible, as was the case at Alexandria. Theodore, consequently, was able to assert consistently the impassibility and the immutability of the divine nature. In denying the major premise, the Antiochenes were forced to predicate the human and divine attributes to two different subjects. This double predication is the fundamental problem of Theodore's Christology, just as the difficulty of what becomes of the human nature is the fundamental problem of the Alexandrian Christology. The double predication, furthermore, is the basis of what is called in text book terms 'Nestorianism.' We have seen the basic motivation for such double predication.[2] We

must now turn to Theodore's own work in order to see how the double predication and how the union of the two subjects are expressed and described.

Let us first set forth Theodore's conception of the divine subject, the 'Word who assumes' (*Verbum assumens*). It has already been seen that the Logos is one *hupostasis* of the Trinity. The Logos is *homoousios* with God [3]:

'. . . *True God of True God.* Indeed what else were we justified in thinking of the one who is from God and not from outside Him but from the very nature of the Father, except that He was what God is by nature. . . . a true Son who is consubstantial with His Father is also a true creator like Him.'

The Logos is, therefore, impassible, immutable, and eternally generated from the Father. Theodore more often than not expresses his Christology not in strictly philosophical terms, but rather in terms of the event itself. That is why the divine subject is not so much the *Verbum* alone, but rather the *Verbum assumens*. This way of speaking tends to project the Christology on to time and space. The Logos assumed the 'man who was assumed' (*homo assumptus*); and this assumption might be spoken of as an *assumptio continua*. The initiative was with God the Word. The divine scheme of redemption was wrought in Jesus Christ, 'the man of God's own choosing.' This acting of the *Verbum assumens* is expressed in a number of ways [4]:

'. . . to assume upon Himself all that which belonged to the nature of that man, and to be exercised in all (human) faculties? And He perfected him by His power, so that He did not remove from him the (bodily) death which he received according to the law of his nature,—but while He was with him He delivered him by act of grace from (real) death and from the corruption of the grave, . . .'

'He Himself was not tried with the trial of death but He was near to him and doing to him the things that were congruous to His nature as the Maker who is the cause of everything, i.e., He brought him to perfection through sufferings and made him for ever immortal, impassible, incorruptible, and immutable for the salvation of the multitudes who would be receiving communion with him.'

These passages might seem to suggest that the Incarnation was a kind of divine rescue mission. And yet the key word in these passages is 'grace.' The resurrection was accomplished by 'act of

grace.' And in fact, it is implicitly stated that the human faculties of the *homo assumptus* were exercised by the power and grace of the *Verbum assumens*. But what was Theodore's conception of this power and grace? The following brief passage almost serves as a definition [5]:

'The man Jesus was like all men, and differed in no way from men because they are of the same nature as he. And, indeed, God gave grace to them also; moreover, the grace that is given does not change the nature. But after the destruction of death God gave (Christ) the name above every name.'

What exalts the *homo assumptus* to the level of Lordship (the name above every name) is not grace alone, but God's gracious action in the resurrection. The *homo assumptus,* even though he is the agent of redemption and is to be worshipped as one with the Word, is still *homoousios* with man. Even though he has been the giver of grace, that does not affect his nature; and even though he was the receiver of God's grace, that fact did not affect his nature. Thus, God's grace acts through and within nature. And, as has been seen, Theodore's doctrine of man involves the notion that man has the 'choice of contraries' (*discretio contrariorum*). God's grace can act with that choice, but it cannot abolish it. For without the freedom of choice, the freedom of perfect service is impossible. Grace and freedom are, therefore, two sides of the same coin. From God's side (which, after all, is prior) man's freedom is exercised in the context of grace. That is, man lives in a world governed providentially by God. On the other hand, from man's side, human life is lived my making free choices, and by striving to follow the path of obedience. When Theodore speaks of the *Verbum assumens* as perfecting Jesus, this is essentially what he means. That grace and freedom are both words describing the co-operative venture of God and man in Christ is evident from a number of passages [6]:

'And He effected (lit. received) the abolition of condemnation with ease, and He rose from the dead by the power of God and became worthy of a new and ineffable life which He generalized to all the human kind.'

'And he (the *homo assumptus*) had an inclination [*ropên*], which was not by chance, towards the good [lit. better things] because of his union [*henôsei*] with God the Word. He was also accounted worthy of this (union) by the foreknowledge [*prognôsin*] of God the Word, who united Himself with him from above. Thus, because of all this, he kept straightway with discretion a great hatred of evil [*to kakon*], and with boundless love he fixed himself upon good

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[*to kalon*]. And receiving a power in accord with the fitting purpose [*oikeiâi prothesei*] (of the divine economy), and receiving the co-operating energy [*sunergeian*] of God the Word, he kept steadfast for the rest (of his ministry) from changing for the worse. On the one hand, this was a purpose [*gnômês*] he held himself; and, on the other hand, it was something he kept faithfully according to the purpose [*protheseôs*] and by the co-operating energy of God the Word.'

The first of these passages simply asserts the human side of the coin. Even though the power of God and God's grace hold the initiative, the *homo assumptus* truly rose from the dead and became worthy. Both the man's free exercise of the choice in the right direction, and the grace of the *Verbum assumens* are asserted simultaneously. The second passage presents Theodore's view of grace and freedom in Christ even more clearly. The grace of God enabled the *homo assumptus* to have 'an inclination' to choose the good. This grace of God was given Jesus in a special way, simply because God must work through particulars. God foreknew (*prognôsin*) what the outcome would be; and in all of it God's purpose and, so to speak, His predestined plan were being worked out. Theodore is here interpreting the Incarnation as a special election of the man Jesus, though this by no means implies any adoptionist bias. The last sentence is a succinct statement of how the Word can be called *assumens*. The action of Jesus Christ is an action governed by the grace of God the indwelling Word, by whose 'co-operating energy' the purpose of God was maintained and brought to fruition. But it is equally an action of Jesus' own ('himself'), and is a 'purpose he held himself.' The completion of the action depends upon this autonomous exercise of the *homo assumptus*' moral freedom toward the good. From this point (that is, the end of the citation above) Theodore continues to describe the life of Jesus Christ as one of freedom exercised in the context of God's grace.

So far the discussion has been chiefly of the Word and the operation thereof. But already it seems clear that Theodore's Christology is not framed so much in terms of concepts and abstractions as it is in statements involving the historical process. The *Verbum assumens* is described in the context of God's providential governance in electing the *homo assumptus*. We have already seen something of how the *homo assumptus* is described. The man is the 'man of God's own choosing.' He is fore-ordained, and is the recipient of God's special election and grace. And yet he is a perfectly free moral agent. There can be no question that Theodore thinks of

the *homo assumptus* as a real being separate from the Logos at least in terms of Christological analysis.[7] The notion of the *homo assumptus* was one Theodore may well have derived from the teaching of Diodore, and even from Eustathios and Paul of Samosata.[8] It was a necessary concept because a subject was required for the human predications. From this point of view the *homo assumptus* was a logical consequence of the Antiochene theology as a whole. God was defined as impassible; man, as a passible creature with a mutable soul. Therefore, there had to be a subject for the passible attributes of Christ; and *a man* was the obvious possibility. But the *homo assumptus* was a necessary part of the Antiochene theology for two other reasons as well. The first of these was the strong emphasis Theodore placed upon man's freedom. The *discretio contrariorum* was essential to man's nature. If Jesus did not possess freedom of choice and act as a free moral agent, then the humanity of Christ disappeared. The obvious implication of the passages last quoted is that Christ as the *homo assumptus* had perfect freedom as appropriate to man, in such a way that at any time prior to his glorification at the resurrection, he could have repudiated the indwelling Word. Only when Jesus said 'it is finished' was the Incarnation completed. This emphasis upon the ethical life of the *homo assumptus* is what is largely responsible for casting Theodore's Christology into historical modes of thought.

The *homo assumptus* is made necessary not only by reason of needing a subject for the human predications and by reason of Theodore's concept of man as a free moral agent, but it is also required by Theodore's inability to hold the Platonic notion of 'man.' By this is meant not so much the Hellenistic anthropology as such, but rather a realist notion of 'man.' In other words, the Alexandrians were perfectly able to think of 'man' as an abstract concept which had a reality of its own. 'Man' in this generalized sense is a universal which has a reality over against the many 'men.' This reality of the one does not exclude the reality of the many; but while it is embodied in the many, it is also distinct from them. But the Antiochenes in general, and Theodore in particular, found this a difficult concept. Theodore could not conceive of 'man' apart from 'a man.' In this sense, one might also say that Theodore was somehow an Aristotelian. However, the only real evidence for such a view is to be found in the close relationship of Theodore's anthropology with that of Nemesius of Emesa; and it is probably closer to the facts to consider Theodore against the general, eclectic, Platonic backdrop. In any case, Theodore appar-

ently believed that manhood involved in its very essence existence as *a* man. Putting this in more abstract language, Theodore is quite clear that no *hupostasis* can exist without a *prosôpon* [9]:

'. . . nor indeed is it possible to speak of an *hupostasis* that has no *prosôpon* (*aprosôpon*).'

In other words, something that is described as a reality (*hupostasis*) must express that reality outwardly, to us. Although Theodore does not seem to state it explicitly, it is implicit in his thought that a *phusis* cannot exist in the abstract, but must have a real expression.[10] To apply these generalities to the *homo assumptus,* the human subject in Jesus Christ must be *a* man (or perhaps *the* man) and not simply man. The human nature must find its expression hypostatically. And for Theodore, to say that that expression is found in the divine *hupostasis* would have seemed nonsense, or at best Apollinarianism. Thus, Theodore everywhere speaks of the *homo assumptus* as an individual [11]:

'In this they (our blessed Fathers) showed us the gift of His grace which they saw in the human race, and through which He assumed a man from us, was in Him (*sic*) and dwelt in Him (*sic*), and they taught us that He (*sic*) endured and bore all according to human nature so that we might understand that He (*sic*) was not a man in appearance only, but that He (*sic*) was a real man who suffered all the human (passions) according to human nature.'

This same usage is reflected in the fact that in his commentaries Theodore often paraphrases the words of our Lord by having Him speak in the first person as the *homo assumptus* and refer to the Logos in the third person. This emphasis upon the fact that man must exist as *a* man can be seen to spring not only from Theodore's anthropology in general, but more particularly from his Biblical point of view. Theodore is very little inclined to speak in terms of abstractions. He speaks in terms of particular things, events, and people. And this literal manner of speaking can be seen to spring from his literal method of exegesis. Of course, such a generalization is based to a certain extent upon impressions, and its justification involves a study of Theodore's exegetical method. But it is certainly clear, even on the surface, that Theodore's approach is much truer to the Scriptures than the realist, Platonic approach of the Alexandrians.

At this point, we can see that Theodore's doctrine of the *homo assumptus* as the human subject, as free, and as an individual man

springs from the deepest anthropological and soteriological sources of his thought. And it has been the contention of this essay that those very sources are fed by Scripture and by Theodore's carefully literal approach to it. But the doctrine of the *homo assumptus* leaves Theodore with what must be called the fundamental problem of his Christology. How is the union of the *Verbum assumens* and the *homo assumptus* to be described? But before some answer to this question is given, it is worth while to show how strongly Theodore is forced to distinguish the two[12]:

'Is there then one nature of man and God, of Lord and servant, of Creator and created? Man is consubstantial with man, and God is consubstantial with God. [Migne makes this a question.] How, therefore, can man and God be one in unity so that He who saves and he who is saved, He who is before (all) ages and he who appeared from Mary ('s womb) are one and the same?'

'When any one discerns the natures, of necessity he finds them utterly distinct [*alterum et alterum*]. And I think that the (natures) themselves are not put aside by this, but let it be conceded that God the Word is one thing by nature and that which is assumed, whatever it is, another. But they both are found in one and the same person, by no means because the natures have been confused, but because of the union which was made of what was assumed with that which assumed. For if it be clearly conceded that the one is different from the other by nature, it is clear first that what was assumed is not equal to what assumed nor the one similar to the other, nor that which was assumed the same as that which assumed. And it is clear, second, that the two are one and the same by the unity of person. Thus, it is perfectly proper to separate the attributes of Christ.'

Of course, it should be clear that these passages are quoted out of context, even though there is but a limited context extant. The passages contain much that states the unconfused unity of the two natures; but they are most particularly, strong examples of Theodore's distinction between the two.

It is now necessary to discuss how Theodore describes the union of the two natures. He refuses to do so in terms of the Word *becoming* flesh[13]:

'So then, we find no other possible interpretation of the word "became" [*egeneto in egeneto sarx*] than to refer it to appearance [*kata to dokein*]. . . . and when it says "became," then it means it according to appearance; for (the Word) was not changed into flesh.'

Theodore in this passage explicitly states that the Word was not changed into flesh. He must do so in order to preserve the distinction we have already seen made. What the phrase 'became flesh' in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel means is that the Word became flesh 'according to appearance' (*kata to dokein*). What does Theodore mean? It is probably too simple to say that he means that the Word became flesh, but only in appearance and not in actual fact. Some light is shed on Theodore's meaning in the *Commentary on John*. There he states that when it says 'the Word became flesh,' it means it in the sense that the Word 'dwelt among us.' The *sarx egeneto* is explained, according to Theodore, by the following phrase—'tabernacled amongst us.' This tabernacling is the indwelling of the *homo assumptus* by the Word. Thus, there is a real sense in which the Word became flesh; Theodore is not simply rejecting the idea by the phrase 'according to appearance.' Perhaps what he means by the phrase is this: the Word became flesh not in the sense of being metamorphosed, but in the sense that we could look at the *homo assumptus* and say, there is God. In other words, 'according to the appearance' would seem to this writer to have more or less the same connotation as *prosôpon*. In any case, it is clear that Theodore did not describe the union in terms of the *sarx egeneto,* save as it could be qualified by one of his other conceptions.

We have already touched upon several of the ways in which Theodore describes the union. The very words *assumens* and *assumptus* express the union, but they are never employed in much more than a terminological way. That is to say, the implications of the 'assumption' are always expressed in other terms. Another way in which the union is described has been discussed at some length in defining what is meant by the *Verbum assumens*. The union in Christ is the supreme instance of the co-operative operation of God's grace and man's freedom of choice properly exercised. It is this notion of grace and freedom that lies at the heart of Theodore's most carefully reasoned statement of the union. That statement is to be found in the fragments of the *De Incarnatione*. There Theodore refers to the union as the *enoikêsis* or indwelling. The word simply expresses the union metaphorically and in terms of the basic notion of assumption. Theodore asks how the indwelling must be described, that is, what is its mode (*tropos*).[14] Various possibilities are advanced. The indwelling cannot be by *ousia,* because in that way either God's *ousia* will be excluded from the rest of the creation (which is declared impossible), or else there will be nothing unique about the indwelling of God in the *homo assumptus*. This

argument is, in effect, hoisting the Alexandrians with their own petard. The Alexandrians later claimed that the Antiochenes denied the uniqueness of Christ. Theodore, remarkably enough, here anticipates the argument and, unwittingly, hurls it back upon the Alexandrians. The same argument is advanced against describing the union as an indwelling by energy, *enoikêsis kata energeian*. Finally, Theodore advances the term he wishes to employ [15]:

'Therefore, it is evident that the indwelling should fittingly be described as by "good pleasure" (*eudokia*). And "good pleasure" means the best and finest willing (*thelêsis*) of God, which He grants when He is pleased with those who are zealous to please Him, because of the good and fine reputation and character (*tou eu kai kala dokein*) they have in His sight.'

This definition of the indwelling is a direct reflection of the concepts of grace and freedom as Theodore uses them. *Eudokia* or 'good pleasure' (cf. Matthew 3 : 17, Mark 1 : 11, Luke 3 : 22) is a Biblical word, and its verbal form is used in the divine words spoken at Jesus' baptism. According to Theodore's definition, the word refers to the exercise of God's will. This willing (*thelêsis*) would appear to be the same thing that has been called earlier in this essay 'grace' or 'providential governance.' The willing or good pleasure is given by God, but only to those 'zealous to please Him.' Again man's freedom of choice and moral autonomy is preserved. Theodore's argument for *eudokia* as a qualification of the indwelling continues. *Ousia* is common to all, in that God is the ground of being for all creation. But God dwells in different men in different degrees by good pleasure. And this differentiation is determined at least in part by the moral character of the indwelt man. The next problem is what is the difference between the indwelling by good pleasure of God in Christ and that in the apostles, prophets, and the just? Theodore's answer is that only in Christ is it 'as in Son' (*hôs en Huiôi*). Thus, the final formula to describe the union is God's indwelling of Christ by good pleasure as in His Son—*enoikêsis kat'eudokian hôs en Huiôi*. At the heart of the definition is Theodore's conception of grace and freedom. And the expression is in terms of the Biblical ideas of indwelling, good pleasure, and sonship. Nowhere in Theodore does his rejection of Alexandrian, Platonic modes of thought appear more clearly; for in this long passage Theodore is striving to express the union in as careful and philosophic a way as possible. Yet throughout his terms are Biblical and ethical in their import.

Theodore's basic way of describing the union is in terms of some

kind of *synapheia* or moral harmony. In other words, Theodore describes the union as a moral union, rather than one which can be defined in Alexandrian ontological concepts. But to say that the union is a moral one is by no means to minimize Theodore's formula. In fact, for Theodore, such a 'moral' union, described in Biblical terms, was a far closer and more real union than one defined by the manipulation of the limited, more abstract (even in a realist sense) terms of the Alexandrians. If one understands the reasons behind Theodore's formula, it is possible to appreciate how deeply it penetrates into the mystery of the union. Theodore is trying to describe and not to define; his formula appeals to the deepest religious instincts of man and not to the cobwebs spun by man's mind. However, in spite of the fact that Theodore generally avoids ontological terms, he does describe the union in the sense of a union into one *prosôpon* [16]:

'Sacred Books which speak differently of natures while referring (them) to one *prosôpon* on account of the close union that took place between them, so that they might not be believed that they were separating the perfect union between the one who was assumed and the one who assumed. If this union were destroyed the one who was assumed would not be seen more than a mere man like ourselves.'

'So that, when He indwelt (the *homo assumptus*), He united the whole of what He took to Himself, and He fashioned him to be a partaker with Him in all honour. In (this honour) the indwelling Son Himself participates by nature, so as to bring (him) to completion in one *prosôpon* by union with Himself [*hôs suntelein men eis hen prosôpon, kata ge tên pros auton henôsin*], and to share with him all power.'

The first thing to be said about these passages is that Theodore does not seem to be using *prosôpon* in any specialized metaphysical sense. All he means is that both natures and the Christ of the union are real. We have seen that Theodore uses *prosôpon* to refer to the *hupostases* of the Trinity in their outward expression. He uses the word in his *Commentary on Psalms* in a similar fashion. Each psalm is spoken by one *prosôpon*; that is, each psalm is a unity. In this Christological usage, *prosôpon* seems again to refer to outward manifestation. And this is not to deny that the outward manifestation has an integral relationship to the internal reality. That this is so for Theodore is sufficiently proved by his Trinitarian use of the word. But, it is suggested, Theodore uses the word in his Christology simply to mean there is *really* one divine nature, *really* one human nature, and *really* one Jesus Christ, one Lord. *Prosôpon* is

simply a handy label to tack on the union which Theodore has actually tried to describe as an 'indwelling by good pleasure as in Son.' It is interesting to remark that, while every one with any claim at all to orthodoxy posited the reality of the human nature, the divine nature, and the Person of the unity, there is a whole world of difference between the way this is stated by, say, Cyril and Theodore.

Theodore expands his description of the union by using several analogies. Three of these analogies may be cited. First, the indwelling of the Logos in Jesus is like the indwelling of the Temple by God[17]:

'. . . not a temple for a short time only and not one in which God the Word sometimes dwelt and sometimes not, but a temple from which it will never be separated, as it possesses an ineffable union with the one who is dwelling in it.'

This image is obviously taken from the Bible. The Lord dwelt in the Tabernacle of the Temple. God's presence among His people is thus effected. The access to God and the covenanted relationship between God and Israel were thus maintained. The indwelling of the Logos in the Temple of Christ's Body is, therefore, the fulfilment of all that was signified by the Temple of the Hebrews. Theodore's analogy conjures up the entire argument advanced by the author of *Hebrews*. Our Lord Jesus Christ Himself spoke of His body as the Temple. Thus, He confirmed the understanding of His mission as at once the abolition and the fulfilment of the Jewish religion. The image of the Temple is, therefore, hardly original with Theodore, even though his particular Christological use of it may be. The Word's becoming flesh is described in terms of this same image in the *Commentary on John*. The *sarx egeneto* is the tabernacling of God with us.

A second image is that of the union between man and wife[18]:

'Thus, when the Lord says of man and woman: "Wherefore, they are no longer two, but one flesh," we can (by analogy) agree in saying according to the rationale of the union, "They are no longer two persons, but one, though, of course, the natures are kept distinct."'

This image, of course, is Saint Paul's for use in describing the 'mystical union that is betwixt Christ and His Church.' In marriage there is certainly a distinction of personalities, and yet there is also an area in which the two personalities merge to form, not a *tertium*

quid, but a true union of distinguishable personalities. Something of this idea raised to an infinite power is what the analogy as used by Theodore suggests.

A third image calls for more comment. That image is of the union of body and soul [19]:

'Similarly also the Apostle, when he is speaking of our soul and our body in the epistle to the Romans . . . (Romans 7 : 21). But he does not mean the same thing when he says "When I will to do good" and when he says "since evil is present with me." For the contradiction of the terms would certainly not bear this interpretation, no matter how often the pronoun of the first person appears in each. But the former phrase "When I will to do good" is meant of the soul; while the latter "evil is present with me" is meant of the body. And as he speaks of two natures and two diverse things, . . . he places with each clause the pronoun "me" as though he were speaking of one thing. This is because he is speaking of his own person in so far as it is one because of the union which takes place between body and soul. So also our Lord, when He spoke of His humanity and of His divinity, referred the pronoun "I" to the common person. And so that He might show that He was not speaking of one and the same nature in all these instances, He used a variety of words.'

Both the image of marriage and that of the union of body and soul in man are connected with Scripture by direct quotation. But, the body and soul image tends to become a bit hazy. It is far too easy to lapse into anthropological controversy and lose sight of the fact that only a metaphor is intended. Perhaps this is why the body-soul analogy is so rare in Theodore, and yet common enough in Theodoret, for example. In any case, the precise sense in which the body-soul union must be understood for Theodore's purposes is reflected best in the work of Nemesius of Emesa. Nemesius' anthropology bears striking resemblance to Theodore's. This essay has not attempted to cite too many parallels; separate treatment would be required were each parallel explored. However, Nemesius describes the union of body and soul as follows [20]:

'If, therefore, we must rule out union, juxtaposition, or mixture, in what manner can we say that a living creature is a unity? . . . Ammonius, the master of Plotinus, solved the problem thus. He said that it is in the nature of intelligibles both to be capable of union with things adapted to receive them, just as much as if they were things that would perish with them, and to remain, nevertheless, unconfused with them while in union, and imperishable, just as though they were merely juxtaposed.'

Nemesius rules out confusion and disjunction in the union of body and soul. He can do this because the soul is incorporeal and cannot change; therefore, in a perfect union it does not lose its identity as a material substance would. All three of these analogies or metaphors are aimed at describing the 'indwelling by good pleasure as in Son.' The Temple image approaches Theodore's formula from the Godward side, describing it as Jahweh's dwelling amongst His people. The marriage image, which is used by Saint Paul to describe the union between Christ and the Church His Body, tends to approach the formula more from the manward side, and is also a social analogy stressing the two natures that make up the union. The body-soul analogy, on the other hand, stresses the union itself, which is capable of being analysed into two natures. All three images are designed to show that Jesus Christ is perfect man and perfect God in perfect union. And all three images are drawn from the Old and New Testaments.

Before attempting any appraisal of Theodore's Christology as it has been outlined, several problems suggest themselves. To some extent these problems have been seen in the course of the discussion of Nestorius; and certainly they will arise in later consideration of Theodore's theology. But it is necessary to state them now, because it is precisely at these points that Theodore's Christology falters. Beyond stating them, we must endeavour to show that to some extent there can be found an apologetic explanation of them. And, in any case, every theological system must have its weak points; for, after all, human language does have limitations when it is made to deal with any kind of eternal reality. It is only fair to state these weak points; but if some case can be made for overcoming them, then their presence cannot wholly justify a rejection of the entire system. Our 'little systems' are indeed but 'broken lights' of God, and He is 'more than they.' The first question we are left with after dealing with Theodore's Christology as a whole is: what is his view of the *communicatio idiomatum*. According to the Alexandrian 'substantial' or 'physical' union, the *idiomata* of both the human and the divine natures were to be attributed to the one subject, God the Word. This meant that attributes properly human could be attributed to the divine nature. The distinction of predication *kata phusin* and not *kata phusin* was maintained, but it became perfectly proper, for example, to speak of Mary as Theotokos, God-bearer. Theodore, as is obvious from what has been said, refused to accept the *communicatio idiomatum* in this sense. Predication had to be either to the human nature or to the divine nature. However, a certain kind of *communicatio* is acceptable to Theodore, since he

allows predications proper to either nature to be applied to the *prosôpon* of union [21]:

'. . . Sacred Books which speak differently of natures while referring (them) to one *prosôpon* on account of the close union that took place between them, so that they might not be believed that they were separating the perfect union between the one who was assumed and the one who assumed.'

As has been seen, this usage is not meant to be an ontological one; and, therefore, the *communicatio idiomatum* does not mean for Theodore a transfer of the attributes of one nature to the other. Referring all attributes to the *prosôpon* of union is simply a way of preserving the truth of the union while speaking analytically of the two natures. The union itself is a mystery which Biblical language can suggest, but which strictly metaphysical terms such as were employed in Alexandria cannot define. Even though there is no real *communicatio idiomatum* for Theodore so far as a substantial or 'physical' *communicatio* goes, there is a real *communicatio* or *koinônia* of glory, worship, and honour in that the Word glorifies the *homo assumptus* [22]:

'. . . being neither Son nor Lord by nature, . . . received these (attributes) through His (*sic*) close union with the Only Begotten God the Word, and so we hold that there is one Son only; and we understand that the one who is truly Son and Lord is the one who possesses these (attributes) by nature, and we add in our thought the temple in which He dwells and in which He will always and inseparably remain on account of the inseparable union which He (*sic*) has with Him and because of which we believe that He (*sic*) is both Son and Lord.'

The titles 'Son' and 'Lord' which belong to the Logos by nature and to the *homo assumptus* by adoption and grace are really the only categories in terms of which Theodore allows a *communicatio idiomatum*. These titles in turn make for a community of immortality, immutability, and for a unity of the worship man addresses to Jesus Christ. This series of concepts will be discussed at greater length when we come to speak of the *Huiothesia* (Adoption of Sons) and the Two Ages in the next chapter. But something more should be said here of the title 'Lord.' Of course, Theodore's *locus* for the title is Philippians 2, where 'Lord' is the name above every name, to which every knee shall bow. This passage perfectly explains the sense in which Theodore applies 'Lord' to the *homo*

assumptus. Kurios, of course, is the Septuagint translation of YHWH (Yahweh) and is a title of the Logos by nature. It is given to the *homo assumptus* by virtue of his union with the indwelling Logos. In summary, the *communicatio idiomatum* for Theodore is not an ontological conception. The attributes must be predicated of their proper natures, but they may also be predicated of the one Lord and one Christ in so far as He is one *prosôpon* in the union. And the specific titles of Sonship and Lordship, and hence, the qualities or characteristics of immortality, immutability, glory, and of being able to be worshipped are conferred upon the *homo assumptus* by the Word through *koinônia.* Thus, while the denial of the *communicatio idiomatum* does involve Theodore in the necessity of speaking sometimes as though there were two utterly distinct subjects walking about, it is quite clear that there is thought to be a perfect community between the two subjects of predication. The invisible Word and the visible *homo assumptus* is *one* Lord, *one* Son, and is worshipped as one in immortal and immutable glory.

A second problem raised by Theodore's Christology is that of adoptionism. Theodore's Christology, of course, is not explicitly adoptionistic. The fact that it could be so construed must be attributed to the crucial difficulty of the Christology, the double predication of Christ's attributes. The Antiochenes did speak of the coming of the divine Word to indwell the man Jesus, and such language easily lent itself to the charge of adoptionism. And yet, as has been suggested, if Theodore adequately expresses the union of these two subjects, and if the Antiochene notion of the co-operation of divine grace and human freedom be properly understood, at the very least the adoption of the *homo assumptus* by the Word was a very special kind of adoption. It took place at the moment of Jesus' birth or conception, and was a part of God's eternal plan and not something wrought by Jesus' human action alone. And, in point of fact, any Christology which makes the distinction between the divine and human natures (viz., any 'orthodox' Christology) must posit some point where the Logos adopts or unites Himself with a human nature. Even if that point is before the world as we know it began (as in Origen), an adoptionism of sorts must be admitted. Further, in the New Testament itself, we find the adoption of the human nature by God expressed in various ways.[23] In the first chapter of Romans, Jesus, the Son of David, is described as 'appointed' or 'declared' to be the Son of God by the Resurrection. In the Synoptic Gospels this appointment and/or declaration is sometimes fixed at the confession of Peter. In all

the Gospels it is somehow connected with Jesus' baptism. In the Lucan birth narratives and the traditions which lie behind them, it is pushed back to Jesus' birth. In John the divinity is put back to eternal realms, 'in the beginning.' The same is true for portions of the Pauline literature. In all of this, may not a consistent development be evident? And, perhaps, may not a consistently growing apprehension of the truth of Jesus Christ be discerned? But the charge of adoptionism can be brought against any or all of these views, and is just as real an objection to the Alexandrian view as to the Antiochene. Even the *sarx egeneto* can be understood as the adoption of Jesus by the Logos. In any case, the notion of Christ as a man who by good works attained divinity is as foreign to Antioch as to Alexandria.

A third problem which some have thought to be raised by Theodore's Christology is this : when the *homo assumptus* is united to the second Person of the Trinity, does not this destroy the Trinity by introducing a fourth *hupostasis*. In other words, the *prosôpon* of the second Person of the Trinity does not seem to equal for Theodore the *prosôpon* of union of the two natures in Christ. Jesus Christ, once on earth and crucified and now seated at the right hand of the Father, somehow is not identically the same as the Word of God 'by whom all things were made.' The question is what to make of the human nature assumed by the Word in the Incarnation. The problem is there all right; but the Alexandrians do not avoid it by maintaining that all predication belongs to the second Person of the Trinity, except by falling into Apollinarianism. For what becomes of the human nature for them? Surely it either becomes a *quartum quid* in the Trinity just like the *homo assumptus* or else it disappears altogether. The problem is not one peculiar to Theodore; rather it is peculiar to the limitations to which language is subject when speaking of ultimate things and beings. Perhaps the one sure thing is that it is a grave mistake to turn the doctrine of the Trinity into some obscure and peculiar form of religious mathematics.

Theodore's Christology has been presented from a very sympathetic point of view. If it be judged in terms of the Alexandrian concepts, admittedly it fails of its end. But if one can understand the reasons for Theodore's position, and if one can appreciate the force of the Biblical images and concepts he employs, then once so taken, one can certainly term Theodore's Christology a brilliant one. The basic problem of Theodore's Christology—the distinction of the *Verbum assumens* and the *homo assumptus*—is still with us, together with the more specific problems thereby implied. But the

problem is really made necessary by everything in Theodore's thought—his anthropology, his soteriology, the starting point of his Christology, his refutation of the Arians and the Apollinarians. And the difficulty, from this writer's point of view, is nothing more than the one point at which Theodore has failed to tie everything up in a neat package. The Alexandrians had (and have) their basic problem and point of inconsistency, too. That point, for them, has to do with what becomes of Christ's human nature in the union. Neither Christology is an absolute expression or definition of who Christ is; there must always come a moment when Christ can be found and understood only in terms of religious experience. And there is a profound sense in which Christ is not so much an answer and a blueprint of reality as an eternal question and challenge to us.

One final point must be made even though it should probably be fairly evident by now. In all of what has been said in this chapter, the influence of the Scriptures upon Theodore is evident. First, Biblical notions govern, or at least are in accord with, his anthropology. And it is the anthropology which determines Theodore's soteriology and Christology. Second, the very formulation of that Christology draws almost exclusively upon Biblical images—indwelling, 'good pleasure,' Sonship, Lordship. It cannot be stated too strongly that the clearest expression of Theodore's Christological doctrine lies not in terms of abstractions such as *phusis, hupostasis,* and *ousia* (or *prosôpon*), but rather in terms of concepts and images drawn from the Bible. This whole area of Theodore's thought is expressed in terms of the simple, pictorial Semitic images of Sonship, family life, and God's covenanted relationship with His people Israel. The Christology is drawn from exegesis of the two testaments in a way that seems almost to suggest that Theodore deliberately eschewed philosophical formulations in the formal sense. Of course, there is a distillation and interpretive arrangement of the Biblical terms; but this seldom goes very much beyond what is necessary for establishing an harmonious, reasoned way of expressing the truth of God that is in Christ.

CHAPTER 4

REDEMPTION, THE CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

WE must turn from the strictly theological outline of Theodore's thought to the way in which he relates that theology to the individual Christian's life. For this reason, the first part of this chapter will be devoted to Theodore's doctrine of redemption. Considering this doctrine as focusing the rest of the theology, we must then consider the relationship of the whole complex of doctrines to what Theodore envisages as the ideal life within the framework of Church and sacraments. The redemption wrought by Christ is described by Theodore in a number of different ways. The first of these ways was implicit in what was said about man's original condition. It will be remembered that Theodore tends to think of man as originally *nêpios*, as innocent and fallen short of his intended goal, and as needing a redemption which will raise him from lower to higher things. In other words redemption is portrayed as an historical process, a *paideia*. On the other hand, Theodore sometimes retains the more prevalent patristic view that man was originally righteous, and that having fallen from that state, man must be restored to what he was to begin with. Both these views spring from the typological interpretation of Adam, but one sees Christ as a fulfilment of what Adam was, while the other sees Him as the fulfilment of what Adam was only in potentiality. One example of each of these soteriological schemes will suffice. In a passage from his *Commentary on Ephesians* Theodore follows the more usual line and interprets Christ's saving act largely in terms of a restoration[1]:

'(Eph. 1 : 10) . . . "to renew [*anakephalaiôsesthai*] (or rather 'recapitulate') all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth, even in him." "Recapitulation" evidently means the swift recovery of many faculties [*sensuum*]. [Theodore then describes the universal harmony with man as the pledge thereof, the *amicitiae pignus*.] . . . but when we sinned, death entered into the scheme; and, from that entrance, there came about a kind of dissolution of everything. For the soul was separated from the body; and the body sustained a total dissolution [*solutionem plenariam*] when it had been left separate. Therefore, after this the

unifying binding [*copulatio*] of the created order was dissolved. Therefore, "he renewed" (or "recapitulated") everything, both those things in heaven and those things in earth, "in Christ," in the sense that he made a kind of abridged renewal and restoration of the whole created order through him. For by making his body incorruptible and impassible through the resurrection, and by assigning it to the immortality of his soul so that it could no longer be separated from the soul by corruption, He is seen to have established a bond of harmony (*vinculum amicitiae*) for the whole creation.'

This passage has been quoted at some length because it demonstrates an interesting shift from one soteriological view of the recapitulation to another. The first part of the passage speaks as though the universal harmony (*copulatio creaturae*) were in effect from the very beginning. Consequently, Theodore speaks of a 'renewal and restoration of the whole created order.' However, when he comes to speak of Christ's work, Theodore modifies this view. By the end of the passage the predominant tendency of his thought has asserted itself, and he speaks as though the redemption were a perfecting of the imperfect, a *paideia*. Christ is not only the pledge of harmony (*pignus amicitiae*), but is even more the very bond (*vinculum*) by which that harmony has begun to be effected. That is, man is thought of as the keystone of the harmony intended by God in creation; but only in Christ is this keystone actually set in place. This harmony effected by Christ is described not as a reproduction of the primeval harmony, but as the realization of the intention of the Creator. A final modification is brought about when Theodore states that the harmony effected by Christ will, of course, be complete only in the future or Second Age. The above passage was quoted in order to show how Theodore often speaks of redemption as a restoration; it also can be seen as demonstrating his more usual view. One more passage may be cited to give a clearer example of that more usual view[2]:

'This (1 Cor. 11 : 3) is intended to mean that we have access to God by Christ, from whom He (Christ) is, and that we have (union with) Christ because of humanity. For from Him we are brought close to our second existence [*kata tên deuteran huparxin*] in which, rising together with Him and gaining in Him the grace of the Spirit, we shall be immortal [*aphthartoi*]. While we were passible we had Adam as our head, from whom we took our origin; but when we became impassible, we (took and) have Christ as our head, who makes us impassible.'

Here the typology is presented in such a way that a real contrast

between Adam and Christ is pointed out. The 'second existence' marks a perfecting of the first, and not a restoration of it.

A second way in which Theodore describes the Atonement is in terms of a struggle between Christ and the Devil. The struggle seems usually to be described in forensic terms. In the *Catechetical Homilies* on Baptism Theodore interprets the enrolment of the catechumen in terms of a lawsuit to obtain legal title to some possession.[3] The analogy used is that of a man who, during a government census, 'comes to establish his legal title to a land fertile in corn and rich in good things, in which there is much happiness to those who are registered for it.' But another man, the enemy of the first, had also possessed the land; and he also lays claim to it. The case is then presented to a judge[4]:

'In this same way God placed the kingdom of heaven before men, and willed that all of them should be in it in an immortal and immutable state, as is suitable to the dwellers in heaven, and granted to the Church to be the symbol of heavenly things in this world, and we pray and implore Him to draw us nigh through baptism unto that heavenly city, and to make us participate in its life; but it is necessary that a judgment should be given for us against the Tyrant, who is fighting the case against us, that is to say Satan, who is always envious of our deliverance and salvation.'

Theodore then has Satan present his case to the eternal Judge. It is a strong one; but[5]:

'. . . He who is truly our Creator and our Lord, He who created us while we were not, and formed our body of dust with His hands and breathed into it a soul which did not previously exist, was pleased to make manifest a providence consonant with the works which He himself had made. . . . For this He took one of us, and in Him made the beginning of all our good things, and permitted Him to receive the impact of all the trials of the wickedness of Satan. . . . He (Satan) brought forward all his subtle arguments (against Him) and did not cease from inflicting injuries, from beginning to end, and finally, in spite of the fact that he found not a single just cause against Him, brought an unjust death upon Him. . . . God, however, who was listening to all the story, after having heard the things that were said by both sides, condemned the Tyrant . . . and pronounced judgment against him, while He raised Christ our Lord from the dead, and made Him immortal and immutable. . . .'

Theodore moves almost imperceptibly from the analogy of the lawsuit to the catechumen's enrolment, to a description of Christ's

triumphant resurrection in terms of the same lawsuit analogy. The life of the believer is woven into unity with that of Christ. The case of Satan was somehow lost when Christ was raised from the dead; and yet, Satan still presses his case against us. Such a use of the analogy is required because Theodore sees quite clearly that the Atonement was not the act of a *deus ex machina,* but rather an act which marked 'the beginning of all our good things.' This subtle movement of thought is evident whenever Theodore speaks of redemption as mediated from God through Christ to us here and now. It takes into consideration the fact of our living in time and space.

The struggle against Satan is not always described in the way outlined above. Sometimes it is portrayed as the struggle between the lawful king and the Tyrant Satan. Throughout the passages of the *Catechetical Homilies*[6] Satan is fairly consistently referred to as the Tyrant. He it is whose service we Christians must renounce at baptism. And this renunciation is made against the background of Christ's own struggle with Satan[7]:

'Now, however, that the great and wonderful grace, which was manifest through Christ, freed us from the yoke of the Tyrant and delivered us from his servitude, and granted us this wonderful participation in benefits, I (*sic*) have recognized my benefactor. . . . I abjure, therefore, Satan, I flee from communion with him, and engage myself that henceforth I shall not run towards him nor shall I have any intercourse with him, but I shall flee completely from him as from an enemy and an evil doer, who became to us the cause of innumerable calamities, who does not know how to do good, and who strives with all his power to fight us and overcome us.'

Again the two notions of Christ's deliverance and our renunciation are held in balance. The struggle against Satan is the struggle between God and the Tyrant who seeks our service. The last sentence of the passage just quoted reflects a final way in which the struggle is pictured by Theodore. That struggle is a battle or warfare. Christ has won the battle; but, while Satan is defeated, each new Christian must fight his own battle. The two are not unrelated, since our victory is made possible only because Christ's victory is a reality. One final point must be made concerning Theodore's description of redemption in terms of the warfare or lawsuit against Satan. And that is that it appears to be the case that Theodore seldom describes redemption in this fashion save in the *Catechetical Homilies.* The reason is not far to seek. In point

of fact, most of the references made in this essay to the struggle with Satan are from parts of the *Homilies* which Theodore devotes to the baptismal ceremony of renouncing Satan, a ceremony which comes at the end of the exorcisms. This formula of renunciation is[8]:

'"I abjure Satan and all his angels, and all his service, and all his deception, and all his worldly glamour."'

Theodore's exposition is derived from this abjuration, and can be thought of as simply an exegesis of it. The lawsuit aspect of the exegesis undoubtedly comes from Theodore's analogical interpretation of the enrolment of the catechumens. Once again it is evident that Theodore's theology springs not so much from any philosophical presuppositions as from the very texts he is interpreting at the time.

A third interpretation of the Atonement is offered by Theodore in terms of the Adoption of Sons, the *Huiothesia*. The doctrine of the Adoption of Sons appears specifically in five passages in Paul —Romans 8 : 15; Romans 8 : 23; Romans 9 : 4; Galatians 4 : 5; and Ephesians 1 : 5. Theodore's interpretation of the first and last two of these passages is extant. The exegesis of Romans 8 : 15 is worth citing, not only because it may be considered the *locus classicus* for Theodore's use of the *Huiothesia*, but also because the other passages mentioned really make very little contribution to Theodore's idea[9]:

'*For you have not received the spirit of bondage again unto fear.* Instead you have becomes partakers of the spirit, so that you may not go back to servitude and fear as those under the Law. For this is not a real possibility for those who have received the perfect grace of the Spirit. You have received the Spirit which makes you sons of God, whence we make bold to call God Father. For it is evident that, according to the injunction of the Lord—the "Our Father who art in heaven"—those who have been baptized have been made worthy of calling God Father. And the "Abba, Father" is well put, too, since it is appropriate for little children [*nêpiôn*] to call their fathers "abba," and since those who have been made worthy of Sonship are still little children in this world, though they are looking for the perfect and true Sonship of the Age to Come.'

According to this passage, the redemption wrought by Christ has enabled us to call God Father. We are able to do this by virtue of our baptism. Finally, we are God's children in a special sense. We are still little children (*nêpioi*), and must grow into the perfect son-

ship which we hope to attain in the Second Age. Thus, the Adoption of Sons has a direct relationship to our ultimate destiny, and to our life in the Church which is an anticipation and a participation by foretaste of that destiny. Theodore also employs the notion of the Adoption of Sons to describe the saving work of Christ[10]

> '"We are all partakers of His fulness," he says. That is, (we partake of) the grace of the Spirit. . . . He is speaking of His human nature (and saying) that all grace is present in it; but at the same time this reveals the dignity of the nature which is in Him. For through union with God the Word, the Spirit mediating, He became partaker of the true Sonship. We receive our share through His spiritual grace, and through that same grace we are made participants with Him in the adoption of sons, no matter how far we are from possessing His worthiness.'

The distinction between us and Christ in this passage becomes more than simply the distinction that what has been perfected in Christ is yet to be perfected in us. Certainly, the notion of time and of Christ as the cornerstone and first-fruits of our salvation is present in Theodore's thought. But in addition to this distinction, Christ is *the* Son, while we are sons only by virtue of His Sonship. Christ is not only the Son *par excellence*; He is the *principium* or foundation of our sonship. It should be noted that 'Son' for Theodore refers specifically to the *homo assumptus.*[11] The reason for this is dictated by Theodore's notion of the Adoption of Sons. Our salvation consists in being made sons of God. The foundation of that salvation is in Christ. Yet we are unable to participate in the nature of the Word who assumed, simply because we are created and the Word is uncreated. However, we can attain communion with God because of the supreme and ineffable union of the *homo assumptus* with the *Verbum assumens.* This union is that because of which the *homo assumptus* is called 'Son of God.' We participate in this supreme communion with God through the Sonship of the *homo assumptus,* and are thereby made sons of God ourselves. In every respect we are able to share in the Sonship of Jesus. But since that Sonship is unique and the *principium* for ours, it is necessary to state that 'we are far from possessing his worthiness.' For this reason the indwelling is described as *en Huiôi,* 'in Son.' The article is omitted in order to show that the union is a perfect one, and the keystone of the general Adoption of Sons.[12] One final point about Theodore's use of the Adoption of Sons is that he connects it directly with the resurrection[13]:

'. . . and so the apostle calls the Adoption of Sons the resurrection.'

So far as we are concerned, this means that our sonship will be completed only at the general resurrection. Meanwhile, we are still little children (*nêpioi*). With regard to Christ's resurrection, two points must be made. First, the obvious implication is that the Sonship of Christ was not made perfect until the resurrection. This does not mean that before the resurrection Christ was not the Son of God. What it does mean is that the union before the resurrection depended on the grace of God and on the obedience of the *homo assumptus*. Of course, God's grace in choosing this man was constant. But the *homo assumptus* could theoretically have repudiated the indwelling Word at any time prior to the resurrection. That he did not gives meaning to our own moral decisions. The union was maintained perfectly throughout Jesus' life and ministry. Then, at the resurrection the final seal was placed upon the union, and the *homo assumptus* now raised from the dead possesses immortality, immutability, and true Sonship in its perfection. This is all implicit in Theodore's thought. The second implication of connecting the Adoption of Sons with the resurrection of Christ is that His resurrection becomes a guarantee of ours. Just as He is the Son and the *principium* of our sonship, so His resurrection is the *principium* of ours. It is in this sense that Christ is the 'first-fruits of them that slept.'

In what has been said so far of Theodore's soteriology, two problems have been arising with considerable regularity. The first is what to do with time and history in this scheme of redemption which finds Christ having effected redemption and us still in the process of attaining it. The second is related to the first, and involves the question of how to relate Christ in heaven to us here and now. In point of fact, the first problem implies the second. For, once time and history are dealt with by Theodore in his doctrine of the Two Ages, he is left with the problem of relating the Second Age (ushered in by Christ) to the First. Let us turn first to Theodore's doctrine of the Two Ages in order to see how he deals with what we might call the temporal element in salvation. Of course, to call the doctrine Theodore's is somewhat misleading. The notion of two ages is to be found throughout the Old Testament, and is what lies behind a good deal of the Messianic and apocalyptic thought governing the New Testament. One statement of Theodore's formulation of this doctrine will suffice[14]:

'This was indeed God's pleasure—to divide the whole creation

[*creaturam*] into two states [*status*]: the one which is, to be sure, the present one in which He made everything mutable; and the other, moreover, the one which will be, when by renewing everything He will transfer it to immutability. The foundation [*principium*] of these things He shows us in the dispensation of the Lord Christ, whom as taking his existence from among us He raised from the dead and made immutable in body and soul. Through this He demonstrated that this would happen to the entire creation.'

This formulation is so clear it hardly needs any elaboration. It sums up and puts into order a number of the ideas which have been suggested elsewhere in Theodore's soteriology. God's plan for the whole of creation is to be worked out in two stages. The First Age is (a) mutable and (b) present. It is mutable because of the necessity of allowing man free choice.[15] The Second Age is (a) immutable and (b) future. Yet an immediate qualification must be made of the assertion that the Second Age is future, for Christ has ushered in the Second Age. Theodore solves this problem by describing Christ as the *principium* of the Second Age, and again the resurrection is thought of as the *locus* for that *principium*. Thus, we are given a consistent pattern. Time is moving on from the First Age to the Second Age, from mutability to immutability. The end of the process has been revealed to us in Christ, and we live in the light of that revelation and hope. Theoretically speaking, the doctrine of the Two Ages gives adequate expression to Theodore's realization that time must be taken into consideration. Two minor points should be made concerning this doctrine. First, the Second Age is thought of in more or less Platonic terms. In spite of his rejection of much of the Platonic anthropology, Theodore is still unable to think of the soul's salvation as being described by anything but 'immortality' and 'immutability.' This is not to say that these Platonic notions undermine any of Theodore's religious ideas. Rather, it is to say that Theodore was simply a man of his own age, and thought in terms of an Hellenistic view of things. The second point to be made is really an impression of this writer's rather than a point capable of proof. And that is that the commentaries of Theodore on the Pauline epistles seem again and again to turn to the doctrine of the Two Ages in order to expound the text. In other words, the doctrine of the Two Ages finds its most consistent expression in Theodore's comments on the texts from which the doctrine is taken in the first place. The principle involved in this point will be of some interest when we come to consider the *Commentary on John*.

If the doctrine of the Two Ages solves, at least theoretically, the

problem of what to do with time in speaking of salvation, Theodore is still left with the question of how we in this First Age are related to Christ in the Second Age. To some extent the answer to this problem as given by Theodore has been anticipated by referring to Christ as the *principium* of the Second Age. However, the idea must be elaborated upon somewhat, inasmuch as it seems to be what lies at the heart of much of what Theodore says about the meaning of 'sacrament.' A passage in the *Catechetical Homilies* is quite helpful in determining what Theodore means by calling Christ the *principium* of our salvation [16]:

'The things that the ancients held as figures and shadows came now into reality when our Lord Jesus Christ, who was assumed from us and for us died according to the human law, and through His resurrection became immortal, incorruptible and for ever immutable, and as such ascended into heaven, as by His union with our nature He became to us an earnest of our own participation in the event. . . . As we have a firm belief that things that have already happened will happen to us, so (the things that happened at the resurrection of our Lord) we believe that they will happen to us.'

In this passage Theodore moves from the types of the Old Testament to their fulfilment in Christ. He then portrays Christ as the 'earnest of our own participation in the event.' The word 'earnest' probably represents *arrabôn* or *pignus*. Just as man was the earnest or pledge (*pignus*) for the universal harmony of the created order, so Christ is the *pignus* for the general resurrection and for man's salvation. And just as that same universal harmony was not really possible until Christ became the *vinculum amicitiae,* the *bond* of harmony, so our salvation is not possible in any completed sense until this First Age is over. This character of Christ as the pledge or earnest of our salvation is expressed in a slightly different way as follows [17]:

'And He [Christ; or more properly, the *homo assumptus*. The capitalization in the translation is somewhat erratic] became for ever immune from death, and immortal and incorruptible by nature. And as such He (*sic*) ascended into heaven and became for ever beyond the reach of the harm and injury of Satan . . . and . . . dwelt in heaven and possessed a close union with the Divine nature. From the fact that the man who was assumed from us had such a confidence (with God), He (*sic*) became a messenger on behalf of all the (human) race so that the rest of mankind might participate with Him in His (*sic*) great change, . . .'

Christ is not only a sure pledge of our future; but He is, as it were, a messenger from the end of time, who comes with the good tidings of man's destiny of salvation. That good tidings enables us here and now to be participants by faith and hope in the good things which we hope to possess in perfect reality in the Second Age. The nature of this participation is, of course, difficult to describe. It is expressed in the Christian life in terms of participation in the sacramental life of the Church and in terms of the obedience of the good life[18]:

'. . . the future age or the life which is after this will furnish us also that which we were by no means capable of attaining by ourselves, . . . Therefore, because Christ came, pointing out and directing through His resurrection those things which are future, He offers indeed to us, too, the promise of these things. All of us who in this present life believe in Christ are, so to speak, in the middle of this present life and of the future one, . . .'

'. . . who by grace (he says) gave us that eternal consolation (that is, the hope of future good things), He also in this life may prosper it in your heart, confirming you that you may both speak and do everything that is good.'

Christ is our pledge, our messenger of salvation. We participate in the Second Age of which He is the first-fruits, by anticipation in faith and hope. And that participation somehow transforms our present life.

Before turning to Theodore's statement of the Christian life in terms of this soteriology, some sort of summary will prove helpful. We have seen that Theodore describes redemption as Christ's recapitulation of Adam, as Christ's victory over Satan, as the Adoption of Sons, and in terms of the Two Ages with Christ as the *principium* or earnest of our salvation. The last two of these categories solve in a theoretical way the problem of how to speak of eternal salvation and still consider history and time, and of how to relate Christ to us. The last part of this chapter will be devoted to those same problems; only from now on we shall see how Theodore solves them not so much in the abstract as in terms of the Christian life. However, one final point must needs be made. And that concerns the source for Theodore's doctrine of redemption. That source is almost always Scripture. The Adoption of Sons, the Two Ages, Christ as the 'earnest,' and even the Adam typology are all taken directly from either the Old Testament or the New or both. Even the warfare against Satan can be seen to accord with many aspects of Judæo-Christian apocalyptic literature. It has been the

contention of this essay, however, that the notion of redemption as victory over Satan springs largely from Theodore's use of the baptismal formula of abjuration. In all of Theodore's language about redemption, his dependence upon Scripture and Scriptural images is quite apparent. There is, to be sure, some systematization of those images and there is a certain transformation at some points of the ideas into the Hellenistic terms that were a part of Theodore's view of things. But, all in all, the soteriology we have been discussing is thoroughly Biblical in its phrasing and its significance.

We must now turn to Theodore's doctrine of the Church. That doctrine follows directly from what has been said so far[19]:

'*and He is Himself the Head of the Body the Church.* That is: the One in whom all things were created is accounted by the Church as her Head in common, because she was made His Body through spiritual regeneration. The Church has the form [*formam*] of the future resurrection, following which we were baptized in expectation of fellowship with Him and of becoming participators in His immortality by completing, so to speak, the particular form of these things. He shows them to us because He is their principal [*princeps*].'

In other words, the Church is simply the means whereby we are made partakers of the benefits of the Second Age. The Church holds the *form* of the future resurrection. That is to say, the Church is the *type* of the future. This inverted typology is characteristic of Theodore's sacramental view. It has already been seen that Theodore regards the events of Christ's life and the whole complex of doctrine and discipline which mediates those events to us as the fulfilment of the Old Testament types.[20] But Theodore makes very little use of typology in this sense. In fact this is so true that Daniélou can say[21]:

'. . . his (Theodore's) whole sacramental symbolism is founded on the parallel between the visible and the invisible liturgies. We are here in line with the symbolism of the *Epistle to the Hebrews.* We can certainly speak of typology, but we must make it clear that Theodore's is concerned more with the relation of things visible to the invisible than with the relation of things past to things to come, which is the true bearing of the word.'

Daniélou attributes this lack of the usual typology to the 'sacramental platonism of Theodore' which is in turn the product of 'the literal quality of his exegesis.' It is indisputable that the scarcity of typology is due to Theodore's method of exegesis. But, in the opinion

of this writer, Daniélou fails to understand completely what Theodore is doing. Theodore's typology in the *Catechetical Homilies* is in terms of the First Age as the type of the Second. That is, the Church and the sacraments are typological participations in the fulfilment that will be ours in the Second Age. There is some truth in speaking of this as 'the relation of things visible to the invisible,' but at the same time Theodore's inverted typology must be seen against the background of the Two Ages. For this reason, 'sacramental platonism' is not really a very good description of Theodore's thought. Let us turn now to one example of Theodore's inverted typology as it applies to the Church [22]:

'Christ our Lord established a kingdom in heaven, and established it there as a city in which He has His kingdom, which the blessed Paul calls "Jerusalem which is above, free and mother of us all," since it is in it that we are expecting to dwell and abide. That city is full of innumerable companies of angels and men who are all immortal and immutable. Indeed the blessed Paul said: "You are come unto Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, and to the Church of the firstborn, which are written in heaven." . . . These things will be seen so in reality in the world to come. . . . Those who draw nigh unto Him in this world He wished them to be, through religion and faith, as in the symbol of the heavenly things, and He so constituted the Church as to be a symbol of the heavenly things; and He wished that those who believe in Him should live in it.'

Behind this passage lies the typology which sees the heavenly Jerusalem as the fulfilment of the earthly city. Theodore follows the same line of thinking as in discussing our salvation. He starts with the fulfilment in Christ, and then applies that fulfilment to us by means of an inverted typology. Thus, we are typologically what Christ is already. And, thus, the Church is the type of the heavenly Jerusalem, which in turn is the fulfilment or antitype of the earthly Jerusalem. We are drawn along from the Old Testament to the fulfilment of God's promises in Christ, and then to the completion through time and space of what in Christ is already completed. In other words, we proceed from the Old Testament to the New Testament and then to the Church. This movement of Theodore's thought is a bit confusing, but it represents a very penetrating incorporation of time and history into the very ground of his thought. It is because Theodore's language seems to indicate this that Daniélou's position appears to be somewhat misleading to this writer.

If Theodore envisages the Church as the type of the future heavenly kingdom, he also portrays her ministers as types of the heavenly ministry [23]:

'This name (deacons), however, is especially applied to those who perform this ministry, and represent a likeness of the service of the spiritual messengers and ministers.'

Again, it is not so much a question of the relationship of visible to invisible, as of the relationship of the present order to the future. The ministers of the Church, further, are considered by Theodore to be simply a special part of the corporate Church [24]:

'Indeed all of us are one body of Christ our Lord and all of us are members one of another, and the priest only fills the role of a member that is higher than the other members of the body, such as the eye or the tongue. Lo, like the eye he sees the work of every one, and with the diligence pertaining to a priest he also leads and directs every one according to the rule of priesthood, to that which is necessary; and like the tongue he offers the prayers of every one; . . .'

The priest is also required to be 'healthy in his office, so that after making manifest the health of good works and priesthood, which are required of him, he may be seen to be worthy of the honour that he possesses.' [24]

As is evident, the Church itself for Theodore is a sort of sacramental entity. But we must consider for a moment the view Theodore takes of 'sacrament' in order to demonstrate that this is so. Perhaps the clearest definition Theodore gives is the following [25]:

'Every sacrament consists in the representation of unseen and unspeakable things through signs and emblems. Such things require explanation and interpretation, for the sake of the person who draws nigh unto the sacrament, so that he might know its power. If it only consisted of the (visible) elements themselves, words would have been useless, as sight itself would have been able to show us one by one all the happenings that take place, but since a sacrament contains the signs of things that take place or have already taken place, words are needed to explain the power of signs and mysteries.'

The sacrament, therefore, consists of visible elements which make present 'unseen and unspeakable things.' However, we must beware

of limiting Theodore's meaning to the more or less Platonic relation of visible to invisible. The sacrament makes present 'things that take place or have already taken place.' If this phrase is understood against the background of the Two Ages doctrine, Theodore's meaning becomes clear. The invisible is more often than not thought of in terms of the age to come. Of course, Theodore cannot avoid a certain amount of confusion between the invisible *per se* and the invisible understood as the future age. But is not this rather the fault of human language and of the fact that the Second Age is eternal, rather than of any failure to take time and history seriously? The following passage will show how Theodore tends to set his definition of sacrament in the context of the Two Ages [26] :

'We wait here in faith until we ascend into heaven and set out on our journey to our Lord, where we shall not see through a glass and in a riddle but shall look face to face. These things, however, we expect to receive in reality through the resurrection at the time decreed by God, and now it is only by faith that we draw nigh unto the firstfruits of these good things : to Christ our Lord and the high priest of things that belong to us. We are ordered to perform in this world the symbols and signs of the future things so that, through the service of the Sacrament, we may be like men who enjoy symbolically the happiness of the heavenly benefits, and thus acquire a sense of possession and a strong hope of the things for which we look.'

It should be clear that this 'symbolic enjoyment' of the future involves a real participation in that future. The 'symbol' makes present the future, and participates in its reality. Just as the Church is the sacramental symbol of our future state in heaven, so the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist are sacramental types of our new birth into that state, and of the nourishment we shall receive after that birth.

Theodore summarizes the meaning of baptism as follows [27] :

'In this same way the sentence : "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit" reveals the giver of the benefits of baptism, which are : second birth, renewal, immortality, incorruptibility, impassibility, immutability, deliverance from death and servitude and all evils, happiness of freedom, and participation in the ineffable good things which we are expecting.'

These benefits are, of course, realized only in the Second Age ; for the second birth in reality is the resurrection. The last phrase of the passage summarizes the present benefits as participation in the future good things—immortality, immutability, etc.[28] :

'You should now proceed towards baptism in which the symbols of this second birth are performed, because you will in reality receive the true second birth only after you have risen from the dead. . . .'

Baptism is sacramentally and symbolically the second birth of the resurrection. The symbol is described in another way. The waters of baptism are described as the waters of 'a reverential womb for the second birth.'[29] Even though Theodore usually speaks of baptism as this second birth and as the type of the resurrection, he also uses other images to describe it. Just as Christ is the second Adam, who recapitulates Adam, so the individual baptized Christian is, in a sense, the antitype of Adam.[30] The baptized person is, as it were, cast in a furnace to be remade and refashioned according to God's saving purpose.[31] Or, just as the potter refashions his imperfect pots in water, so the Christian is remade in the waters of baptism.[32] In an image implied by the notion of second birth as resurrection, Theodore describes baptism in terms of the death and resurrection of Christ.[33] A group of images comes to Theodore's thought when he is speaking of the *sphragis* of baptism. Baptism seals the believers in the same way that lambs of a flock are branded, and in the same way that a soldier enlisted for military service is stamped on his hand.[34] In all of these images there is the idea that baptism represents sacramentally the new birth or state that Christians hope to have in the Second Age. One problem that our baptism raises involves its relationship to Christ's own baptism. Theodore interprets Christ's baptism almost as an institution of ours[35]:

'(The baptism of our Lord) was in fact symbolically drawn to the pattern of ours. In it the Father cried and said: "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." In this He showed the grace of the adoption of children for which baptism takes place, and the sentence "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased" is as if one were saying: "this is truly adoption of children; this is the beloved who pleased me; this is the Son who received such an adoption of children as this. . . ."'

Christ's baptism is thus made the prototype of ours; in it Christ shows us the sacramental means whereby we are made to participate in the Adoption of Sons. It is interesting to note how Theodore's ideas flow into one another. The artificial categorization necessary for the purpose of this essay does not adequately convey the great harmony of Theodore's theology.

The Eucharist is intimately connected with Baptism, in the same

way that nourishment is necessary for the new-born child. Theodore interprets the use of water to make bread and to mix with the wine of the Eucharist in this way.[36] Thus the Eucharist is primarily a type of the heavenly nourishment we shall receive after our new birth[37]:

'When we shall have received the true birth through the resurrection, you will receive another food that cannot be described with words, and you will then be clearly fed by the grace of the Spirit whereby you will remain immortal in your bodies and immutable in your souls. It is a food such as this that is suitable to that birth. . . . And because we are born now symbolically through baptism, in the hope of that other birth which we are expecting, we receive at present, in form of an earnest, the firstfruits of the grace of the Holy Spirit, which will then be given to us, as we expect to receive it fully in the next world through the resurrection. It is only after its reception that we hope to become immortal and immutable, and it behoves us now to eat symbolically, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, a food suitable to the present life.'

From this description of the Eucharist, there follows first of all a connection between what we do in the sacrament and the eternal life which is to come. And this connection is one which enables us to have a real participation in the future. For in the sacrament 'is found the happiness of the eternal life.'[38] This phrase is reminiscent of another passage in which Theodore describes the reception of the eucharistic bread as something 'to be sown for its eaters to the happiness of immortality.'[39] Just as a seed is sown in the ground and reaches perfection only after a process of growth, so the future age is sown in us by our participation in the sacraments. But the fulfilment of that sowing is reserved for the future. The Eucharist is not only a type of the future immortality, it is also the means whereby we 'draw nigh unto Christ our Lord risen from the dead.'[40] The Liturgy itself is a symbolic representation, an *anamnesis* of the resurrection of our Lord. This is the chief way in which the Eucharist is connected in Theodore's mind to our Lord's life, death, and resurrection. However, the Eucharist also represents our Lord's Passion. The Last Supper, and the words of institution recited on that occasion, are taken by Theodore to refer specifically to Good Friday.[41] Thus the Eucharist is not so much a 'memorial' of the Last Supper as of the events of the Passion[42]

'Indeed He (our Lord) gave us the bread and the cup because it is with food and drink that we maintain ourselves in this world, and He called the bread "body" and the cup "blood," because, as

it was His Passion that affected His body which it tormented and from which it caused blood to flow, He wished to reveal, by means of these two objects through which His Passion was accomplished, and also in which we expect to participate when we perform this Sacrament from which we believe to derive a strong hope for the future benefits.'

Just as the consecration is specifically the symbol of the resurrection, so the Offertory is the symbol of Christ's offering of Himself upon Calvary.[43] So far Theodore's doctrine of the Eucharist presents a fairly consistent pattern, and is typical of the patristic teaching on the subject. There is one problem to be found in what he says, however. There are a number of passages in which he speaks in a quite literal way of the transformation of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. Before attempting to find a reason for this, let us compare two passages. The first of them will represent this rather literal view of the consecration; the second will be seen to fit a little better into the total picture of Theodore's view of what sacrament means[44]:

'When the priest, therefore, declares them to be the body and blood of Christ, he clearly reveals that they have so become by the descent of the Holy Spirit, through whom they have also become immortal, inasmuch as the body of our Lord, after it was anointed and had received the Spirit, was clearly seen so to become. In this same way, after the Holy Spirit has come here also, we believe that the elements of bread and wine have received a kind of an anointing from the grace that comes upon them, and we hold them to be henceforth immortal, incorruptible, impassible, and immutable by nature, as the body of our Lord was after the resurrection.'

'When the priest gives it (the bread) he says: "The body of Christ." He teaches you by this word not to look at that which is visible, but to picture in your mind the nature of this oblation, which, by the coming of the Holy Spirit, is the body of Christ.'

To a certain extent the second of these passages qualifies the first. In the opinion of this writer, Theodore never wishes to undermine his notion of what a sacrament is, viz., the type of the future reality. But at the same time, he speaks in a way which certainly suggests that the elements are somehow transformed into the Body and Blood of Christ. Again, such a way of speaking, at first sight, seems hardly to accord either with his notion of sacrament or with his Christology, where he utterly rejects any notion that God was transformed into man. It would seem that if the notion of transformation or metamorphosis be abhorrent to Theodore in his Christology,

it would also be so in his doctrine of the Eucharist. However, despite the very real dichotomy this language introduces into Theodore's Eucharistic doctrine, several reasons may be adduced to help explain why he can talk this way. The first of these reasons is that Theodore's theology is undoubtedly greatly influenced by the Liturgy he is expounding. And it is a reasonable assumption that the Liturgy used in Antioch and Mopsuestia contained some form of the epiclesis. The epiclesis, of course, is simply the prayer which asks God to send His (Word and) Holy Spirit upon the bread and wine that they may become to us the Body and Blood of Christ. This form in one way or another was and is universal in the East. The language of the first passage quoted above certainly reflects the epiclesis. In another passage this influence is even more unmistakable [45]:

'If, therefore, the nature of the vivifying Spirit made the body of our Lord into what its nature did not possess before, we ought, we also, who have received the grace of the Holy Spirit through the symbols of the Sacrament, not to regard the elements merely as bread and cup, but as *the body and the blood of Christ, into which they were so transformed by the descent of the Holy Spirit, by whom they become to the partakers of them* that which we believe to happen to the faithful through the body and blood of our Lord.'

The underlined words seem to represent the epiclesis as Theodore knew it. Reference to the operation of the Word upon the elements is missing; but otherwise, all the components of the traditional epiclesis, as now used in the Eastern Churches, are present. And yet, even with this phrase, Theodore attempts to set his Eucharistic doctrine in the framework of time and history by adding 'that which we believe to happen to the faithful.' In the light of what has been said, this phrase would seem to refer to the fruition of the seed planted by the bread and wine of the Eucharist, in other words to the Christian's new birth into the Second Age.

The most important of the reasons for Theodore's way of speaking of the Holy Spirit's transforming the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ is certainly the influence of the epiclesis. However, two other reasons may also be adduced. First, Theodore's own conception of sacrament involves the notion that the elements of the sacrament participate in the reality of which they are the type. Thus, the bread and wine do partake of the reality of the Body and Blood. This truth of religious experience is a difficult one to express in terms of a consistent philosophical system; but language is subject to such difficulty. Second, the very fact that the

Eucharist is a mystery means that the representation of Christ's Body and Blood is ultimately ineffable. It is clear that Theodore holds no magical view of the Eucharist. But at the same time, it is easy enough to realize that he must use language which will convey the notion that there is a reality present in the Eucharistic elements. These reasons do not explain away Theodore's language about the Eucharist, but they do serve to make that language understandable in terms of the whole of his thought.

In conclusion, we may summarize the Christian life as Theodore envisaged it. The redemption wrought by Christ is mediated to Christians through the Church and the sacraments. By these means Christians everywhere participate in the good things of the future age. This participation is in a mode conforming to our present state, but it is nevertheless a real participation in the sense that some mystic foretaste of salvation and immortality is vouchsafed to the believer. This participation is evidenced also by the community of which the Christian is a part; the *koinônia* of the Spirit is a reality, even though a reflection of the future perfection. In speaking of the Christian life in terms of participation in the sacramental life and in the Christian fellowship, Theodore never for a moment loses sight of the importance of morality and the good life. Just as a considerable portion of his Christology is governed by this notion, so the Christian life is pictured as one of freedom and grace. Theodore's discussion of the Lord's Prayer reflects this interest quite well[46]:

'He made use of these short words (the Lord's Prayer) as if to say that prayer does not consist so much in words as in good works, love and zeal for duty. Indeed, any one who is inclined to good works, all his life must needs be in prayer, which is seen in his choice of these good works.'

The life of prayer is intimately a part of the good life; and the two cannot exist apart from each other. Theodore's whole interpretation of the Lord's Prayer is a splendid summary both of his doctrine of redemption, and his conception of this Christian life.[47] 'Our Father' is a demonstration of the Adoption of Sons. 'Who art in heaven' explains to us that our present life is simply the type of the Second Age when we shall be with God. 'Hallowed be thy name' refers to the Christian's moral character through which he must seek to conform his present conduct to the age to come by means of good works and obedience to the divine will. That is, the hallowing of God's name comes through the example of the good Christian shining as a light in this wicked world. 'Thy kingdom

come' prays for the conforming of this age to the next, something which will happen only when 'thy will' shall 'be done as in heaven so in earth.' 'Give us to-day our necessary bread' prays that we may be sustained in this present life, so that we may arrive at the redemption promised us in Christ. 'And forgive us our debts' prays that our past conduct may be forgiven, and that we may be drawn into a kind of conduct becoming to the redeemed. 'As we have forgiven our debtors' shows that we cannot expect God's forgiveness, unless we are willing to show forgiveness ourselves. Our Lord Himself was the perfect embodiment of what this prayer shows us our lives should be like. Before closing, it is necessary to state that Theodore's concept of the Christian life is strongly rooted in the example of Christ. He is our model, and He it is who has provided for us the means whereby we may attain to the perfection of that example. Those means are the result of the redemption wrought by Him; and in terms of the life of the Church, they were instituted by Christ Himself at His baptism and at the Last Supper. And if Theodore's teaching is rooted in Christ Himself, it is also rooted in the tradition about Christ as found in the Church and in Scripture. Once more, Scripture is seen to exert a profound, formative influence in all of Theodore's thought.

CHAPTER 5

THEODORE'S EXEGETICAL METHOD

OUR concern has been to show that Theodore's theology is drawn largely from Scripture. Therefore, the first four chapters have attempted some systematization of Theodore's thought with specific reference to the Biblical ideas with which it has particularly to do. It is now necessary to turn to the method with which Theodore approaches the Bible itself. Of course, it is perfectly true that all Christian theology is based upon Scripture. That is in part why there was such a strong antipathy at Nicæa to the use of the non-Scriptural word *homoousios*. And yet, as we have examined Theodore's writings, the Bishop of Mopsuestia somehow seems more strongly grounded in the Bible than were his contemporaries. That this is so must be the result of the particular method Theodore used in reading and interpreting the Bible. First, the general sorts of exegesis employed in the early Christian centuries will be briefly examined. Then, it will be possible to discuss in some detail Theodore's own idea of interpreting Scripture.

In considering Christian exegesis, it is necessary to realize that in great measure that exegesis was determined by Jewish ideas on the subject. That this is so is a necessary result of the fact that the first Scriptures used by the early Christians were the Law, the Prophets, and the Writings of the Old Testament. Jewish interpretation of this body of material may be considered under two headings. First, the Palestinian Jews interpreted the Hebrew Scriptures largely in terms of the Law. Second, the Alexandrian Jews were more directly influenced by such Hellenistic phenomena as Stoic allegorization of Homer. We may discuss the more strictly Jewish tradition first. By the early centuries of the Christian era a large body of interpretative material had grown up around what we call the Old Testament. This consisted for the most part of the Talmud and the Targums. The Talmud is composed of the Mishna (a collection of Jewish oral laws derived from the Torah) and the Gemara (a commentary on the Mishna). It exists in two fairly separate redactions —the Jerusalem and the Babylonian Talmuds. The Midrashim are commentaries upon Scripture; but the word Midrash may be taken more properly to refer to the method of exegesis used in the Talmud itself. The Midrashic method was designed to discover a meaning

deeper than the literal signification of a text. This method resulted in Halakha and Haggada. A Halakha (YLCH, walk) is essentially a legal decision, or the extension of the Law to a more particular case. The Mishna is made up largely of Halakhoth. A Haggada (NGD, tell) is more a legend, a piece of folklore, or even a bit of astrology or magic. This system of exegesis is expressed more fully by the mnemonic word *PaRDeS*. The *P*eshat is simply the literal sense of a text. The *R*emez is the latent meaning, usually to be expressed in Halakhoth. The *D*arush is the homiletical or allegorical meaning, and is embodied in the Haggadoth. The *S*ôd is the mystic or qabbalistic meaning. This last part of the *PaRDeS* method finds its fullest expression in the theosophical speculations of medieval Judaism. But its beginnings are to be found in the early Christian era, where it may well be related to some one of the protean forms of gnosticism. Certain of the qabbalistic methods are known to us not only from Judaism, but also from Christian literature and tradition. Gematria was the science of numerology; the mark of the beast (666) in Revelation is an example of Gematria. Notarikon was defined as the use of one word to spell out a full phrase. The Christian use of *ichthus* to represent *I*êsous *Ch*ristos *Th*eou *Hu*ios *S*ôter is a case in point. Finally, Temoorah was defined as the cryptic alteration of a word. Thus, in Athbash the first letter of the alphabet is represented by the last, etc. Armageddon in Revelation may be an example of Temoorah for Harmagedol or Roma Hagedol, Rome the Great.

The Midrashic method employed particularly in the Talmud could lead to wild speculations which had little to do with the text of Scripture. This is evident from the Qabbala discussed above. As a result rabbinic rules were drawn up defining the way in which legitimate Halakhoth could be taken from the Law. Hillel's seven rules are an excellent example of this attempt to reduce the logic of interpretation to a canon of rules. These seven rules justify argument from 'light' to 'heavy' (*a fortiori*), from special to general, from general to specific, and from self-evident inferences. They also state that one passage may be interpreted by another; and this juxtaposition of texts may be done in a number of different ways. Hillel's rules, and the method employed by the more strict of the Jews, involved for the most part the comparison of texts for interpretation. The assumption was that the Scriptures were uniformly inspired, and that by comparing the different passages one could arrive at the meaning implied by all passages. Even though the end product of this system (the rabbinic writings) is certainly different from the results of modern criticism, this comparison of texts is at

the heart of much modern Biblical criticism. In point of fact, the method is one systematized, to be sure, by the rabbis, but none-theless, one suggested by the very logic of the human mind, and supported by any view of the unity of Holy Scripture.

The method employed in the Targums is somewhat different from the strictly Midrashic system described above. The Targums are simply Aramaic translations and/or paraphrases of the Old Testament. They are greatly influenced by the Midrashic system, but they remain primarily fairly literal interpretations of the Scripture. This statement is qualified only by saying that the Targums aimed at giving the meaning of Scripture; and as such, difficult passages lent themselves to fairly free paraphrase. Departure from the text was made whenever God was described anthropomorphically. Thus, God was made so transcendent that He could not even be described in any human terms. For example, when God is described as having arms, eyes, or face, the Targums substitute for these words: Might, Presence, Memra or Word. The theological position of the Targumist was read into the text of Scripture. While usually the implicit (or an implicit) meaning of the text is drawn out, sometimes the Targumist's method involves going so far as to reverse what the text actually says. Thus, the Targums represent a method which does not so much compare texts as alter them whenever a contemporary theological opinion demands it. In a sense, it is from such an approach to Scripture as this that the allegorical method of Philo must have developed.

Before turning to Alexandria, something must be said of a third Jewish method of exegesis. That method is reflected in the *Habakkuk Commentary* found among the Dead Sea Scrolls. In that document the text of Habakkuk is referred to what must represent the contemporary or near-contemporary history of the Dead Sea community. For example, the interpretation of Habakkuk 2: 5–6 is as follows[1]:

'*Shall not they all take up a parable against him and heap on him jesting satire and say*: "*Woe unto him who amasses what is not his! How long shall it last! He is merely heaping pledges* (*which must some day be returned*)." This refers to the wicked priest who, when first he came to office, enjoyed a reputation for truth, but who, when he came to rule in Israel, grew arrogant and abandoned God, betraying His statutes for the sake of wealth, plundering and amassing for himself the kind of wealth usually acquired by criminals who have rebelled against God. He also took public property, thereby merely heaping upon himself the penalty of guilt. Furthermore, he practised abomination, involving every kind of impurity and filth.'

It is also interesting to note that the text 'the just shall live by faith' is interpreted to mean that all who keep the Torah and put their faith in the one who expounded the Law aright will be delivered by God from the house of judgment. In any case, the *Habakkuk Commentary* represents the attempt to see the text of the Old Testament fulfilled in contemporary events. It is this same kind of attempt which lies behind seeing Christ as the fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecy or as the antitype of the Old Testament types.

In Alexandria a quite different method of exegesis had grown up, a method undoubtedly influenced by Hellenistic allegory. Philo is the best representative of this allegorical school. He attempted to see in the Hebrew Scriptures the Platonic philosophy he held on other grounds. His method, if he can be said to have held any really consistent one, may be described negatively and positively.[2] Negatively, Philo excluded the literal sense when there occurred a statement unworthy of God, when there was contradiction of the text elsewhere in Scripture, and when the Scripture was itself allegorical. Positively, Philo resorted to allegory when expressions were doubled, when superfluous words were used, when there occurred repetition of facts already known, or when any unusual or redundant expression occurred. From this list it can be seen how fertile a field was offered Philo by the Jewish Scriptures. In many respects Philo's method resembles the Palestinian, Midrashic method examined above. And yet, it is fair to say that Philo was not so much interested in comparing texts as in going beyond the literal meaning of whatever text confronted him. At this point, the Targumists offer a closer parallel to Philo. But even here, the parallel is a limited one; for Philo really had no interest in the Scriptures as records of Jewish history or experience. He was simply interested in using them as a springboard for the Platonic, moralistic philosophy he believed[3]:

'Philo's use of allegory, then, marks him and the tradition in which he stands as taking an attitude to the Old Testament Scriptures in several important points quite distinct from that of Palestinian Judaism. Philo used allegory not only to emancipate himself from the literal meaning of the text, but also from its relation to history, and also to some extent from the obligation to observe the Jewish Torah in full. We know of almost no direct successors to Philo; with him, as far as we know, the line of Alexandrian Jewish thought ended. Pharisaic Judaism took over the direction of Jewish thought after the fall of Jerusalem, and in its schools a speculative, Hellenistic Judaism was impossible. The heirs of Philo's system—in

its own way a noble and admirable system—were the theologians of the Christian Church.'

The early Church inherited the Old Testament, together with much of the tradition of interpretation associated with it. Our Lord Himself used the Old Testament, both in a typical rabbinic fashion [4] and in terms of prophecy and fulfilment.[5] One has only to examine the New Testament quotations of the Old Testament to realize that the Hebrew Scriptures were the first Scriptures of the Christian Church. As the New Testament canon developed the Church was faced with the problem not only of what to do with the Old Testament, but also of how it should be related to the new body of sacred Scripture which was growing up in the Church. R. M. Grant gives a penetrating analysis of how the Church handled these problems [6]:

'The Church was entering a conflict not over the historical reliability of the gospels but over the inspiration and interpretation of the Old Testament and what came to be regarded as the New.

'This conflict was really a series of conflicts. First came the question of the place of the Old Testament, a question raised most forcefully by Marcion, who argued that the Old Testament had to be rejected since it contradicts the true gospel of Jesus and of Paul. When the Church sought refuge in its traditional allegorical method, it encountered the second question, posed especially by the Valentinians. These gnostics insisted that the gospel too should be taken allegorically, and that it really corresponded to their own theories of the æons and of human nature. The Church then relied on its interpretation of the Old Testament as predictive rather than philosophical allegory, only to meet the third question, that of the Montanists. If the Old Testament was prophecy, so was the New.'

The answer of the Church was in terms of positing equal inspiration of the Old and New Testaments, and in appealing to the tradition of the Church (and no secret *gnosis*) as the guide to exegesis. Thus, for Irenæus, Scripture is the basis of Christian doctrine, but Scripture as interpreted by the apostolic tradition.[7] Jerome, while employing allegory to some extent, is very much in this sober tradition [8]:

'And when such men charm the public ear with their splendid rhetoric, they suppose each and every syllable they utter to be a solemn legislative act of God, and consider it quite beneath their dignity to stoop and notice what the Prophets and Apostles, whose sentences they expound, might have meant. Adapting instead, incongruous, conflicting passages to suit their own private meaning,

they indulge in the finest kind of teaching, they think, but it is really the most corrupt kind : to misrepresent a writer's views and coerce the Scriptures to mean reluctantly what one wishes them to mean.'

In spite of this more literal-minded Western tradition, there lingered on in Alexandria an allegorical method of exegesis similar to that of Philo and not dissimilar from much in the gnostic exegetical method. In the fifth century this Alexandrian method came into conflict with the more literal school of Antiochene exegesis. As has been seen, the conflict was largely a theological one. But it certainly has an exegetical dimension ; in fact, much of the theological argument can be explained in terms of the two differing approaches to Scripture. We have examined the background for this conflict in Jewish thought and in the history of the early Church. It remains to speak first of the Alexandrian method itself, then of the Antiochene tradition before Theodore, and finally, of the meaning of the terms 'allegory,' 'typology,' and 'prophecy.'

In Book IV of the *De Principiis* Origen sets forth the platform for the Alexandrian method of exegesis. The basic premise is that all Scripture is divinely inspired[9] :

'But just as providence is not abolished because of our ignorance, at least not for those who have once rightly believed in it, so neither is the divine character of scripture, which extends through all of it, abolished because our weakness cannot discern in every sentence the hidden splendour of its teachings, concealed under a poor and humble style.'

This divine inspiration means that every word of the Bible is, so to speak, dictated from God. Such a doctrine causes enormous difficulties ; but Origen was well equipped to deal with them. Whenever the text of Scripture seemed to be 'concealed under a poor and humble style' or to declare something not in accordance with Christian theology, then Origen could apply the allegorical method, and the text could be immediately transformed into what truly represented the 'splendour of its teachings.' Scripture has a threefold sense, which corresponds to the trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit. The body of Scripture is its literal sense ; the soul, its moral sense ; the spirit, its spiritual and mystic sense. Not every passage has a bodily sense ; and in point of fact, it is difficult to find Origen making any real distinction between the soul and the spirit of Scripture. Even though he claims that 'the passages (in Scripture)

which are historically true are far more numerous than those which are composed with purely spiritual meanings,'[10] one can hardly help feeling that in almost every instance the literal meaning evaporates into the spiritual. The following passage represents the whole spirit of Origen's exegesis[11]:

'But the most wonderful thing is, that by means of stories of wars and the conquerors and the conquered certain secret truths are revealed to those who are capable of examining these narratives; and, even more marvellous, through a written system of law the laws of truth are prophetically indicated, all these having been recorded in a series with a power which is truly appropriate to the wisdom of God. For the intention was to make even the outer covering of the spiritual truths, I mean the bodily part of the scriptures, in many respects not unprofitable but capable of improving the multitude in so far as they receive it.'

The literal meaning of the text is, for Origen, really beside the point. It is helpful for the *sarkikoi,* but hardly worth considering beyond that. Further, Origen seems to have no idea of time at all. That is, the text of Scripture points to eternal truth; it has nothing to do with the history of wars, etc. Thus, the history of the descent into Egypt and the Exodus becomes, for Origen, the description of the fall and salvation of the pre-existent souls. Origen does have some notion of a doctrine of accommodation. God must deal with His children like a schoolmaster or physician. But even this notion of accommodation seems utterly divorced from any real notion of the importance of history. Origen was certainly a brilliant theologian and exegete. But, because he was unable to understand inspiration in any way but that which involved direct revelation in the Bible itself, and because he was unable to take seriously the narrative, historical character of Scripture, his method fails to interpret the Bible. What it does is to enable him to use the Bible as a starting point for his own system. Origen's allegorical method, as well as many of his theological opinions, were influential throughout the patristic period. His writings were a veritable gold mine from which heretic and orthodox alike could draw materials for constructing their own systems of doctrine and exegesis. It is against the background of Origen's enormous influence that any discussion of Theodore's method must take place.

We may now turn to the antithesis of this Alexandrian method of exegesis, viz., the Antiochene tradition. In point of fact we know very little of this tradition—hardly more than enough to enable us to say that Theodore seems to have been the supreme representa-

tive of the tradition. Antioch during the fourth century was the scene of great controversy. At one point there were four Christian bishops – one Arian, one Apollinarian, one 'old Nicene' bishop, and one 'new Nicene.' And yet, in the midst of this turmoil there seems to have been a more or less constant theological and exegetical tradition. The names connected with this tradition are Theophilus, Paul of Samosata, Lucian, Eustathios, Diodore, Theodore, and John Chrysostom – and later, of course, Nestorius, Theodoret, Ibas, *et al.* Diodore of Tarsus, who was the teacher of Chrysostom and Theodore, was the immediate source of the tradition so far as we are able to tell. But the theological opinions of Paul of Samosata may well be reflected in the later Antiochene theology.[12] Theophilus, moreover, seems to have employed a more Jewish exegesis than many of his contemporaries.[13] And, as has been seen, Theophilus also may be thought of as representing the source of the Adam as innocent (*nêpios*) view of man's origin – a view characteristic of Theodore's thought. Diodore first expresses in a clear fashion the exegetical principle of the Antiochene tradition[14]:

'We do not forbid the higher interpretation and *theoria*, for the historical narrative does not exclude it, but is on the contrary the basis and substructure of loftier insights. . . . We must, however, be on our guard against letting the *theoria* do away with the historical basis, for the result would then be, not *theoria*, but allegory.'

One has only to compare this statement with the quotations from Origen offered above to see the very real contrast between the Alexandrian and the Antiochene methods. The Antiochenes wished to exclude allegory, to maintain *theoria* (presumably, in some sense, typology), and to insist upon the historical basis of the scriptural text itself.

We have seen in a summary way how the respective positions of Alexandria and Antioch regarding exegesis developed from Judaism and within the early Church. And, it is hoped, the basic contrast between the two schools of thought has been pointed out. But it is necessary before proceeding to a consideration of Theodore's own method to examine the terms over which the battle was fought – typology, allegory, and prophecy. K. J. Woollcombe defines the terms as follows[15]:

'Allegorism, typology and the fulfilment of prophecy are consequently to be differentiated. S. Paul's interpretation of the story of Hagar in Gal. 4 is an example not of typological, but of allegorical, exegesis. The account of the Triumphal Entry in Matt. 21

is a record of the fulfilment of Zech. 9 : 9, and not a piece of typological writing. Admittedly, typological writing and the fulfilment of prophecy overlap each other to a certain extent : in Matt. 21 : 14 the reference to the blind and the lame has probably been borrowed from the story of David's capture of Jerusalem. There is also a close resemblance between S. Paul's allegorism and his typological exegesis, because his allegorism was of the historical kind. But the similarities between allegorism, typology and the study of the fulfilment of prophecy are not so close as to justify ignoring the differences between them, and using one of the terms to cover them all.'

In this definition the three distinctions are made only to be obscured once more in what follows. And, in point of fact, the distinction between the three is not always clearly to be made. Perhaps the most helpful way of thinking of these three methods of exegesis is this. Typology can be considered the normative method of specifically Christian exegesis. Allegory represents 'left wing' typology, while fulfilment of prophecy represents 'right wing' typology. Admittedly, this sort of definition is a very vague one; but it does guard itself against any kind of specific generalization. Some elaboration of the distinction made above will be helpful. Typology places in juxtaposition the Old Testament and Christ or the New Testament record. Or, typology places in juxtaposition things present and things to come, as in Theodore's sacramental typology, or as in many passages in the later prophetic writings of the Old Testament itself. Thus considered, typology preserves the reality of both poles of juxtaposition, even though it may attribute a development to the pole second in time, and even a higher reality. Typology not only preserves the two realities, but it sets those realities against an historical background. And by 'historical' is simply meant the view of life which sees things in terms of events moving towards a goal of some sort. Allegory marks a step to the left of typology, in that it involves a radical denial of one of the basic propositions of typology. That is, allegory is essentially non-historical. This would seem to this writer to be the main characteristic of allegory. The method may also involve a denial of the reality of the two poles used in typology. Or allegorism may even mean that there are no longer two poles to be considered. The allegorical system is used to go beyond the literal meaning of the text and find a 'true' meaning. It may begin with the typological comparison; but it always denies either history or the reality of the things being compared. When Gregory of Nyssa allegorizes the life of Moses into a sketch of the Christian's spiritual life, there is really

nothing left of the historical events of Moses' life,[16] even though the events are still a part of Gregory's exegesis. If allegory is left wing typology, the exegesis by means of fulfilment of prophecy is right wing typology. It preserves the historical framework of the typology, but it tends so to see all events in terms of their fulfilment, that the events themselves become unimportant and meaningless. A good example of this is the *Habakkuk Commentary*. There the comparison between what Habakkuk said and what was happening contemporaneously with the writer is still in evidence. But, while both 'poles' of the typology are present and set in terms of history, the only pole that matters is that of fulfilment. In other words, it does not really matter what Habakkuk said, save so far as what he said prophesied the cast of characters which occupied the scene of the Dead Sea community. Prophecy then becomes not a speaking to the contemporary scene, but purely prediction of events to come in the distant future. This casting of typology in the prophetic mould is common in the New Testament, and throughout the course of Christian exegesis. In the Gospel according to Matthew we often read that 'this happened that the prophecy might be fulfilled.' Proof of Christ by His having fulfilled the prophecies was one of the most popular apologetic methods of the Christian Church. Yet, according to the view submitted in this essay, this method of exegesis which involved pointing out fulfilments of prophecies, represents a departure from the specifically typological method.

If the view advanced above be accepted, allegorism and fulfilment of prophecy represent extreme uses of typology. It is, therefore, necessary to describe somewhat more specifically the typological method as employed in the patristic period. The sources of the system are to be found not only in Judaism, but also in the Old Testament itself. In the later prophetic writings it is possible to trace the beginnings of typology. There the prophets (such as Deutero-Isaiah) had begun to see that the Lord would work His purpose out in restoration as well as destruction. The earlier prophets simply prophesied doom, and this doom was often described in terms of the Day of Jahweh. As soon as the hope of restoration began to be expressed, categories with which to describe that future were needed. And since restoration was quite naturally thought of largely as the restoring of the 'good old days,' there gradually emerged the basic principle of typology—the end is like the beginning. In what was previously said of typology it was noted that the two poles were set against an historical background. We may proceed one step further, and say that the two poles represent the

former things and the latter things. In other words, typology has not only an historical dimension, but also an 'eschatological' one. As soon as the prophets of restoration began to describe the *eschaton,* the end of all things, they naturally turned to the myths of creation to find the proper imagery. In Genesis the beginning of things is described by what resembles the Babylonian myth of the slaying of Tiamat or Rahab, and by the story of the garden of Eden. We find these stories used to describe the end of things in many places in the Book of Isaiah, for example [17] :

'In that day the Lord with his sore and great and strong sword shall punish leviathan the piercing serpent, even leviathan that crooked serpent; and he shall slay the dragon that is in the sea.'

'For the Lord shall comfort Zion; he will comfort all her waste places; and he will make her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of the Lord; joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving, and the voice of melody.'

Restoration is cast into the type not only of creation, but also of other instances of God's providential care of Israel. The restoration will be a supreme manifestation of God's power, goodness, and of His choice of Israel. In describing this, the prophet naturally turned to other instances of this same activity of God—instances that were to be found in the sacred, historical traditions of Israel as expressed in the Old Testament. In the following passage the restoration is described not only in terms of the Tiamat myth, but also in terms of the Exodus [18] :

'Awake, awake, put on thy strength, O arm of the Lord; awake as in the ancient days, in the generations of old. Art thou not it that hath cut Rahab and wounded the dragon? Art thou not it which hath dried the sea, the waters of the great deep; that hath made the depths of the sea a way for the ransomed to pass over? Therefore the redeemed of the Lord shall return, and come with singing unto Zion.'

This sort of speculation about the end of things was continued, and found expression in the Messianic expectations of the rabbis. The rabbis also conceived of the Messianic deliverance as foreshadowed by the Exodus.[19] Just as the Hebrews wandered forty years, so the years of the Messiah will be forty in number. And as the manna fell in the wilderness, so the Messiah will prepare a heavenly banquet. The Messianic plagues or woes are thought to be foreshadowed by the plagues of Egypt, etc. In the *Habakkuk Commentary* the same sort of reasoning is evident. The end of all things

is thought to have been foreshadowed, and even predicted, by the prophets.

Thus far we have seen the origins of typological speculation in the Old Testament, in the rabbinic Messianic hope, and in the expectations of the Qumran community. In the New Testament we find the same reasoning, but with one important difference. Christ is declared to be the fulfilment of the types of the Old Testament. It is difficult to determine how far the *Habakkuk Commentary* thinks of the prophecies of the Old Testament as being already fulfilled. But in any case, the rabbinic speculation regarding the Messiah, and the prophetic interpretation of Israel's restoration are both what may be called 'unfulfilled typology.' The greatest part of Christian typology involves the notion of Christ as fulfilling the Old Testament. To this statement there is one important exception. Christ fulfills the types; but that fulfilment will be ours only in the future. Therefore, the typology is sometimes cast into the future. This is done either in terms of an apocalyptic hope, as in Revelation, or in terms of the kind of inverted, sacramental typology found in Theodore himself. In any case, this unfulfilled typology bears greater relation to the kind of Jewish speculation that led to the development of Christian typology than it does to Christian typology itself. In a sense, this unfulfilled typology marks the same sort of deviation from the normative Christian typology as does allegorism or simple fulfilment of prophecy. We may say that Christian typology involves not only the comparison of two poles against an historical, eschatological background, but also the belief that the second pole has taken place as the fulfilment of the first.

Typology, thus defined, may be applied to Christ Himself, or to the sacraments, or to the Church, or to the moral and spiritual life of the Christian. Christ is the second Adam, the second Moses, the antitype of Isaac's sacrifice, or the Messiah (David). Baptism is the antitype of the salvation of Noah by water, or of the Exodus and crossing of the Red Sea. The Eucharist is the true manna from heaven, the true Passover feast. This typological method of understanding the Old Testament is to be found both in the writings of the New Testament, and in the liturgical tradition of the Christian Church. That liturgical tradition is itself rooted in Jewish liturgies. The Eucharistic prayer in many of the early Christian liturgies is a kind of listing of the types of which Christ is the fulfilment. God is blessed for His providence in creation, in saving mankind from the flood, in the Exodus, in the entry into the Promised Land, etc. Christ sums up all these acts of deliverance. In the Western Liturgy

this sort of *eucharistia* is evident, to use one example, in the Liturgy for Holy Saturday. At the blessing of the Paschal Candle is said :

'It is very meet and right, that with the service of our lips we should glorify and should praise with heart and soul God the Invisible and Almighty and likewise his only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord and Saviour, Who paid for us to the eternal Father the debt of Adam's transgression : and with His dear Blood wiped away the reproach of our former offences. Now therefore we sacrifice our Passover, wherein for us the very Lamb of God is slain, by whose Blood the doors of his faithful people are made holy. The night is come, wherein, when our fathers, the children of Israel, were led forth out of Egypt, thou dividedst the sea and madest them to pass over as on dry land. Yea, the night is come, that with the fiery pillar hath purged away the darkness of our condemnation. The night is come, whereby all that believe in Christ upon the face of all the earth, delivered from this naughty world and out of the shadow of death, are renewed unto grace, and are made partakers of eternal life. The night is come, wherein the bonds of death were loosed, and Christ harrowing hell rose again in triumph.'

We have seen that typology proper may easily become allegory, or fulfilment of prophecy, or apocalyptic speculation. Finally, in this liturgical development, typology can become simply the listing of all God's mighty acts, with the culmination, but not necessarily the fulfilment, in Christ. In other words, the comparison essential to true typology may be discarded in favour of a simple statement of the *Heilsgeschichte.*

With this rather lengthy discussion of the exegetical background, we may turn to Theodore's own exegesis. First, the critical foundation of Theodore's exegesis must be appraised. So far as the Old Testament is concerned Theodore's knowledge of Hebrew seems to have been somewhat limited, and he relied largely upon the Septuagint. That this is so is evident in a number of passages. In Job 42 : 14 Job's third daughter is named *Qeren Hapuch.* In Hebrew the two words mean 'horn of stibium' or 'antimony' and refer to the use of the black mineral for darkening the eyes. The Septuagint translates the words, *Amaltheias keras* or 'Amaltheia's horn.' Theodore's comment is [20] :

'For when it says that he (Job) called his third daughter Amaltheia's Horn, it has no other significance than to show that he assented to pagan myths and loved the fictions of idolatry. . . .'

Since this assertion is one of Theodore's principal reasons for rejecting Job from the canon, one can only say that his argument is based upon a faulty knowledge of Hebrew, and an unwise reliance upon the Septuagint. But to dismiss Theodore's critical foundation as worthless would be too hasty. In commenting upon Psalm 9 (LXX numbering) he says [21]:

'This ninth psalm, since it is divided in two in the Hebrew and Syriac versions, I don't know why it is found in our version (the Septuagint) redacted into one.'

Theodore, at least according to this passage, certainly follows the Septuagint; but he is not totally unaware of what the Hebrew and Syriac texts read. And in point of fact, in one passage he actually prefers the Hebrew reading to the Septuagint. In speaking of Psalm 15, verses 3 and 4, he says [22]:

'If, therefore, the text which reads "to the saints that are in the earth, and to the excellent, in whom is all my delight" be understood according to the Syriac version as meaning that the divine judgment has been visited upon the strong nations round about, and if this meaning which arises from the Syriac and Hebrew versions be held, then everything that follows is most fittingly joined with what was quoted above.'

Theodore goes on to explain that 'saints' simply means 'the strong.' This is because, says Theodore, in Hebrew 'holy' means anything that is 'singular and exceptional.' The interesting point about all this is not the interpretation of the psalm which Theodore offers, but rather the fact that he is arguing from whatever knowledge of Hebrew he did possess, and is seen rejecting the commonly accepted Septuagint reading of the passage. Even though the Hebrew text does contain *Qadosh* (holy), the passage in Hebrew will really not bear the interpretation Theodore offers. None-the-less, this bold exegesis would seem to indicate that he realized the authority of the Hebrew text, that he knew some Hebrew, and that he did not follow the Septuagint with completely closed eyes. Nowhere do we find Theodore speaking of the Septuagint as a miraculously inspired translation, having as much authority as the original. His view of the Septuagint is, in a sense, summarized by his comparison of it with the other Greek versions. In his commentary on Psalm 55 Theodore is contrasting the version of Symmachus with the Septuagint. He says that Symmachus tried to give the meaning of the text and an interpretation thereof. The Septuagint, on the other hand, stays closer to the Hebrew text, and is, therefore, more reliable [23]:

'The Seventy were especially zealous to preserve the literal sense [*emphasin*] of the Hebrew without any change. But Symmachus showed he was more interested in clarity and did not always hit upon the most accurate rendering of the Hebrew idiom.'

Theodore relies on the Septuagint, not because it is thought to be an inspired version, but because it is faithful to the Hebrew text. This fact is indicated also in another passage [24]:

'It is said that the Syriac reads "peg"—but it would be foolish to disregard the Hebrew, in which the prophet spoke and which the Seventy translated into Greek clearly, since they were intelligent men and knew the language accurately. . . .'

The passage which is being discussed is Habakkuk 2 : 11b, which reads in Hebrew, 'And the beam (*Caphis*) from the wood will answer.' The Septuagint reads *kantharos* (beetle) for 'beam.' The Peshitta reads 'peg.' Theodore rejects the Peshitta completely, and accepts the Septuagint. In effect, this means rejecting the Hebrew text; but the reason that Theodore uses the Septuagint is that it is faithful to the Hebrew. We must summarize what has been said concerning Theodore's critical basis for his Old Testament commentaries. First, Theodore probably knew some Hebrew. But it must be remembered that without the aid of lexicons and grammars, the study of Hebrew was a difficult undertaking. And it is clear from the passages cited above that Theodore's knowledge of the language did not carry him too far. He was not so proficient as Jerome. Second, because of this deficiency in Hebrew, Theodore was forced to rely on translations. He followed the practice of his age and accepted the Septuagint as the authorized version. He rejected the Peshitta and the other Greek translations as non-authoritative, though he did not hesitate to consult them. Third, Theodore's reason for using the Septuagint was a remarkable one for his day. Even Origen used the version as a divinely inspired one.[25] But Theodore rationalized his use of it by saying that the Seventy followed the Hebrew text more closely than the other translators.

Two other comments must be made concerning Theodore's critical procedure. First, in at least two places in the New Testament he departs from the received text. In Ephesians 2 : 22 and 3 : 15 his reading is slightly different from the best reading available. And in John he omits the pericope of the woman taken in adultery. In the first of these instances, Theodore by modern standards is at fault. However, in the omission of the verses from

John, Theodore is in accordance with most modern views of the matter. Second, Theodore explicitly rejects Job and Song of Songs from the canon. Job fails to please Theodore because of the book's heathen associations. Job, according to Theodore, was an Edomite. Theodore also refuses to accept Song of Songs. He cannot allegorize the book in terms of Christ and the Church; and, therefore, he sees the book for what it is—an erotic poem. Theodore claims that Solomon wrote the poem for his wife. In what has been said so far, it is evident that Theodore presents to the modern reader a remarkable dichotomy. On the one hand, he is limited by his own age in certain respects. He accepts the Septuagint fairly uncritically; he does not have the tools with which modern critics can work. On the other hand, Theodore rationalizes his use of the Septuagint in quite a modern spirit; and he is not afraid to reject books from the canon on rational, or at least logical, grounds.

Theodore's exegesis itself is more remarkable than the critical assumptions which lie behind it. In Ebedjesu's catalogue of Theodore's works there is listed a book *On Allegory and History* which apparently attacked the Origenistic method of exegesis and expounded Theodore's own view of the subject. That book is lost, however, and one can only turn to what Theodore himself says elsewhere. Perhaps a brief survey of the extant commentaries will best give an idea of what the Antiochene literal exegesis was like. Of the Old Testament commentaries all that remain are the commentaries on the Book of the Twelve, on the Psalms, and fragments of the commentaries on Genesis and Exodus. The *Commentary on Psalms* is one of Theodore's earliest works.[26] In it he adopts an unusual method of exegesis. He assumes the inspired authorship of David in every case; but David speaks not only in his own person, but also in the person of various other individuals or groups. And each psalm is spoken in the one *persona,* so that the unity of each psalm is assumed beforehand[27]:

'So we ought with the Lord's aid to pay great attention throughout the commentary to preserving the meaning. And if it be necessary in the consideration of matters which arise to explain anything at greater length, still we must not forget the brevity we have promised in the preface. Moreover, we shall preserve this best both in the psalm under consideration (1) and in all the rest by reducing everything so as to be understood under one heading [*in summum*] so that we may explain whatever must be said, succinctly.'

This method is so strictly adhered to that it often gets Theodore in trouble. No double references of the text are really possible, though

as we shall see later Theodore tries to get around this. Further, no dialogue is possible; one voice is assumed throughout. As is evident from even a cursory reading of the psalms, Theodore's method often means forcing the psalm into the preconceived mould of the *persona*. David speaks in his own *persona* in many of the psalms. The story of Absalom is the subject matter of several of these psalms, according to Theodore (3 and 21, for example). In others David is thought to be repenting of his sin with Bathsheba (6 and 12, for example). Again, David speaks in his own *persona* when pursued by Saul (10 and 16, for example), or when speaking in general, moralistic terms (1, 4 and 11, for example). One psalm (17) is attributed to David at the end of his life. David also speaks *ex persona populi* (9 and 15), and sometimes is described as *profetans ex persona populi* the Babylonian Captivity (5 and 25, and *in sua persona,* 23). Other prophetic psalms are referred to the defeat of the Assyrians (as described in Isaiah 36), (29, 31–3, 40, for example), to the prophecies of Jeremiah (34), to the return from Exile (64–6), and to the Maccabees (55, 57–9, 68, for example). In all these cases David is thought of as inspired and as prophesying distant events. The attribution of many psalms to the Maccabæan period, even in this roundabout way, is an unusual feature of Theodore's commentary. Finally, several psalms are spoken by David prophesying Christ. These psalms are 2, 8, and 44. Other verses of other psalms which have been applied to Christ are also discussed by Theodore. We shall reserve whatever consideration of these passages is necessary for later. One final remark about Theodore's commentary on Psalms is that he seems to be more concerned with comparing texts and with lower criticism in general, than in most of the other commentaries. This is evident simply from the proportion of quotations taken from the commentary on Psalms in the discussion above of Theodore's critical methods.

The *Commentary on the Book of the Twelve* is not so unusual as that on Psalms. Theodore is content with expounding the text verse by verse. Strictly prophetic passages in the sense of passages applied by Christian tradition to Christ present Theodore with the greatest problem of his commentary. But, by and large, he quite rightly refers the prophetic books to the impending Babylonian Captivity. The prophets restate what David had long before prophesied; but they do so in the sense that they point to the immediate outcome of events contemporaneous with themselves. This is a view of prophecy much closer to our modern conception, and to what seems to have been the true nature of Hebrew prophecy. It is interesting to see how Theodore combines the view of prophecy

as divine revelation of the future with this notion that prophecy is simply the description of present events in terms of their inevitable outcome. The books of Jonah and Nahum are connected by Theodore because they both refer to Nineveh. Theodore attempts some unified view of the Twelve, and tries to date them relative to one another [28]:

'The blessed prophets Hosea, Joel, Amos, and Micah addressed their words equally to the entire people of Israel, both to the ten tribes whose metropolis was Samaria, and likewise to the tribe of Judah and the citizens of Jerusalem, as well. All of them they cursed equally as men delivered over to sins and guilty of all kinds of crimes. Once these threats of impending evils had been delivered (on the condition that they continue delinquent without penitence), the disaster really happened to them, since the ten tribes were (destroyed) by the Assyrians, and then the tribe of Judah was (destroyed) by the Babylonians.'

Theodore goes on to associate Obadiah with 'punishments to be inflicted upon the Idumæans at the time of the return,' Jonah with the fall of Nineveh, and Nahum with the fall of Nineveh and the universal triumph of the Babylonians over the Assyrians. He dates Habakkuk and Zephaniah at the time when the northern kingdom was in captivity, but Judah not yet taken by the Babylonians. Haggai is taken to be a prophet of the 'restoration of the children of Israel to their own country by the grace of God beyond all human hope.' Zechariah and Malachi are also connected by Theodore with the restoration. What this demonstrates is that Theodore sees the Old Testament prophets in terms of the historical sequence of events against which they prophesied. In the commentary on Psalms this historical sequence is evident, but only by prediction from the one point in time represented by David's life. In the Book of the Twelve, the prophets are themselves cast into the sequence of events, and even if many of their sayings represent for Theodore prophecies of Christ and of distant events, the primary reference is always to the Captivity, Exile, and Restoration. From this primary reference Theodore turns to a simple explanation of the text itself. Because his fundamental reference is basically the correct one, his exegesis is not only literal, but in most cases accurate. One exception is his belief in the historicity of Jonah.

Of the New Testament commentaries there remain fragments of the commentaries on the first three Gospels, Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Hebrews. The *Commentary on John* will be the

subject matter of the next two chapters of this essay. The *Commentary on the Minor Epistles of Saint Paul,* however, deserves some comment here. So far as 'literal' exegesis is concerned, it can be seen that the New Testament presents fewer problems to the patristic exegete than does the Old. In order to relate the two testaments to each other, the Christian Church adopted the view that the Old Testament was fulfilled in the New. Such a view often led, as we have seen, to an implicit rejection of the original meaning of the Old Testament. For this reason, Theodore's literal explanation of the Old Testament, preserving the relationship between Old and New Testaments, but guarding the original application of the Old to Hebrew history, represents an outstanding exegetical contribution. The New Testament was more easily interpreted by a simple *explication du texte.* The orthodox reaction to gnostic allegorism gave an importance to the literal meaning of the New Testament text that was never really transferred to the Old Testament. Yet, even when all this has been said, Theodore's determined rejection of the allegorical method means that he stays much more within the text than Origen, for example. In interpreting the Pauline epistles, Theodore does cast all of Saint Paul in terms of his theology. The doctrine of the Two Ages and of the Adoption of Sons seem of prime importance. But, even though Theodore organizes Pauline thought, and tends to find in it his own theological convictions, nevertheless, the very basic notions of that theology are ultimately derived from the Pauline Epistles themselves. As a generalization, we may say that Theodore draws his theology from the text, organizes it somewhat systematically, and then reimposes the more sophisticated theological system upon the text. This method is certainly legitimate; and, in fact, the rabbinical system of explaining one text by another is really little more than what Theodore is actually doing. Support to the generalization above will be given, it is hoped, by a more detailed study of the *Commentary on John.* As in the Old Testament commentaries, so in the New Testament ones, Theodore is concerned primarily with an exposition of the text. Again, in the New Testament Theodore is also concerned with the historical background of the writings he is discussing. For example, in the introduction to the *Commentary on Ephesians* Theodore (accepting, of course, the Pauline authorship) compares Ephesians to Romans, and attempts to date the epistle in terms of the evidence of Acts and the tradition about John. Paul, says Theodore, wrote the epistle before visiting Ephesus, and before John had arrived in Ephesus. The chronology of John and Paul is set against the imperial reigns of Nero and Trajan.

Regardless of the accuracy of Theodore's reasoning, he is making an attempt to relate the Christian literature to the history of the period.

We have seen that Theodore, largely because of his sense of history, concentrated on giving a fair exposition of what the text really meant when it was first written. To a certain extent, it must be admitted, this attempt fails. That is, Theodore's notion of prophecy and inspiration is the one dictated by his age; it is a notion no longer accepted by Biblical critics, but one which was inevitable as soon as Christians began to read contemporary events into the Old Testament. But in spite of his inability to escape completely from the preconceptions of his time, Theodore demonstrates in his writings a remarkable ability to return to the true sense of Scripture. We must turn from this account of his exegesis to a discussion of Theodore's notion of inspiration, accommodation, and his attitude toward the threefold method of exegesis—typology, allegorism, and fulfilment of prophecy. Such a discussion should also shed some more light on precisely what the Antiochene 'literal' exegesis involved. First, we must discover what Theodore thought about the inspiration of Scripture. It has just been stated that he shared the notion of inspiration held by his contemporaries. This is certainly true in the sense that Theodore fails to distinguish carefully between inspiration and revelation.[29] That is, the inspiration of the authors of the Bible enabled them to reveal God's purpose or will directly. According to this view of 'plenary inspiration' the Bible was, so to speak, dictated by God. By and large, it would be fair to say that Theodore shared much implicit in this view. But at several important points he qualified it. We have already seen one such qualification in terms of Theodore's notion of grace.[30] God's grace must operate through and not in spite of human nature. It is perhaps implicit in this idea that the inspiration given by God must work through human beings, by which the revelation is modified. One very definite distinction is made by Theodore in his view of plenary inspiration. In his *Commentary on Job* he states that the 'grace of prophecy' and the 'grace of wisdom' are not on the same level with each other.[31] In fact, the notion of the modification of inspiration, whether through human beings themselves or through the different kinds of divine grace, is given some expression in Theodore's doctrine of accommodation. Another way in which the doctrine of plenary inspiration is modified is by casting it upon an historical background. First, let us turn to several statements of Theodore's view of inspiration as cast against this historical background. Then, we shall be able to see how Theodore qualifies his

doctrine of inspiration by means of a notion of accommodation[32]:

'. . . the divine grace put before the prophets the things that were soon to be, and before the rest of them it (made) Hosea mindful of those things that would be from God for them, and (helped) him to make a kind of list of those things which had been spoken by David long ago. . . .'

'. . . that he might have greater faith in the divine grace which energized [*energousês en*] the prophets.'

'Then indeed they all had a share in the grace of the Holy Spirit and became worthy of many different kinds of gifts [*charismatôn*]. Some of them predicted the future, and most of these did this to strengthen faith in the greatness of what would happen and to give proof of the glory concerning the Lord Christ.'

In these passages Theodore is discussing the inspiration of the prophets by divine grace. That inspiration is the same which enabled David to foretell all the events of Hebrew history, culminating in Christ. Once foretold, there was no further need of prophecy until the time when the events were about to come into being. That is why there was no prophecy between David and the great Old Testament prophets. The latter were to retell what David had long ago foretold. Theodore, therefore, sets prophecy against the historical events themselves. Furthermore, the operation of prophecy is thought of as an operation of God's grace. Again we find the word *axiôthentes,* 'made worthy' or 'become worthy.' God's grace to make worthy and man's freedom to become worthy are in full co-operation in prophecy as elsewhere, for example in Christ. But we still find no notion that inspiration is modified *ad modum recipientis.* The grace of inspiration enables the prophet to have a vision of the future quite apart from any natural gift in seeing the consequence of the present. Finally, in these passages we see a theme often found in Theodore's interpretation of the prophets. Some of the prophetic passages are simply prophecies of the future (*to mellon*). The future must mean the immediate future of Israel—the Captivity, Exile, and perhaps the Return. But some of the prophets wrote concerning Christ, and their work is a foreshadowing and proof of the glory of Christ. Some texts may even be examples of both kinds of prophecy at once. In all of this, Theodore's notion of inspiration can be seen to be largely one of plenary inspiration; and his notion of prophecy, even though related to history, seems to be one of foretelling the future.

These ideas of inspiration and prophecy find some modification not only in Theodore's doctrine of grace, and in his emphasis upon

history, but also in his doctrine of accommodation. By accommodation is meant that there is some idea of revelation as given *ad modum recipientis* at least in terms of how the divine inspiration is related to the people. Origen has such a doctrine, but it is not nearly so clear in the Alexandrian as in the Antiochene, nor is Origen's notion of accommodation much more than an attempt to explain instances of 'hard texts' in terms of God's eternal, providential operation.[33] Theodore's doctrine comes from his sense of history and not from any strictly theological necessity. We have already seen [34] that Theodore refuses to allow that the Holy Ghost was seen as a separate *hupostasis* in the Old Testament. In a sense, this fact is an accommodation; the full revelation of God's being is reserved for the New Testament. Not only is accommodation a part of this denial of the Holy Ghost as revealed in the Old Testament, but it is also accommodation in the sense of a progression of revelation. God's providence in revealing Himself is a *paideia,* a leading into all truth. Origen's doctrine of accommodation misses this point to some extent, by failing to see the *paideia* in strictly historical terms. The two passages that follow will express Theodore's idea [35]:

'However, for this reason, most of what appears in the Old Testament is distributed [*ôikonomêse*] in this manner [*tropon*] so that what appears might furnish the greatest help [*ôpheleian*] to those living at the time and yet hold a certain reminder of things to be demonstrated clearly only later. . . .'

'Those things that happened then and that were made clear in the Scriptures, which certainly also furnished the greatest of help and usefulness [*chreion*] in that time—from these let us discuss (each) in turn and with God's help arrive at an interpretation.'

Theodore accepts the typological method of the Christian Church. He firmly believes that the Law foreshadowed Christ. But at the same time, while he believes that all of God's revelation is summed up in Christ, he refuses to allow that the revelation God gives of Himself in the Old Testament is meaningless apart from Christ. God really gave that revelation in such a mode (*tropos*) that it would be meaningful, helpful, and profitable for His people. This accommodation of revelation is set in the context of God's *oikonomia,* which finds its end in Christ. Thus, there is in Theodore's thinking a real notion of progressive revelation, though, of course, the doctrine is not expressed in any nineteenth century, evolutionist mode of speech.

Theodore held a strong doctrine of inspiration, but that doctrine

was modified by his notion of accommodation, his sense of history. We must turn from this foundation of Theodore's exegetical method to a discussion of that method as it is carried out in terms of anti-allegorism and by the use of typology. After that discussion, we shall be able to close with a brief consideration of the provenance of Theodore's method, and an evaluation of it. In commenting on Galatians 4 Theodore first interprets Saint Paul's allegory as typology, and then proceeds to reject the allegorical method completely. The argument runs as follows. Galatians 4 has been used by the allegorists as a proof text for their method; but they fail to understand the difference between what Saint Paul is doing, and what they are doing. Saint Paul preserves the history ('for the apostle does not destroy the history, *historiam*'). He is making a comparison (*similitudo*), and the comparison is worthless unless the two things being compared really are (*rebus stantibus*). The very division of time between the two events (Hagar's story and the Judaizing controversy) implies that both really happened. But the allegorists [36]:

'. . . they indeed turn everything backwards, since they wish to make no distinction in divine Scripture between what the text says [*historiam*] and dreams in the night [*somniorum nocturnorum*].'

Thus, says Theodore, in the typology of Adam, Adam and Christ must both have existed for the typology to make any sense. (Thus, an interesting argument from the historicity of Adam is given.) If either pole of the typology does not exist, the method becomes allegory and fails to work. And since the allegorical method uses things that (they say) never happened, the arguments as thus advanced are all unnecessary. If the allegorists' doctrines are true, but the Scripture from which they get those doctrines is not, then what use is the Scripture in the first place? Theodore finishes the argument by defining typology as the comparison of two historical events that bear some real relationship to each other [37]:

'Because of this he said: "which things are an allegory"—calling an allegory that comparison which could compare things that took place a long time ago with things which pertain to the present.'

One may question the legitimacy of including the Hagar allegory under this definition; but, in any case, Theodore must do so in order consistently to reject all allegory.

From the comments on Galatians 4 we have found at least a preliminary statement of what Theodore means by typology. Three additional definitions may be adduced [38]:

'One and the same is He who rules over the Old and the New Testaments, God the Master and Maker of all things; to one end [*skopon*] of ends [*horôn*] He distributes [*ôikonomêse*] both in the former and in the latter.'

'To be sure, the Law had the shadow of all things that would happen; but the people became worthy of God's providence [*kêdemonias*] because of the expectation of what would appear at the coming [*parousiâi*] of the Lord Christ.'

'. . . since it is evident that every type has a certain resemblance [*mimêsin*] because of which it is said to be a type of something.'

Theodore grounds typology in the relationship of the Old and New Testaments, a relationship established by the providence of God (*kêdemonia*) by which He caused and causes all things to move towards Christ. In this sense, typology expresses the conviction that all God's promises and all His revelation are summed up in Christ. Finally, the two poles of the typology must have a real relationship —*mimêsis*. Thus, Theodore defines typology just as it was defined earlier in this essay—as the comparison of two poles against an historical, eschatological background, with the belief that a real relationship between the two exists, and that the second is the fulfilment of the first, and with the conviction that each pole has its own reality.

In spite of this careful definition of typology, Theodore is very hesitant in using the method. Very seldom does he employ typology without pointing to some New Testament proof text as the legitimate authority for the typology. Thus, when quoting the bronze serpent in the wilderness and Jonah's three days in the belly of the whale as types of Christ's death and three days in the grave,[39] Theodore also cites their typological use in the New Testament—John 3 : 4 and Matthew 12 : 40. It is true that Theodore cites the types of the Exodus, the Promised Land, Jonah's entry to Nineveh (as a type of Christ's Advent), and does so without offering any kind of proof text for their use. But this is an exception to the common rule. Another peculiarity of Theodore's use of typology is that he often gives a passage a double reference, so that the literal sense of the text is combined with the typological sense. Such passages as Amos 9 : 11, Micah 4 : 1–3, Micah 5 : 1, and Zechariah 9 : 9 are referred not only to Christ (and not even always primarily to Him), but also to Zerubbabel, for example. One final peculiarity of Theodore's typological exegesis is brought about by the peculiar system adopted in his commentary on Psalms. Since every psalm is said from one *prosôpon* or *persona,* the kind of double application of a text we have seen made in the commentaries on the minor

prophets cannot really be used. Theodore gets around this by using a number of texts as what we may call non-typological types. That is, he denies their use as true types; but because of their use as such in Christian tradition (as found largely in New Testament citations of such passages) he describes them as appropriate to, but not necessarily types of Christ. Psalm 15: 10, 24, and Psalm 69: 22 (LXX numbering) are taken this way. The following passage is an example of Theodore's circumlocution in describing these 'non-typological types'[40]:

'Obviously, then, through these words our Saviour (in the Gospel) indicates His own Passion, lest, as some believe, His whole work and ministry be thought to be a fantasm. Moreover, He shows in these words that He never did anything contrary to the Father's will. . . . For this reason He used this testimony (from the psalm), not because it was something predicted of Him through the oracle of prophecy, or certainly the psalm (as a whole) would have been composed concerning Him [*de ipso compositus*].'

Having discussed Theodore's method of exegesis, can anything be said with regard to its provenance? That method is so remarkable that nothing seems really to explain its origin. Certainly Theodore was in an Antiochene tradition which was largely uninfluenced by Origenism save by way of reaction. And that tradition seems to be quite close to the conservative aspects of the Jewish exegesis. But to say that Theodore stayed close to Jewish exegesis, and that he reacted strongly against Alexandrian allegorism is not to answer the question of provenance. Jewish exegesis could be as non-literal as the worst allegory; and a reaction to Alexandria might well have taken place in terms of a lavish use of typology. Theodore's philosophical and theological training undoubtedly influenced his exegetical method, even as we have seen that method influencing his theology. But the real answer to the question of provenance must lie in the spirit with which Theodore approached Scripture, and it is with an appraisal and encomium of that spirit that this chapter must be brought to a close. Theodore understood the Bible because he had an understanding of the way of thinking implicit in the Bible. He could enter into the Bible in a way that the Alexandrians with their philosophical preconceptions could not. Christian exegesis has always been faced with the problem of what to do with the Bible. This problem was magnified for Theodore because every one regarded the Bible as inspired without much qualification to that inspiration, because every one was citing it to prove his own opinion, and because the Bible presents many

stumbling blocks to the sophisticated reader. The answer to the problem as thus conceived must lie in terms of a distinction between inspiration and revelation, in an appeal to the open, apostolic tradition of interpretation, and in a doctrine of revelation as progressing through history *ad modum recipientis*. Essentially, this is the kind of answer given by modern criticism. But, the Alexandrians tended to solve the problem by means of allegorism. Perfect inspiration was made concordant with the stumbling blocks of the Bible by allegorizing those stumbling blocks. This Theodore refused to do. He did not solve the problem exactly as we would solve it to-day. And, in point of fact, perhaps there is no perfect solution. But Theodore did move in the direction of the inspiration-revelation distinction, and of the notion of progressive revelation. Although he still clung to a doctrine of plenary or almost plenary inspiration, and to a naïve view of prophecy, his sense of history and his doctrine of a providential, Creator God enabled him to enter into the spirit of the Scriptures. And because he could do this, the Bible is allowed to speak in his commentaries (and in his theology) as it is in those of few, if any, of the patristic exegetes.

CHAPTER 6

THE *COMMENTARY ON JOHN* AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THEODORE'S EXEGESIS AND THEOLOGY

THEODORE'S theology and his exegetical method have so far been discussed without detailed reference to any particular work. In the last two chapters of this essay we must turn to such a work. The *Commentary on John* has been chosen because, in the opinion of this writer, *John* poses more problems to Theodore's method and thought than almost any other book of the Old or New Testaments. That is, how can Theodore's theology with its rejection of much of Hellenism accord with the Gospel which has usually been seen as embodying the Hellenistic or at least Jewish-Hellenistic spirit *par excellence?* The question is made still more difficult by the 'literal' quality of Theodore's exegetical system. Does this mean that Theodore allows *John* to change his theological presuppositions? These questions will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter. For the present we must attempt some exposition of the exegetical method used in the commentary, and of the expression of Theodore's theology to be found therein. The interaction of *John,* Theodore's method, and his theology will be reserved for later consideration.

First, let us turn to the general scheme of the commentary. Theodore divides his consideration of the Gospel into seven books, of more or less equal length :

Book One—John 1–2 : 22 ; The Prologue, John the Baptist and Jesus' baptism, the Wedding at Cana, the Cleansing of the Temple.
Book Two—John 2 : 23–5 : 47 ; the discourse with Nicodemus, the Woman of Samaria at Jacob's Well, the healing of the Nobleman's Son, and of the impotent man at Bethesda.
Book Three—John 6–8 : 59 ; the Feeding of the Five Thousand, the visit to Jerusalem at the Feast of Tabernacles.
Book Four—John 9–10 : 42 ; the healing of the blind man, the Good Shepherd discourse.
Book Five—John 11–12 : 50 ; the raising of Lazarus, the anointing at Bethany, the entry into Jerusalem.
Book Six—John 13–17 : 26 ; the Last Supper, the discourses before the Passion, the High Priestly Prayer.
Book Seven—John 18 : 1–end ; the Passion and Resurrection.

No attempt has been made to give a detailed outline of *John*, but from the general scheme it can be seen that Theodore considers the Gospel in fairly natural segments. The only book division of the commentary which seems somewhat illogical is that between the first and second books. There does not appear to be any real reason for Theodore's consideration of chapter two, verses 23–5 at the beginning of book two. The commentary is simply an exposition of the text verse by verse, save that Theodore spends a considerable amount of time on the Prologue, and gives very little time to the Passion. In fact he does not even discuss chapters 20 : 31–21 : 15, and tends to paraphrase rather than expound the text of the Passion. These two divergences from the more usual method are in accord with the principle set down by Theodore in the preface. He sets out to explain not the passages which are easily understood, but the passages which are difficult. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the pericope of the woman taken in adultery (8 : 1–11) is omitted. The pericope is almost universally regarded as a late addition to the Gospel; that view is given added support by Theodore's omission of the passage.

Within this scheme Theodore's method of exegesis must operate. That method as evidenced by the *Commentary on John* may be discussed in terms of the critical assumptions made by Theodore in the preface to the work, the view Theodore takes of the relationship of the Fourth Gospel to the Synoptics, the attitude adopted towards passages using a typological or fulfilment of prophecy method themselves, the use of passages from other books of the Bible, and, finally, a brief comparison with Origen's *Commentary on John*. In the preface to his commentary Theodore sets forth the critical assumptions he makes concerning the Fourth Gospel and states the method he will use in commenting upon it. The first principle is stated as follows[1]:

'What we propose to do, therefore, with this book, with the aid of God, is this : we shall not omit to explain in full any one of those things which are difficult to some, nor shall we linger over those things which are clear to all upon a single reading.'

We have already seen how this principle works itself out in Theodore's comments on the Prologue, on the one hand, and on the Passion, on the other. The principle as thus expressed is elaborated upon. A distinction between the commentator (*interpretis*) and the preacher (*praedicatoris*) is made. The preacher talks even about those verses which are perfectly clear in their meaning; the commentator does not. But when the commentator comes to a verse

that has been used wrongly by 'heretics,' his explanation of the verse may be quite long[2]:

'But when it happens that it is impossible to make the explanation clear without using many words—which happens when we run into verses which have been corrupted by the deceit of the heretics because of the plague of their impiety—then we do not blame them for dragging the explanation out so that what is desired may be clearly set forth. We shall be very careful about this; for this is also the duty of the commentator who expounds the text as accurately as he can, not only to give his dissertation with authority, but also to refute an opinion which goes contrary to his own words.'

The task of the commentator is, therefore, in some sense a theological task. He must interpret Scripture in terms of legitimate Christian doctrine. But, in doing so, Theodore does not abandon his purpose to expound the literal meaning of the text. '. . . who expounds the text as accurately as he can' is a phrase Theodore uses to describe his own procedure.

After he has set down the definition of a commentator and the description of his own system as one which 'accurately expounds the text,' Theodore turns to the critical problems afforded by *John* itself. He accepts the authorship of John the Disciple, whom he describes as 'one of the Twelve,' but younger than the rest. John was the disciple whom Jesus loved. Whether or no this primacy accords with the primacy often given Peter is not for Theodore to say. After the resurrection the disciples stayed in Jerusalem for a while, and when Paul had begun his mission to the Gentiles, the other apostles also began to go out on missionary journeys. John went to Ephesus, where he settled down. It was there that he wrote the Fourth Gospel. The three Synoptic Gospels had been written, and were brought to John for comment. He praised them, but thought they had omitted a number of things and that they failed to give any doctrinal interpretation of the events. Therefore, John took it upon himself to fill up these gaps. Thus, according to Theodore, John's main purpose was to set down in writing traditions about Jesus not contained in the Synoptics, and also to give a doctrinal interpretation. The particular omissions Theodore notes John as having corrected are the miracle at Cana and the discourses (*sermones*) of Jesus. John's doctrinal bias is an emphasis upon the divinity of Christ, for he believed[3]:

'. . . that his divinity also ought not to be passed over in silence, lest as time went on men accustomed to those writings (the

Synoptics) might not believe that he is our Lord so much as is apparent from those words (*John*).'

Theodore also states that John's chronology is much more reliable than that found in the Synoptics. It is interesting to find this view having a revival among many circles of modern scholarship.

It can be seen from this discussion of the preface, that one of the critical problems with which Theodore struggles is the relationship between the Synoptics and *John*. From one point of view Theodore's solution is a rather naïve one, for he simply states that John added whatever had been left out by the Synoptic authors. While this is the fundamental principle with which Theodore relates the four Gospels to one another, he is not so uncritical of the differences as one might believe. Let us first examine how Theodore handles the Johannine additions[4]:

'Then, when he says that he (Christ) left Judæa to go to Galilee, because it was on the journey that he happened to meet the Samaritan woman, this is something left out by the other Evangelists. And (John) opportunely tells it here both to pass on what the others had left out, and to preserve the historical order of events.'

'The words, therefore, "Shall I drink it," are spoken as a question, that is, "it is fitting for me to drink." Indeed, Luke says that our Lord replaced and healed the ear of the slave, that he might show forth his power [*virtutem*] by healing the infirm, and through this he shows that he is willing to suffer but unwilling to harm any one. If this is omitted by this Evangelist (John), the reason should not make us wonder. For men are not wont to tell everything that happens to all in the same way. Rather, some tell the story, omitting nothing; others, though, only briefly note what does not serve the point [*scopo*] of their story. This is an example for the disorder of the stories of the Evangelists. . . . And again let it be noted, as we have said several times, that the blessed John took especial care only to tell what had been omitted by the others, and then to relate what had already been told by his companions only when the order of the story or something that really had to be noted compelled him so to do.'

In these passages Theodore attempts to show first that the additions of John are consonant with the actual order of events narrated also by the Synoptic authors. In the second passage he is particularly concerned to state that the Johannine additions are not simply added because they were left out by the others, but because the approach of the various authors differs. This is essentially a recognition of the distinction between historical events and the

history which records those events. Even we moderns with a more or less scientific method of historical writing behind us are apt to forget this distinction. Theodore attributes the interpretative aspect of the Gospels to the authors and not to any discrepancy in the facts themselves. Such a view would seem to this writer a sound one. Of course, Theodore is unable to make a complete harmony of the four Gospels; but he attributes any disharmony to the limitations imposed by the fact of human authors. In discussing the varying accounts of the resurrection Theodore says[5]:

'If indeed they (the four Evangelists) exhibit in all of these matters a perfect harmony—since they all preach the resurrection and indicate the same day and say that the women came to the tomb—why they wish to waste time discussing the *minutiae* I do not know. Indeed, in my opinion, nothing else is required for the confirmation of the truth of what is said than that the various accounts exhibit a great harmony in the essentials; in the unimportant things and in those things which small men value, their words are by no means in perfect accord. . . . There are many instances of this happening to them, first, because they were not all from the number of the disciples who were conversant with our Lord, . . . second, because the others were not present at the events which happened in the end, since they fled amidst the tumult of those events. Therefore, even in those things which seem contradictory to calumniators, I find, after a careful study, perfect accord. . . .'

Omissions from any of the Gospels or discrepancies among them are, therefore, the natural result of varying traditions and views of the same events. Although Theodore here takes an attitude toward the composition of the Gospels that hardly accords with the modern 'document' theories, the spirit of his approach to the problem is one that seems much saner than that of much of the New Testament criticism with which our generation is afflicted.

Not only does Theodore approve of the Johannine additions, but he also prefers John's chronology[6]:

'It is evident that this "third day" is computed to refer to the third day after the baptism. For he means the first day to be the one on which Andrew and his companion followed Him and spent the night with Him. The second day is that on which happened what is told of Philip and Nathaniel. Finally, the third day is that on which took place the events of the wedding feast. Obviously, all these things happened in Galilee; for right after the baptism He set out for there and stayed there. Moreover, what happened in the contest with the devil, which Matthew relates, evidently took place

afterwards; for Matthew is not concerned with the order of events, but simply with relating what happened.'

This passage demonstrates Theodore's concern with the chronological order of events. In preferring John's order, he also commits himself to the order John gives to the cleansing of the Temple and the ministry of John the Baptist.

Theodore also approves of John's doctrinal additions. In introducing his comments of chapter 6, he says[7]:

'From this point the evangelist turns to the telling of the miracle of the bread, which the other evangelists also narrate. However, John tells it because of the teaching [*doctrinam*] deduced by our Lord from the miracle and left out by the others.'

Theodore makes no mention of the omission by John of the Institution of the Eucharist; therefore, his interpretation of chapter 6 does not follow the usual modern line of saying that chapter 6 is a kind of substitute for the Institution. This same sort of critical limitation is evident when Theodore comes to consider the discourse placed just before the Johannine Passion narrative[8]:

'Then the evangelist turns to the story of the Passion. Moreover, observe also in this that in so far as possible he does not tell anything that had already been related by the others—unless the continuity of the story compelled him and it was impossible otherwise to compose an order congruous to the story. . . . And indeed when he refers to what our Lord said and did with the disciples before the Passion, things which we do not find noted by the others in their books, he wishes to show that our Saviour was by no means without knowledge and expectation of His Passion, but rather (awaited it) with free will. . . .'

The theological reasoning behind this is indeed complicated. Theodore quite rightly sees that there is a theological reason for the pre-Passion discourses. But rather than viewing them as a meditation upon the Passion placed on Jesus' lips, Theodore understands them as revealing Jesus' perfect knowledge of what was going to happen to Him. And, in point of fact, this interpretation may be much closer to what *John* actually means than the one just offered. Later we shall see the problems that Jesus' foreknowledge in this Gospel cause Theodore. But for now, it must only be noted that Theodore tries to soften the blow of attributing the discourses to divine prescience, by adding the idea that this very prescience secures Jesus' free will in offering Himself. This rather odd mixture

of divine knowledge and human free will in Christ is characteristic of what happens when Theodore's theology runs headlong into the ideas of *John*. One final point about the passage quoted above is that Theodore tends to dismiss what *John* omits as insignificant. If something is found in the Synoptics, but not in *John,* it is simply because John realized every one already knew it and did not want to make his Gospel a mere repetition of the others. This idea is quite similar to Theodore's definition of a commentator as one who explains the obscure passages, but finds no need to comment upon verses easily understood by all.

In one place Theodore fails to place the great confidence in *John* that we have seen above. At least he seems to accept what Matthew says as of some value, and even of equal value with the Johannine account. The passage in question concerns the anointing of Jesus at Bethany. Matthew, says Theodore, only describes the scene briefly. But John, through his great love for Jesus, is led to relate all the events in detail. But even this hint that John may have exaggerated his account of the story does not prevent Theodore from accepting both the Johannine and the Matthæan versions[9]:

'At this point this must be noted, namely, that Matthew says she poured the oil on His head, while John says that she anointed His feet and wiped them with her hair. From this it is evident that she did both: she anointed His head and His feet. Moreover, blessed Matthew related this in a cursory fashion, and so he spoke especially of the head. But John, because this had been said, omitted it; since, moreover, it was a demonstration of great love for Christ that she anointed His feet and dried them with her hair, he decided that this was a fitting thing to be related.'

It must be admitted that the logic of Theodore's argument is flawless. He assumes that the event is the same event, described in different ways. He argues from John's knowledge of Matthew, and from his love of Christ; and he assumes Matthew's indifference to the story, at least comparatively speaking. From these assumptions about what John was doing, Theodore's conclusion is rational. But the argument is singularly unconvincing. It reveals all the faults of Theodore's comparison of the Synoptics and *John*. But in spite of those faults, which are in a sense just limitations imposed upon Theodore by his age, the very fact that he attempted some real comparison is unusual. And in some respects modern criticism has not gone much beyond Theodore. His insistence upon the reliability of *John's* chronology, and his refusal to get bogged down by small discrepancies in the various accounts, as well as his realiza-

tion that such discrepancies were inevitable—all this is in quite a modern spirit.

We have seen something of Theodore's exegetical method at work upon the Fourth Gospel. Something must now be said with regard to his use of typology. Of course, he utterly rejects allegory in the *Commentary on John* as elsewhere. And, as was suggested in the last chapter, his use of typology and argument from prophecy is limited, probably because of his fear of allegory. In fact, Theodore's typological speculation is limited to passages where the typology is suggested by the very text of *John*. This is in itself remarkable. In places where *John* itself speaks of a prophecy as being fulfilled, Theodore interprets the passage accordingly[10]:

'Therefore, He cites Isaiah the prophet, who, in fact, predicted that it would be difficult to find believers among the Jews.'

'And so, knowing that something was lacking from the perfect fulfilment of the book of the words of the prophets, He asked to drink water. And when the vinegar was given Him, He bowed His head, and His spirit left Him, so that it might appear that He had done this when He willed.'

Of course, this is not typology proper, but simply fulfilment of prophecy. But even so, Theodore is careful to avoid any notion that prophecy and fulfilment are automatic and quasi-magical. The text cited from Isaiah is a prediction for Theodore, but it is apparently a general prediction which just happens to fit the particular circumstances of Jesus' Passion. In the second instance, Jesus Himself consciously fulfills the prophecy.

This reluctance to pin too much upon fulfilment of prophecy is reflected in Theodore's use of typology. In fact, it is difficult to find much typology in what Theodore says. That Theodore still thinks of Christ as the fulfilment of the Law is clear[11]:

'*This is indeed the prophet* (7 : 41); *others indeed were saying: This is Christ*. But the Scripture does not intend to say that the prophet is one person and the Messiah another; but the crowd was ignorantly expecting two men because of the difference of words. *Moreover others said: Did not Christ come from Galilee?* Whence is He? *For the Messiah comes from the seed of David and from Bethlehem the city of David, as the Scripture says*. Because of this a great dissension arose among the people. . . . Since they knew the place and tribe whence the Messiah was to come, it was clearly false what they were saying above, as it was unknown whence the Messiah would come.'

All the promises of God in the Old Testament are fulfilled in

Christ. Regardless of the fact that Theodore here presents this view more in terms of prophecy fulfilment than of typology, the rationale for typology is evident. As a kind of footnote to the present discussion, it is interesting to note that Theodore accepts the typical rabbinic belief that the place from which the Messiah would come was to be unknown. Implicitly, Theodore is rejecting the text: 'Thou Bethlehem in the land of Judah.' A real instance of typology is evident in Theodore's comment on 3 : 14[12] :

'*As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so it is fitting that the Son of man be lifted up, that every one who believes in him may not perish but have everlasting life.* Let not the Cross frighten you in any way, He says, and do not let it make you doubtful of what has been said. For, just as the serpent was lifted up by Moses in the wilderness and though it was bronze by nature, it saved those who looked upon it because it represented the strength of the One who commanded it: so also He takes upon Himself the lot of mankind and suffers the agonies of the Cross, but because of the strength (*virtutem*) indwelling Him, He makes those who believe on Him worthy of eternal life.'

Even in this passage, Theodore's comment is little more than an expansion of the text in terms of his own Christology. The brazen serpent and Christ are similar in that they both represent instances of God's sacramental providence in using lowly things as vehicles for divine, saving '*virtus*.' The same limited use of typology is to be found in Theodore's explanation of the text: 'Moses did not give you bread from heaven, but my father gives you the true bread from heaven.' (6 : 32) Theodore explains at great length the typology of manna and the Eucharistic bread, but that is all.

In several places this cautious use of prophetic fulfilment and typology leads Theodore to declare certain passages that in *John* are meant to be prophetic fulfilment to be nothing more than apt citations of the Old Testament. For example, in discussing the Cleansing of the Temple, Theodore comments on 2 : 17 as follows[13] :

'*And his disciples remembered that it was written, The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up.* To be sure, this was not spoken in prophecy of Him, but it was an opportune quotation to make, since He cleansed the Temple. For it is characteristic of the just to be zealous for the house of the Lord, and to guard from it what is unbecoming.'

A number of the prophetic quotations in the Passion are passed by

in this fashion. Theodore does not reject typology or the argument from prophecy, but he is very careful in using these methods of exegesis. His primary concern is to expound the meaning of the text.

In explaining the texts in this fashion Theodore does more than give a simple paraphrase, or even an extensive theological discourse on the text. He also adopts the rabbinic method of text comparison. For example, when he is discussing the meaning of 'Word' in the prologue,[14] Theodore defines the word as analogical when applied to God the Word. In the course of his argument he quotes eleven passages from Scripture, including the books of Hebrews, Numbers, Psalms, Acts, and Corinthians. Although this probably represents the most extensive use Theodore makes of other texts to explain the one he is expounding, the method is by no means limited to this particular passage. In the entire commentary Theodore cites more than one hundred such passages. A more typical example of this method is to be found in Theodore's exposition of 3 : 29—'He that hath the bride is the bridegroom : but the friend of the bridegroom, which standeth and heareth him, rejoiceth greatly because of the bridegroom's voice.' Theodore explains this passage by stating that all men are one body. Furthermore, so runs the argument, there are two creations. As Adam is the *principium* of the first, so is Christ of the second. By baptism we partake typologically (*typice*) of the second creation. (*Vide,* says Theodore, Romans 6 : 3–5.) The argument proceeds in this fashion with Theodore citing 1 Corinthians 15, Romans 8, Genesis 2, and Ephesians 5. The theological discourse fits into John's original statement because the bride is the Church, and Christ, the bridegroom[15] :

'Therefore, also, in this place he (John Baptist) says : *he who hath the bride is the bridegroom,* that is, mine is not the rank of the bridegroom, but his. For there is in him the divine nature, in which first we believe, and then through regeneration, by a certain natural familiarity received by and with the man who was assumed, from this we too receive an ineffable union with God the Word.'

John the Baptist is like the friend of the bridegroom because he rejoices in this great salvation which is made possible through Jesus, whom he baptized. The argument of this passage is somewhat complicated, and one may quite rightly wonder whether the verse will bear the weight of interpretation Theodore places upon it. But in using the text as a basis for the theological interpretation, Theodore does ground that interpretation in other scriptural quotations, and he does preserve the initial image. The interpretation is

really not far from the true meaning of the text, though even Theodore would readily admit that the text does not necessarily imply the particular, sophisticated theological system Theodore sees in it. But aside from the argument itself, the text is a fine example of how Theodore uses the rabbinic method of eliciting the meaning of one verse from the comparison of that verse with others. To be sure, Theodore uses this method in his own way; but the parallel is close enough to warrant a vindication of the assertion made in the last chapter that Theodore's method is fairly close to that of the more conservative Jewish exegesis.

Enough has been said concerning Theodore's exegetical method as it is found in the *Commentary on John*; but in order to clarify the peculiar characteristics of that exegesis, it may be helpful to contrast it in certain respects to Origen's *Commentary on John*. Origen's commentary is really nothing more than an example of the principles laid down in *De Principiis*, Book IV. These rules, as described in terms of the study of *John*, are[16]:

'We have now to transform the gospel known to sense-perception into one intellectual and spiritual. For what would the narrative of the gospel known to sense-perception amount to, if it were not developed into a spiritual one? It would be of little account or none. Any one can read it and assure himself of the facts it tells—nothing more. But our whole energy is now to be directed to the effort to penetrate to the depths of the meaning of the gospel, and to search out the truth that is in it when it is divested of its prefigurations [*gumnên tupôn alêtheian*].'

One has only to compare this with Theodore's introduction to his commentary to realize the vast difference between the two. With Origen we are in an entirely different world, a world not of history but of allegory. The types themselves no longer matter; only the 'naked truth' they represent is of importance. It would, however, be unfair to leave the impression that Origen's commentary is totally unlike Theodore's. Origen, as well as Theodore, considers *John* as the best interpretation of the divinity of Christ.[17] It is for this reason that he names the Fourth Gospel the firstfruits of the Gospels. And Origen in a number of places takes a very cautious view of the text. For example, he considers that the healing of the impotent man at the Pool of Bethesda took place in great measure because of the man's faith.[18] And in describing Jesus' movements in John 4: 43, Origen considers John to have been 'almost a simpleton in reasoning' (*hôs idiôtês tôi logôi*) and to have described the facts obscurely and badly.[19] But in spite of these more critical

passages, Origen's method is usually quite different. He reads his theology into *John*. For example, he decides that John the Baptist was an angel who had become incarnate to minister to Christ.[20] And, despite his view of the miracle of Bethesda, he believes that the important thing about the miracles is not that they happened, but rather the truth symbolized thereby.[21] Origen uses the typological method, but he also states that with the coming of Christ and the fulfilment of the types, the types themselves have lost their significance.[22] Of course, when what is meant is that the Law is no longer operative since it has been fulfilled in Christ, then Origen's view has a certain amount of truth. But one can hardly help feeling that the Law and the types contained therein have been abrogated not only by being fulfilled, but also by becoming no longer relevant, even historically. This marks a radical use of typology, a use which really abandons typology as so carefully defined by Theodore. Once the types themselves have lost their reality for any present significance, typology tends to drift into allegory. Not only does Origen tend to allegorize the typology of the Old Testament, he even allegorizes the events described in *John*. For example, the Cleansing of the Temple is thought to be purely allegorical. Jesus drives the unworthy thoughts and motives of profit from the souls of Christians, represented by Jerusalem. Or again, by driving the animals out, Jesus signifies that the Old Testament sacrifices have been superseded. Of course, a certain amount of this allegory is probably present in the symbolic meaning intended by Jesus Himself. But, such symbolism does not really warrant Origen's extensive allegorization.[23] Again, the Entry into Jerusalem is allegorized[24]

'Jesus, therefore, is the Word of God, who enters into the soul, which is called Jerusalem, riding upon the ass which the disciples loosed from its bonds—and here I mean the unloosed writings of the Old Testament which were made clear by the two disciples who unleash their significance.'

The two disciples, furthermore, apparently represent the moral and the spiritual senses of Scripture. That allegorism of this sort really destroys any historical sense at all is clear from what Origen himself says[25]:

'Indeed we must not think that historical things are types of historical things and bodily of bodily (*sômatika*), but bodily things are types of spiritual (*pneumatikôn*) and historical of intelligible (*noêtôn*).'

This comparison of Origen and Theodore brings home with great

clarity the distinctive note of Theodore's exegesis—his sense of history, and his reverence for the literal meaning of the text. It is all the more remarkable that he could possess such a spirit when one considers that in Antioch alone was allegorism totally rejected. Even Jerome with all his sense that the meaning of the text was the important thing, did not hesitate to use allegory.[26]

From what has been said above there can be drawn a fairly comprehensive notion of how Theodore's exegetical method works itself out in relation to *John*. The final question of this chapter must be: what are the theological results of this method. No attempt will be made for the present to describe Theodore's theological-exegetical difficulties. Rather we shall try to show that the same general system described in the first four chapters of this essay is to be found in the *Commentary on John*. It must be kept in mind that in the first four chapters only a very few citations from the commentary now under consideration were made. Therefore, we may legitimately attempt to find the same outline of theology in the commentary as was found elsewhere. Let us first examine Theodore's doctrine of man as found in the commentary[27]:

'Although because of the distinction of persons [*personarum*] men are seen to differ from one another in this life, nevertheless, we are all one man by affinity of nature, as appears from the fact that the body of all is one and the same, but we are each one of us individual members of the whole. This man, therefore, which we all are, is mortal and corruptible in that we are all together confined under the decree of death.'

'. . . we are all one body by nature, and Adam is the head of all of us, because he was the foundation [*principium*] of our nature.'

All of this sounds quite familiar. Nowhere does Theodore discuss the nature of man in any really technical way in the commentary, but his emphasis upon man's corporate nature, and upon his life in this world as mortal and mutable is evident from the passage just cited. Man's free will, and his exercise of that free will in the context of God's grace is described quite succinctly by Theodore in what might almost be considered a definition of grace[28]:

'. . . to all those who will is His grace offered.'

The doctrine of man as found in the commentary does not provide enough detail to warrant the conclusions made concerning Theodore's anthropology in the first chapter; but the line followed

here certainly accords with the view taken of that anthropology.

Theodore's doctrine of God is essentially the same in the commentary as elsewhere [29]:

'For if the Father [*Genitor*] is incomprehensible, how much the more is it impossible that the Son [*Genitus*] be spoken of as inferior.'

'For what can we say exactly concerning the nature of Him in whom we find no point at which He began to be. . . . Indeed we say that they (the creatures) were made afterwards, but (we say this) in such a way that we are in no respect able to say after how much time they were created. For there is no measurable lapse of time between the existence of the Creator and the production of the creatures in time; but before them, God existed immeasurable, and there was no time by which His life could be measured out. But so far as they (the creatures) are concerned, when they began, time followed upon their birth, and an end measuring their space of time.'

Here the familiar contrast between Creator and created is drawn. The creation itself is limited, while God the Creator is described as 'incomprehensible,' 'immeasurable,' and without beginning or end. Thus, the Platonic categories in which God is described as *agenêtos* are mingled with the strong Biblical conception of God as the Creator. In another place Theodore describes the generation of the Logos by the phrase 'incomprehensible swiftness of the divine generation.' [30] One is reminded of Gregory of Nyssa's statement that nobody knows quite how angels procreate, but they must do it very swiftly.[31] The generation of the Logos is described in the usual orthodox manner.[32] And, just as was previously seen, the created order and the Creator are not utterly separated from each other. There is a community established not only by Christ, but also by the fact of man's creation in the image of God and by the fact of the created order's finding its ground of being in God. For this last reason, man can reason from the world to God [33]:

'For this is the custom of divine Scripture: when it wishes to show anything about the divine nature, it puts a name on it which has been taken from things which apply to us, that it may give rise to an accurate description.'

The term Logos as used of the second Person of the Trinity is such an analogical predication.

In the commentary Theodore says little about the Trinity save that He is. However, the Holy Ghost comes in for some consideration. At one point is found an honest recognition of the ambiguity

of John's description of the Spirit. In *John* 'Spirit' is just as often used to describe God or Christ as it is in any way approaching an hypostatic use of the word. In commenting on the verse: 'But this spake he of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive: for the Holy Ghost was not yet given; because that Jesus was not yet glorified' (7: 39), Theodore says[34]:

'We understand also this, that the phrase "Holy Spirit" frequently designates not the person of the Holy Spirit, and His nature, but rather His grace. In this passage he (John) is evidently speaking of the grace which the Apostles were to receive, and which would be transmitted through them to others.'

It will be remembered that Theodore refuses to allow that the writers of the Old Testament recognized the separate *hupostasis* of the Holy Ghost. From this passage it is evident that he also realizes that many passages in the New Testament speak of the 'spirit' without intending thereby to indicate the Holy Ghost. But from a strictly theological point of view Theodore speaks in quite an orthodox manner of the Holy Ghost. He is co-equal with the Father and the Son.[35] In discussing the verse 'by him were all things made,' Theodore poses the question of whether or no the Holy Ghost falls under the notion of creation. The Holy Ghost is invisible, and therefore cannot be part of the visible created order. Further, none of the invisible creatures were created unique (*unicum*)[36]:

'God, indeed, did not make a single one of the spiritual beings alone [*solum*] and unique of its kind [*singulare in genere suo*]; nor did He create a unique angel or archangel or any of the other spiritual powers; but He created all the angelic orders in a numberless quantity, and made them so that they would all minister in one service.'

But the Holy Ghost is unique[36]:

'But, indeed, to no one of these invisible orders was the Holy Ghost conjoined—for the Holy Spirit is unique [*unicus*], nor does He perform a ministry other than that of a kind of angel, but He operates everything, and in such a way that He exists everywhere and is sufficient for all. From this it is evident that He is to be distinguished from those (spiritual powers).'

Of course, *John* itself describes the Holy Ghost as 'life-giving' and as the Spirit that was in Jesus. This part of Theodore's doctrine of the Holy Spirit is implicit in the text upon which he is commenting.

So far the general outline of Theodore's theology is evident in the *Commentary on John*. When one turns to the Christology, one finds Theodore's usual position, to be sure; but one can also discern a number of passages where that position is modified by the text of *John*. These modifications will be discussed in the next chapter. Here let us seek to discover the familiar outlines of the Antiochene Christology. The *Verbum assumens* takes the initiative in electing the *homo assumptus*. And in the commentary this election is also descriptive of the Word; that is, the Word is seldom if ever spoken of apart from His operation in choosing Jesus [37]:

'Therefore, when our Lord God wished to dissolve this (death) and render men incorruptible, and make them worthy of great honour, He assumed as the principle [*principium*] for all one man in whom God the Word dwelt, and made it so that he acted and bore all things which become a man, by leading the purest [*integerrimam*] life. And then, finally, he accepted the end of life, when death came along. But, afterwards, he rose from the dead, or rather was born a new man, incorruptible, in another life, before the rest. And when he had received the complete gift of the Spirit, he easily accomplished everything which in this world was required for our salvation. And so, when he had received immortality after the resurrection, in conjunction with God the Word, he became Lord of all.'

This passage is a statement of the Incarnation in terms of the gracious operation of the Word in the life of the *homo assumptus*. The Word elects Jesus, but by no means impairs his free will. The *homo assumptus* bears all things human, leads an *integerrimam vitam*, and accepts death, the 'end of life.' The result of the operation of the *Verbum assumens* and the co-operation of the *homo assumptus* is that the *homo assumptus* is raised from the dead and given immortality and perfected union ('conjunction') with God the Word. Nor is the *homo assumptus* an abstract human nature; rather, he is a real entity in the same sense that we are real entities [38]:

'That he was also more outstanding than John the Baptist in his human nature is evident both from the greatness of his power [*virtute*] and from his union with God the Word, by which he was elevated not only above all men, but above the universal creation.'

The *homo assumptus*, therefore, has the *discretio* or choice by which he can choose obedience and attain virtue. The last phrase of this passage sounds a bit unlike Theodore in that it could be

read as dissolving the line between the Creator and the created. But the phrase 'above the universal creation' (*super creaturas universas*) must mean a superiority of 'honour and worship' rather than anything in the sense of divinization. At least only by such an interpretation can the phrase be made to accord with the predominant tendency of the Antiochene theology.

In the *Commentary on John* Theodore makes the same distinction between the *Verbum assumens* and the *homo assumptus* as, for example, in the *De Incarnatione*. In fact, as will be seen in the next chapter, he imposes the distinction on a number of texts in *John* which do not really imply it. The problem of union between the two *prosôpa* is not so acute in *John*, since the distinction between the two is not very clear in *John* itself. But Theodore states the union in the same way as in the *De Incarnatione*[39]:

'For, he says, God did not bestow on him (the *homo assumptus*) a small portion (*exiguam partem*) of the grace of the Spirit, as with other men, but the whole plenitude, because He loved him; and, therefore, He also gave him universal lordship. For it is clear that this is by no means congruous with human nature, except that by its union with God the Word it received lordship over everything.'

This is certainly a description of what Theodore technically calls the 'indwelling by good pleasure as in Son.' The 'good pleasure' (*eudokia*) is expressed by the phrase 'He loved him' (*quia diligebat eum*). That this union is 'as in Son' is confirmed by Theodore's interpretation of the title 'Son of God' as used in *John*. The title refers not to Christ's divine nature, but to the Sonship of His human nature, that is, of the *homo assumptus*. There are very few images used in the commentary to describe the union, perhaps because there are very few occasions when Theodore finds it necessary to describe the union. The example of the body-soul image as quoted in the third chapter does, however, come from the *Commentary on John*. Finally, the union is described as one not of *phusis*, but of honour and adoration[40]:

'Consequently, therefore, this also was fitly attributed to the man, in so far as through those things which he received, he was made a consort of the honour of the Father [*cum Patre*], so that it was not incongruous that he be honoured as the Father. For because he by no means received the honour of all by nature, but as a consequence rather of his union in the adoration addressed to God the Word, he was honoured necessarily with the same honour with which the Father together with God the Word is honoured.'

Thus, the same Christology is to be found in the commentary as in the other works of Theodore.

We must now turn to statements of the doctrine of redemption in the *Commentary on John*. Here again Christ as Redeemer is thought of in terms of the Adam-Christ typology [41]:

'Because it was indeed fitting that we also, as our Lord wished, should be partakers of His resurrection, it was necessary that they (*sic*) receive participation with Adam by natural birth, and besides this also await the sentence of death, that by another birth, the likeness of the Lord, they might be born after death in resurrection, that they might also have a portion in life eternal.'

Christ is the fulfilment of the type of Adam, but the fulfilment advances beyond the type. That is, redemption is described in terms of the Theophilan scheme. Man was created *nêpios,* and is led to perfection and immortality by Christ. Redemption is also described in what might be called forensic terms [42]:

'After the first man was created by God, he, together with all who were born his descendants, became guilty of death because of sin.'

It is undoubtedly an exaggeration to say that this verse represents a forensic view of the Atonement. But, by implication, if Adam is under sentence of death, redemption involves Christ's serving the sentence for us. In any case Theodore very seldom speaks of redemption in these terms, and this passage happens to be the only one found by this writer in the commentary, which is capable of bearing a forensic interpretation. Theodore's more usual way of describing redemption is in terms of the Adoption of Sons [43]:

'For through union with God the Word, the Spirit mediating, he became partaker of the true Sonship. We receive our share through his spiritual grace, and through that same grace we are made participants with him in the adoption of sons, no matter how far we are from possessing his worthiness.'

Christ is the *principium* of this redemption. This doctrine helps avoid the difficulty of how to relate Christ already risen from the dead to us who must still undergo death [44]:

'And so the man who was assumed for all men received participation with him; he is the principle [*principium*] of all good things. Because of those things which happened to him, we all will be participants (with him) whether in the resurrection or in the ascension into heaven or in the kingdom or in the glory.'

It is difficult to find the doctrine of the Two Ages in the *Commentary on John*. This doctrine projects Theodore's notion of redemption on to history and time; but in *John* there is very little in the text to suggest such a projection. The doctrine does appear in a few passages however [45]:

'But our Lord by the abundance of His grace wished finally to create him and lead him to a better state [*meliorem statum*], that is, into the future life to which all of us shall rise after our death.'

Theodore's whole doctrine of redemption, with the one possible exception of the doctrine of the Two Ages, finds expression in the *Commentary on John*.

The Church and sacraments as mediating redemption are described by Theodore in much the same way as in the *Catechetical Homilies*. The words *typus* and *typice* occur again and again in passages where the sacraments are being discussed. Because more is said of baptism than of the Church and the Eucharist, we shall adduce the discussion of baptism in Theodore's comments on John 3. That discussion is typical of Theodore's view of the sacraments. Baptism is above all a type of our new birth at the resurrection. 'Type' is being used in a theological rather than an exegetical way. But, even so, it will be seen that both poles of the typology (baptism and resurrection) have their own reality and importance. Nor are the two poles confounded. And there is a real resemblance between the two because water and the waters of the womb represent the same thing, birth. Moreover, baptism is a type of our Lord's death and resurrection. The view is summed up as follows [46]:

'He (Christ) calls baptism earthly, because it is completed here on earth. But He calls His own divine generation celestial, because it much excels the spiritual generation which pertains to men.'

In conclusion, the *Commentary on John* demonstrates the use of the same exegetical principles described in chapter five. Moreover, it reveals basically the same theological system discussed in the first four chapters. The only points where modifications seem to be discernible are in the Christology and in the doctrine of the Two Ages. If the theology or rather the theological views implicit in *John* accord perfectly with Theodore's own theological position, then no problem is posed for his 'literal' method of exegesis. But if, on the other hand, there are significant differences between Theo-

dore and *John,* and if Theodore attempts to allow the text of *John* to speak for itself, the question arises how Theodore solves the problem thus posed. For in that event, there must come a conflict of principles, a clash between exegesis and theology. The next chapter must be devoted to a consideration of how Theodore modifies *John,* and how he is led by *John* to modify his own theological position.

CHAPTER 7

THE *COMMENTARY ON JOHN*— EXEGESIS VERSUS THEOLOGY

BY turning to a discussion of some of the particular problems posed by the *Commentary on John,* we shall be able to show how what has been discussed in the first part of this essay finds expression in one of Theodore's works. First, some attempt will be made to show to what extent the Antiochene theology is read into *John*. Then, we may consider how Theodore's principle of literal exegesis leads him to modify his theology. Under the first of these headings, we must examine the doctrines of the *homo assumptus,* the Adoption of Sons, and the interpretations given of the title 'Son of God' and of the phrase 'became flesh.' To some extent the choice of these particular doctrines has been arbitrary; but they do represent, in the opinion of this writer, the major instances in which Theodore may be accused of reading his theology into the Fourth Gospel. Let us first cite a typical example of how the text of *John* is used as the basis for an exposition of the *homo assumptus* doctrine [1]:

'Therefore, if any one attentively considers the words of our Lord, he will find that many of them receive a diversity of meaning: some manifest his magnitude, others are lowly and evidently after a close examination cannot be suitable to him.'

The doctrine of the *homo assumptus* and the *Verbum assumens* is motivated not only by philosophical and theological presuppositions, but also by the very double judgment made of Christ. That is, the earliest traditions always described Christ in these two ways. It is quite interesting to compare what Theodore says with the following passage from Origen [2]:

'When, therefore, we see in him (Christ) some things so human that they appear in no way to differ from the common frailty of mortals, and some things so divine that they are appropriate to nothing else but the primal and ineffable nature of deity, the human understanding with its narrow limits is baffled, and struck with amazement at so mighty a wonder knows not which way to turn, what to hold to, or whither to betake itself.'

Origen solved the dilemma in terms of the Logos and the pre-

existent soul of Jesus; Theodore, in terms of the *Verbum assumens* and the *homo assumptus*. Nor are the two solutions so very different from one another.

From this starting point Theodore finds it possible to interpret some verses of the divine, and some of the human nature. Certain verses, for example, are predicated solely of the *homo assumptus*[3]:

'*As the Father knows me, and I know the Father* (10: 15). This, moreover, he speaks concerning his human nature, as the context clearly shows, that is, As I have a familiarity with the Father which does not cease, I cannot thenceforth be extraneous to Him, because through my union with God the Word I am His Son, and I know Him or the Father and by no means renounce my familiarity with Him.'

This passage is typical of Theodore's system of exposition. The *homo assumptus* is made to speak in the first person, while referring to the Word in the third person. It is obvious that the text from *John* does not require or even suggest such an interpretation. This is not the real question, however. The problem is: can Theodore legitimately use his Christological formula in interpreting *John?* From this particular passage it is evident that the formula does make sense when applied to *John*. But let us examine several other passages before any attempt is made to answer the question of whether such an interpretation is justified[4]:

'*I came forth from the Father and I came into the world; again I leave the world and go to the Father.* (16: 28.) . . . For this, *I came forth from the Father,* can certainly be understood of the divinity, and by the same token cannot really be taken of the separation. And, clearly, under no circumstances can it be taken of the *homo assumptus*. But this: *I leave and go,* in no way can be said of the divinity, not even as though of movement or of conjunction. Surely this must be admitted. It can indeed be said of man. And so both (parts of the verse) cannot be taken together as referring to one of the natures; nor do both of them fit God the Word or the man. . . . the first seems to fit the divinity; the other, the *homo assumptus,* because of the conjunction of natures, by which both arrive at a certain unity.'

Here the text from *John* causes Theodore considerable difficulty. There is no hint of a separation of natures such as Theodore envisages, in the text itself. But the Antiochene Christology is forced to find such a distinction, and does so. To find the *homo assumptus* in this passage is a far more difficult task than it was in the last

passage examined. That Theodore does so is certainly proof that he is reading his theology into *John*. But even though this be admitted, note that he realizes it is somewhat anachronistic to find fifth century Christology in *John*. For he admits that the verse describes the 'conjunction of natures' and the unity thereby resulting. But the recognition of the unity does not prevent Theodore from separating the predication of human and divine attributes to two subjects. For example, Christ's Sonship (as we shall see) and His power of judgment are both attributed to the *homo assumptus*[5]:

'. . . *He gave the Son all judgment* (5 : 22). Moreover, he connects the resurrection with judgment, because both, happening together, will demonstrate the dignity of our Lord equally, in so far as all will rise through him, and be judged by him.'

'Not that the duty of judgment is taken from the Father, but because the sight of those to be judged should fittingly fall beneath the sight of the judge, so this could conveniently be done through the *homo assumptus*; not because he held such a dignity through his own nature, but because God the Word dwelt in him, through Whom he was in fellowship (*communicat*) with the Father.'

It is implicit in this that the *homo assumptus* must judge, because we must receive judgment *ad modum recipientis*. Again, this is a reasonable interpretation, but one not necessarily implied by the text being expounded. In spite of Theodore's finding the *homo assumptus* in the text of *John*, he is often forced to use the concept in a strictly theoretical way. That is, the text itself implies the unity of Christ, and Theodore as a faithful interpreter of the text must expound that unity[6]:

'*And no one ascended into heaven, except he who came down from heaven, the Son of man, who is in heaven.* (3 : 13.) . . . If, indeed, any one wishes to understand what has been said, this "ascended" and "descended," as referring to the divinity, it would be an indication of great stupidity. . . . Moreover, if this is taken of the human nature . . . the word "descended" does not fit it; for (the human nature) was born of the seed of David, by no means did it descend from heaven. . . . But these two he joins together, speaking of those things which pertain to his human nature. And, because the meaning of what he said overcame the mind of Nicodemus, by joining them with the divine things he confirmed what he intended to say.'

The text confounds any attempt to read the *homo assumptus* and *Verbum assumens* into it. The 'one who ascended into heaven' can be described as the *homo assumptus*. And the 'one who descended'

can be thought of as the *Verbum assumens*. But the text explicitly equates the two expressions, and must, therefore, refer to the unity of the two natures. Thus far, Theodore's argument, while employing the Antiochene Christological terms, nevertheless remains a faithful exposition of the text. However, he must needs find some explanation of why the text speaks in this way. That explanation is that Christ wishes to present the Christological problem to Nicodemus in an extremely forceful way, because Nicodemus' knowledge of Christ is at this point imperfect.

Theodore certainly does read his Christology into *John*, but he often recognizes the difficulty involved in doing so. To return to the question asked at the outset, is Theodore's interpretation legitimate? The answer submitted by this writer is in the affirmative. In the first place, Theodore can surely be seen to have recognized the problem. In the second place, it is extremely difficult to make a theological interpretation of any part of the New Testament without going beyond the original meaning of the text. This sort of theological interpretation *ex post facto* was, furthermore, absolutely necessary to the theological development of Christian belief. Simply because the Gospels do not contain the Nicene Creed does not mean we must give up the attempt to see how far the Nicene Creed may be implied by the Gospels. In point of fact, Christian doctrine is supposed to be nothing more than a systematization of the witness of Scripture. In this sense, Theodore's interpretation of *John* is legitimate. In the third place, may there not be some justification for Theodore's reading the *homo assumptus* into *John* in *John* itself? The Fourth Gospel often has Jesus portrayed as quite subordinate to the Father, and subordinate in much the same way that the *homo assumptus* is subordinate in the Antiochene Christology. Theodore recognizes this characteristic of the Gospel as follows[7]:

'. . . for he was accustomed to refer all of his words and deeds (Christ's) to the Father, expressly furnishing testimony by saying: that what he himself spoke and did, these were not his own words and deeds. This will clearly appear from the words of the Lord, to any one who examines with care what was said.'

What is referred to here is the sort of language to be found in much of what Jesus is made to say in the Fourth Gospel. For example[8]:

'Jesus answered them, and said, My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me.'

'. . . the words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself:

but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.'

'. . . the word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's which sent me.'

'. . . my Father is greater than I.'

These passages from *John* would certainly seem to indicate that for the author of the Gospel, Jesus was in some sense subordinate to the Father, and yet through the indwelling (a good Antiochene word found in the second quotation above) of the Father, he accomplished the divine purpose. This aspect of the Johannine Christology, however, is but one side of the picture. On the other hand, *John* often speaks of the unity of the Father and the Son. And, there is really very little in what *John* says of Christ that would suggest a distinction between a human and a divine nature. It is this aspect of *John's* Christology that (in the last half of this chapter) we shall see Theodore struggling with. But, for now, we may conclude that *John* itself, in the subordinationist passages cited above, affords some justification for Theodore's doctrine of the *homo assumptus,* who is subordinate in nature to God, but by the indwelling of the Logos, is co-equal with God in honour and glory.

In Theodore's doctrine of redemption as the Adoption of Sons we can discern another point at which some reading of Antiochene theology into *John* is effected. The Adoption of Sons idea, of course, is taken from Romans 8. But it is used by Theodore with considerable frequency in his interpretation of *John.* In several passages, however, the doctrine seems at least suggested, if not implied, by the very text being interpreted[9]:

'*As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, to those who believe on his name,* etc. (1 : 12.) To those, he says, who receive him, this transaction [*negotium*] was by no means vain. For he gave them something great and excellent, that is, in so far as was possible to be done, he made them equal in honour with himself, by giving them the gift of adoption. They enjoy this grace, not by the natural order of generation by being reborn bodily; but they are given birth by means of divine power through similarity and affinity (to him).'

'. . . *This is the Son of God* (1 : 34). . . . We also are regenerated by the power of the Spirit and are made sons of God, on which account it is said: "the Spirit of the Adoption of Sons, whereby we cry Abba, our Father." The principle [*principium*] of these things is what happened in Christ incarnate, who was the first to be born in the Spirit, and, the Spirit mediating, was joined to the Only-begotten, whence he gained the true dignity of Adoption, and communicates to us as well the gift of the Spirit, by which we also are

regenerate and counted among the sons according to the measure of each one's power.'

In both the cases cited above, the phrase 'sons' of 'Son of God' found in the text naturally suggests Theodore's own version of the Adoption of Sons. The notion of Sonship is certainly quite prominent in the Fourth Gospel, and one can admit Theodore's interpretation to be quite legitimate. (One interesting footnote must be added. Note that in the second of the two passages just quoted, Theodore describes redemption as in some sense dependent upon the power or *virtus* of the person to be saved. Again freedom of will is seen to be of prime importance for Theodore.) With such support from the text of *John* Theodore does not hesitate to use the Adoption of Sons doctrine to interpret passages where it is not really implied [10]:

'*Holy Father, preserve in thy name them that thou hast given me, that they may be one as we are:* (17 : 11) that is, just as you united me to God the Father, the Spirit mediating, and made me worthy of Adoption so that I could call you my Father; so also . . . make them sons so that, just as I am, they themselves may also be one, and may have the same union with you and faithfully call you father.'

Romans 8 is then adduced by way of further explanation. Theodore is perfectly justified in explaining the text by the Adoption of Sons doctrine. That this is so is not simply the result of the fact that Sonship is to be found in the Fourth Gospel itself. It is also justified by Theodore's exegetical principle (drawn from rabbinic sources in all probability), that one passage in Scripture may be explained by another. Thus, if there is but imperfect justification for finding the *homo assumptus* in *John,* it would seem to be perfectly legitimate to interpret many passages in the Gospel in terms of Romans 8. In fact, there could hardly be any more explicit statement of the Adoption of Sons doctrine than the Johannine phrase : 'to them gave he power to become the sons of God.'

Another point at which Theodore is probably reading his own views into *John* is to be found in his interpretation of the title 'Son of God.' Theodore claims that the words refer to the *homo assumptus* [11]:

'Moreover, the words "This is the Son of God" do not mean the divine nature, indicating his divine generation, but refer to the human nature because of its union [*coniunctionem*] with the Only-begotten.'

This interpretation is made necessary by the Adoption of Sons idea as Theodore reads it into *John*. Of course, as has been pointed out, the author of the Fourth Gospel makes no real distinction between the human and the divine natures of Christ, and so to apply the title 'Son of God' to one of the two natures is a hardly justifiable reading of later theological terms into the New Testament. Some ground is given for such an application, however, at various points in the Gospel, notably the Prologue. There we read that the Word gave men power 'to become the sons of God.' If the title is applied to us men, it is because we share in the primal Sonship of Christ. Then, it would appear that the title should be proper to the human nature of Christ. However, this reasoning from the text of the Gospel is apparently contradicted in chapter ten. There the Jews accuse Jesus of blasphemy in making Himself equal to God [12]:

'Say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?'

This verse certainly seems to equate the title with Jesus' claim to divinity. But Theodore interprets the verse differently [13]:

'And yet, behold it is written in your Law to men: *Ye are Gods.* It was permissible that this should be said to them in this simple phrase—for they were not changed into the divine nature, but by the grace of God they received this title.'

And in a similar passage (5: 18) Theodore comments [14]:

'*But he also called God his Father, making himself equal with God.* For, they murmured, it wasn't just that he called God Father, but that he so called Him Father as if he himself proceeded from Him and was equal to Him in virtue and power. . . . Any one is a fool who thinks that this word (Son) could have suggested to the Jews who heard it the claim of equality with God, because everywhere at that time men were called sons of God, and God was called the Father of men; . . .'

The passage continues with the citation of texts from Scripture to prove the point. It is by means of such an argument that Theodore is able to apply 'Son of God' consistently to the *homo assumptus*. In conclusion, Theodore's interpretation of 'Son of God' is not totally unwarranted by the text of *John*. However, the fact that the Gospel does not really make the theological distinction between the two natures in Christ, means that Theodore must resort to a certain amount of sophistry to preserve his interpretation.

One final point at which we can see a possible twisting of the text is in Theodore's interpretation of the 'Word became flesh' verse of the Prologue [15]:

'*And the Word was made flesh.* He used this phrase in a very striking way. "Behold, he says, He deigned to become as flesh." Since this was, in point of fact, the opinion of those who saw Him —because He existed in such a humble way in man that this alone was believed by many, just as He appeared—so to explain the phrase was added: *and He tabernacled among us.* That is, in this sense was He made flesh, in so far as He dwelt in our nature. For the words "tabernacled among us" obviously stand for "dwelt among us," as the Apostle also says of us men: *We who are in this tabernacle do groan* (2 Cor. 5: 4), calling our body a tabernacle; and again, *For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved* (ibid., 5: 1). And it must be noted that Scripture uses the word "flesh" to designate the whole man, for example, *To Thee shall all flesh come* (Ps. 64: 2). And so in the present passage, when it says "The Word was made flesh," it means "The Word was made in man." But this phrase "was made" is not used as though He were changed, but because it was so believed on account of the appearance.'

The passage is a fine example of Theodore's method of quoting one portion of Scripture to explain another. Even the juxtaposition of 'the Word was made flesh' and 'and dwelt among us' is an instance of this method. Furthermore, the passage is consonant with Theodore's interpretation of the text elsewhere. The Word became flesh in the sense that the Word dwelt within a man assumed from all men, and became flesh only 'on account of the appearance' (*propter apparentiam,* perhaps, *kata to dokein*). Is this interpretation of Theodore's correct? It is difficult to know precisely what *John* means. And, in point of fact, to attempt to arrive at some 'true' interpretation would be simply to add that interpretation to all the others that have been suggested. One thing is clear, and that is that *John* is thinking neither in terms of the Antiochene nor the Alexandrian Christologies or interpretations of the verse. One danger is that, conditioned as we are by the Cyrillian Christology, we may feel constrained to interpret the passage in terms of the Word-flesh, Alexandrian system. The really remarkable fact is that Cyril interprets the verse in much the same way as Theodore [16]:

'. . . for, indeed, when it says that the Word of God became flesh, lest any one from great ignorance should understand the statement to mean that (the Word) ran away from His own nature

and really was changed into flesh . . . the theologian quite rightly puts the next phrase immediately after—"and tabernacled among us." (He does this) so that he might make his meaning clear that there are two—the one who tabernacled [*ton skênounta*] and the one in whom the tabernacling is, lest you might think that He was turned into flesh rather than that He tabernacled in the flesh. . . .'

This does not prove that Theodore's interpretation of the 'Word became flesh' is the correct one; but it does show that from the point of view of the fifth century, it was an interpretation more or less acceptable to all.

In what has been said so far, we have discovered that while many of Theodore's doctrines do impose themselves upon *John,* there is some justification in the text itself for the kind of interpretation Theodore offers. In other words, in examining Theodore's exegesis from a theological point of view, we have found that the interpretation given is a fairly literal one and one modified only by the necessity of interpreting an essentially unsophisticated (at least from a fifth century viewpoint) work so far as theology is concerned, in the light of at least three centuries of theological tradition. That is, *John* was not meant to be theology in the same sense that Theodore's commentary was. Let us now turn to points at which *John* seems to modify Theodore's theology. With discussion of this point we shall have arrived full circle, and shall have seen most of the important interactions of theology and exegesis in the *Commentary on John.* This discussion will consider Christ's knowledge, His divinity and the unity of His Person, and the lack of a sense of time and history in *John,* together with the effect of these ideas upon Theodore's views. In the commentary, as in the Gospel itself,[17] Christ is often spoken of as having perfect knowledge of the future. Such a view would not seem to accord very well with Theodore's notion of the *homo assumptus* as a man limited in all human respects as we are. Let us turn, before considering this question, to instances in which Theodore portrays Jesus as omniscient in this sense[18]:

'Our Lord, when people first came to Him, in order to confirm their belief altogether, was accustomed to begin suitably to tell them things which were evident to them (alone), so that He might reveal His own secret omniscience.'

'By His own question (whence shall we buy bread) to Philip He intended to expose the disciples to doubt, so that they might the better observe the wonder which was to be performed.'

'You seem not yet to know me, He says; and you are ignorant that I cannot unwillingly be taken by death. . . . So it is impossible

for anything to happen to me unwillingly. For I have the light of knowledge [*lucem scientiae*], and because I know everything [*omnia scio*] on that account, nothing happens to me unless I will it [*praeter voluntatem meam*].'

The first of these three passages is meant to explain Jesus' knowledge about Nathaniel; the second, John's statement that before the Feeding of the Five Thousand Jesus 'Himself knew what He would do'; the third, Jesus' statement of His own knowledge after the raising of Lazarus. In all three cases, *John* describes Jesus as having perfect knowledge; and the reason for such statements would seem to be to avoid any implication that Jesus did not know what the outcome of His actions would be. But Theodore, while he echoes the strong emphasis of the text upon Jesus' omniscience, tries to alter the reason for that emphasis. In the first two cases, the reason Theodore gives for Jesus' prescience is one not to guard His divinity, but rather to 'confirm' His followers' belief. In the last case, Jesus' knowledge secures His free will in offering Himself upon the Cross. Theodore nowhere contradicts the text that he is explaining, but by these subtle changes of emphasis he tries to draw the texts into his conception of the *homo assumptus*. In point of fact, it must be admitted that Theodore does not always succeed very well; and these statements of Jesus' knowledge certainly modify the impression, if not the theological definition, of the *homo assumptus*.

In at least one passage Theodore seems to succumb entirely to the idea that Jesus had perfect knowledge[19]:

'The words: *the Son can do nothing of Himself* must not be taken in the sense of powerlessness [*impotentiae*], as is clear from what has been said, since even men do many things by themselves. Therefore, it is fitting that we turn this to another sense. Why is it impossible for the Son to do anything by Himself?—on account of His undivided equality with the Father, because this natural union [*haec naturalis unio*] brings about a great consensus of will, to the extent that it is impossible for the Son to will what the Father does not will. For divine nature by no means becomes acquainted with events successively in time; but from the beginning, by His foreknowledge, He knew all the future events, and what ought to be done concerning them. Moreover, the Son possesses this knowledge equally. He has all things in common with the Father, even willing; for which reason, He has neither intention nor thought in opposition to the Father, because even He Himself wishes to do everything equally with Him.'

This passage is a difficult one for several reasons. It might imply

that Jesus had no independent will—*Omnia communia habet cum Patre, etiam voluntatem.* It speaks of a *unio naturalis* (*henôsis phusikê,* perhaps); and it attributes the non-successive, divine omniscience to the Son, a title reserved for the *homo assumptus.* This writer has puzzled over the passage, but can find no way of making it consonant with the tendency of Theodore's thought. One can hardly find any really strong justification in the text of *John* for the disquisition in the commentary. The only way in which to rescue the passage from an Alexandrian interpretation is to say that by 'Son' Theodore means the divine nature or Word of God. And yet, this would in itself represent an inconsistency; and, furthermore, why speak of a 'natural union' in any case. One might say that this part of the commentary represents the high water mark of *John's* influence upon Theodore's theology.

Even though in some places Jesus' foreknowledge as described in *John* modifies Theodore's whole picture of the *homo assumptus,* there are other passages where the divine knowledge is forced into some sort of agreement with the usual Antiochene position. For example, John 2 : 24–5 reads :

'But Jesus did not commit himself unto them, because he knew all men, And needed not that any should testify of man : for he knew what was in man.'

The knowledge thus described is not necessarily an intellectual or a psychic one; Jesus is not described as knowing the future, but simply as understanding man and men's hearts. Theodore takes advantage of this description of Jesus' knowledge as a moral one to say [20] :

'Moreover, in these words a singular doctrine of true faith is held. For the power of Christ's knowledge is manifested; because of this He was by no means deceived by the appearance of those who came to Him, but since He knew all men distinctly, He already knew who would be His true disciples, and who would hesitate within themselves, or would come to Him under a false appearance.'

Thus, Jesus is simply a supreme example of a good judge of character. And even more than that, Jesus has a prophetic knowledge [21] :

'*Lord, I see that thou art a prophet.* For only a prophet can reveal what is hidden for all men.'

The prophet, because of the particular grace God has bestowed upon him, is able to see what is hidden to the generality of mankind. The idea of Jesus' knowledge as prophetic would certainly help Theodore solve his problem of what to do with the statements in *John*; but it must also be admitted that at this point, anyway, the idea is implied by the text of *John*. Furthermore, Theodore does not seem to use the idea outside this passage. In another place Theodore seems to associate Jesus' knowledge with His divine nature [22]:

'Nevertheless, it is not to be wondered that, since there was in him that which should be revealed and since he had already said several things as a man, he should from there turn to words suitable to his divine nature. For these words had to be said to the disciples, so that when they recalled what he had said afterwards, and when their meaning was understood, they might possess in their mind perfect knowledge, just as also in the resurrection, they did not understand the words they heard (about it) beforehand, but afterwards indeed comprehended. . . . This, moreover, could not otherwise be manifested than by words pertaining to his divinity, which hitherto lay the more hidden from their mind.'

This commentary is upon the verse: *The words which I speak, I do not speak of myself.* (14: 10.) Thus, in accordance with Theodore's usual way of dividing the text between the Word and the *homo assumptus,* this particular verse must be appropriate to the divine nature of Christ. Hitherto, Jesus' knowledge has been attributed implicitly or explicitly by Theodore to the *homo assumptus.* But, even though the Word is the subject in this case, Theodore still tries to find a reason for the divine knowledge which will accord more easily with his point of view. Therefore, he suggests that the explanation lies in Jesus' wish to strengthen the disciples' belief. This passage also points out another interesting aspect of *John*. Events are narrated, and it is then explained that after the resurrection the disciples understood the true significance of those events. In other words, the perfect knowledge of their experience with Jesus comes only to the disciples after He has been raised from the dead. It can be seen from the passages that have been cited that Theodore betrays considerable confusion in dealing with Jesus' knowledge as portrayed in the Fourth Gospel. That such confusion is natural can be seen by any consideration of the fifth century Christological controversies. There, whenever the controversy centres upon Christ's knowledge, there seems to be a noticeable drift on the part of the 'orthodox' toward docetism or at

least Apollinarianism. Theodore does attempt to deal with the question honestly. He does try to understand Christ's knowledge in terms of the dispensation *re* the disciples, or in terms of a guarantee of Christ's free will; but in faithfully expounding the text, Theodore is forced to allow this notion of divine knowledge to modify his Christology. That is, in the case we have been discussing, the Fourth Gospel does seem to introduce into Theodore's thought an idea really alien to it.

In one respect we have already seen the Antiochene picture of Jesus Christ altered. We must turn to a number of passages which go even further to change the impression one gets from the Antiochene Christology. It has already been asserted that the Fourth Gospel often represents Christ as subordinate to the Father. However, this subordination is but one aspect of the Gospel. On the other hand, Christ seems to be described in terms far more concordant with the Alexandrian notion of the *theanthrôpos*, the God-Man, than with the careful distinction drawn by the Antiochenes. The Gospel explicitly states the perfect unity between Father and Son, the unity that can ultimately be described by saying: 'I and the Father are one.' This does not erase the distinction between Father and Son, any more than the unity of the Son and us believers erases the distinction between Him and us. But it does tend, in the opinion of this writer, to erase the distinction between the God incarnate and the human nature. No one would claim that the Fourth Gospel is an Apollinarian Gospel; but it would certainly seem to be more in accord with such views than with the Antiochene Christology. Just as the miracles wrought by Christ are signs (*sêmeia*) in which the eternal order of things is manifested by and somehow made one with the temporal order, so Christ Himself seems to be a sign (*sêmeion*). Christ is the Word of God, yet somehow this eternal order of things is manifested in and through a man in such a way that the man and the Word become one and the same. The eternal and the temporal realms have at this one point merged into one another. If this interpretation is at all faithful to *John*, it is clear why Theodore finds some difficulty in reading the *homo assumptus-Verbum assumens* distinction into the Gospel. The fact is that no such distinction is really made in *John*; the only kind of distinction made is between the Father and the Son and the believers. Perhaps some justification for this view of the Christology in *John* will be afforded by a consideration of several passages where *John* and Theodore clash, and where Theodore is forced to relinquish his own Christology in order to allow the text of the Gospel to speak for itself.

In several places Theodore is quite able to interpret the lack of any distinction between the two natures in terms of his usual formulæ. That is, the unity of natures evident in *John* is described in technical terms as the *prosôpon* of union [23]:

'Everywhere, whether it is a question of divine things or human, he places the pronoun "I," so that the sense of the statements can be recognized by the context, the difference of natures appearing from the difference of words. And from the fact that in both cases he speaks of himself as though of one there is manifested the unity of person [*adhaesionem personae*]; because if this were not true, the one who was assumed would have no honour, as he clearly does have in everything because of the one who indwells him.'

The one *prosôpon* implies a unity of honour and glory, but by no means obliterates the distinction of natures. *John* certainly does not imply this, but we may allow that Theodore is not reading his doctrine into *John* in any really illegitimate way. The same sort of Antiochene doctrine is used to explain the text: 'I and the Father are one' (10: 30) [24]:

'The term "one" means first consensus, then similarity, and many other things. For example, when it says: *The spirit and the heart of the multitude of those that believed was one and the same* (Acts 4: 32), it obviously uses "one" of the consensus of minds. And again, when it says: *In one Spirit have we all been baptized into one body* (1 Cor. 12: 13), what is designated is obviously the similarity of nature, because all of us are indeed transformed through spiritual regeneration into others, and each one of us acts as a member of Christ, and all of us are gathered into one body. . . . Since it is, therefore, clear that the term "one" is spoken in different ways—for sometimes it means similarity; sometimes, consensus—we do not have to seek whether it means something else elsewhere. Rather this must be examined: how and with what meaning it is used here, whether of equality or in some other sense. Moreover, the context itself indicates this; and the context must be heavily relied upon in interpreting a discourse. Indeed, he says "one" concerning worth [*virtute*], in so far as his is greater and more powerful than all. . . .'

The unity between God and man is here the perfect union of free will and grace, of *virtus*. But, while Theodore seems to be interpreting the text in terms of the union between the Word and the *homo assumptus,* the text itself makes no such reference. Rather it describes the union between Father and Son. Theodore is twisting the passage a little for his purpose; but the fact that he fails to

mention the *homo assumptus* specifically and leaves it somewhat vague as to which nature he is speaking of, leads this writer to believe he recognized the difficulty presented by the passage to his own theological views.

It will be remembered that Theodore rejected the *communicatio idiomatum* as formulated by the Alexandrians. The only community of attributes he recognized was that all attributes might be attributed to the *prosôpon* of union, and that the Word conferred upon the *homo assumptus* a community of worship and honour with Himself. In the *Commentary on John* Theodore does not alter this position. He still refuses to admit that all attributes may be attributed to the divine Word. But the fact that *John* makes no distinction in the subject of the attributes belonging to Jesus Christ leads Theodore to expand slightly the list of attributes conferred by the Word upon the *homo assumptus*. We have already seen that the Word gives Jesus the power of judgment. But in the following passage the *homo assumptus* receives much more than that[25]:

'It is so, for example, with blessed Paul; for when he says: *God spoke to us in His Son, whom He made heir of the universe,* (Hebrews 1 : 2), he meant the man who was assumed, and signified that he spoke in a human manner, and that, although he was not the Lord of creation (lit. things), he received lordship over it through his union with the Word of God, because the Word as the author of things also has dominion over them; but understanding that what was said exceeded the nature of the one the discourse was about, he added the following: *through whom He also made the ages,* that from the attribution of the divine nature universal dominion could also fit this visible one. Similarly also here he argues from what applies to the divine nature and excuses himself thereby from the aforesaid charge; and with this reasoning, he converts the discourse to the human nature, that he may teach that he (the *homo assumptus*) received supernatural gifts from the divine.'

'*I know that you always hear me, but because of the people who were standing about, I said this, that they might believe that you sent me.* (11 : 42.) Although these words were said from the part of man, nevertheless he shows that he has omnipotence [*omnipotentiam*], by that which he received from God the Word, on account of his union with Him.'

In the first of these passages the *homo assumptus* receives dominion and supernatural gifts; but these gifts are really no more than were promised to man made in the image of God. That their perfection is to be found in Christ in no way impairs His humanity. But in

the second passage, one of the supernatural gifts appears to be 'omnipotence.' The divine nature is still working through and in the *homo assumptus*; but the man Jesus is somehow thought to be omnipotent. It was said in an earlier chapter that the *homo assumptus* received the title Lord, implying universal domination and perhaps even omnipotence. But that title was not conferred upon Christ until the resurrection, until He had received the perfected, immutable union with the Logos. Of course, the fact that we must work from a Latin translation of a Syriac translation of the Greek may affect the passage. But even so, it would seem that Theodore is describing the *homo assumptus* as much less limited by his humanity than would be expected from other passages in his works. One other passage will confirm this impression [26]:

'For he tells where he has such power of operating: (5 : 26) *For as the Father has life in Him: so He gives the Son also the power to have life in him, and gives him power to perform judgment.* "The Father," he says, "gave him the same power as His own for raising from the dead, and He gives him the same power of judgment." Well does he say this of the man, because by his union with God the Word, he receives omnipotence like the Father, for God the Word, who was in him, can do everything as the Father.

'Therefore, it is evident, that all this is said of the man who was assumed: because from this phrase, *for the Father judges no one,* he transfers the whole speech to the *homo assumptus.*'

Here Theodore's identification of the Son with the *homo assumptus* makes it necessary for him to attribute some kind of omnipotence to the *homo assumptus.* Again Theodore's attempt to interpret the text faithfully, and yet to find in it his Christology, leads him into confusion and into statements hardly reconcilable with his position as found elsewhere.

The last line of the passage quoted above shows Theodore giving an interpretation of this conferment of omnipotence that is similar to parts of his interpretation of Christ's knowledge. The assertion of omnipotence is to confirm the statements about Christ ('. . . this is introduced into the narrative to confirm the things that have been said'), just as Christ's knowledge is to confirm the belief of the disciples. One is reminded of the preface of the commentary, where Theodore states that John was especially concerned with demonstrating Christ's divinity. The *virtus* of the human nature is always confirmed by being referred to the divine nature indwelling it. (*Vide,* e.g., the passage cited on page 135, *supra.*) Theodore echoes this notion in his commentary [27]:

'He said that this bread had descended from heaven, just as we explained above. Therefore, he did not wish to mean that his body had descended thence; but he spoke in this way because his sublime nature is the gift of that matter. By alluding to the magnitude of the divinity, he confirms his word.'

'He is accustomed to speak of himself figuratively to the Jews, especially when he wishes to reveal the dignity of his humanity, and when he alludes to the nature of his divinity by which he was made a consort of the whole dignity of That One. . . .'

'What it means, therefore, is this; to be sure, he was designating the similarity of the divine nature with the Father. For the man who was assumed could not be said to be similar to God the Father. But the miracles, performed by the man, obviously exceeded the nature of him who did them.'

By alluding to the divine nature dwelling within him, the *homo assumptus* 'confirms his word,' 'reveals the dignity of his humanity,' and is enabled to perform miracles which 'exceeded the nature of him who did them.' In all these cases Theodore is searching for some way to preserve the emphasis of *John* upon Christ's divinity and yet to maintain his own Christological distinction. That he fails is rather a tribute to his method of exegesis than a slur upon his theology. In confronting the Christological descriptions in *John,* Theodore is really baffled. He attempts to interpret the *theanthrôpos* or the Christ-*sêmeion* in terms of the Antiochene theology. In certain passages he is fairly successful. But more often, his attempts to twist the text and yet preserve its true meaning end in frustration. He tries to show that the Logos confers powers upon the *homo assumptus,* and he adopts the rather weak explanation that by referring to the divine nature, the human nature is revealed in all its fullness. But these attempts, while partially successful, cannot disguise the fact that Theodore allows the description of Christ in *John* to affect his own. The Antiochene theology is by no means undermined; but instead of seeing a picture of Christ as a man just as we are with human choices and limitations, we see the Christ of *John* reflected in Theodore's commentary.

At one other point *John* seems to this writer to modify Theodore's general position. It will be remembered that one of Theodore's most striking insights, characteristic of his thought, is his sense of time and history. That sense seems to be somewhat clouded in the *Commentary on John.* Of course, it does not disappear completely; and if the commentary is read in the light of Theodore's other works, it can be found in a number of places. For example, the use of typology in his sacramental theology implies for Theodore the notion of the Two Ages. But, it would be quite

possible to interpret this typology in the *Commentary on John* without any reference to time or to the Two Ages. In fact, were one to read this commentary alone, it would appear to be perfectly true that Theodore's sacramental doctrine involves a relationship of temporal and eternal, rather than present and future. In speaking of redemption Theodore still sometimes keeps this notion of *future* salvation clear [28]:

'Because also from this we receive from him the firstfruits of the Spirit, with the hope of future resurrection; now this transaction [*negotium*] is accomplished only figuratively, but then indeed we hope to receive the perfect grace. . . .'

'. . . these events will be so clear as to conquer your incredulity; for it will happen that the Son of Man will ascend to heaven, which so far has happened to no man.'

But the fact remains that such passages are somewhat difficult to find. And, indeed, the only really clear statement of the doctrine of the Two Ages that could be found by this writer in the commentary is the one quoted *supra,* page 130 top. And in passages where one might expect some reference to the Two Ages, no such reference is made. For example, in the passage quoted towards the top of page 127, Theodore is describing Christ as the *principium* of our redemption. While time is certainly present in Theodore's thought, it is pushed to the background. In fact, instead of referring to Christ's resurrection as an introduction into the future life and Second Age, Theodore calls it 'another life,' *vita alia.* It is submitted that this way of speaking is impressed upon Theodore by *John.* For the Fourth Gospel seldom speaks of things in terms of their historical or temporal relationship. And this statement can be made despite Theodore's hopeful assertion that John's chronology is the best. Rather the whole tendency of the Gospel is to speak in terms of a merging of the temporal and the eternal. This, essentially, is what a 'sign' or *sêmeion* is. Therefore, time, at least so far as the work of our redemption goes, is of little importance. C. H. Dodd expresses much this same interpretation of the Fourth Gospel [29]:

'The primitive eschatological Gospel of Christianity declared that that which was to come has come: "Old things have passed away: behold new things have come into being." The Prologue on the other hand is based upon the philosophical conception of two orders of being, distinguished not by succession in time, but by the greater or less measure of reality which they possess. There is the order of pure reality, transcendent and eternal, which is the very

thought of God, and there is the empirical order, which is real only as it expresses the eternal order.'

This fundamentally Platonic way of looking at things imposes itself upon Theodore to the extent that it causes him to drop any explicit use of the doctrine of the Two Ages. One has only to compare, even cursorily, his *Commentary on the Minor Epistles of Saint Paul* with the commentary under present discussion to see how true this is.

This present chapter has attempted to focus upon Theodore's exegesis and theology by showing how they react upon one another in certain aspects of the *Commentary on John*. Generalizations are, of course, dangerous and limited in their application. But what conclusions can be drawn from this discussion? To some extent Theodore changes *John* by forcing the Gospel into the mould of Antiochene theology. But some such modification is necessary if only because Theodore was interpreting *John* in the light of three centuries of theological development. Furthermore, to a certain extent, what Theodore reads into *John*, while not necessarily implied by the Gospel, is nevertheless not wholly illegitimate and out of place. On the other hand, at a number of points, aspects of *John* cause Theodore considerable difficulty. He is forced to incorporate into his thought some notion of Christ's knowledge; he must accommodate his Christological distinctions to a view of Christ which really failed to take account of any such distinction; and he is led to abandon to some extent his strong emphasis upon time and history. In all of these respects Theodore's theology suffers some modification from *John*. In discussing how the theological principle and the exegetical principle meet in the commentary, we have tried to show that if either one wins out, it is the exegetical principle. To come full circle, we must declare that Theodore was above all an exegete. His theology is but a systematization of his exegesis, even though that theology is in many respects a brilliant one. And from this discussion of Theodore's exegesis of *John*, it can be stated with more assurance than ever that the theology discussed in the first four chapters of this essay is the product of careful, sound exegesis of Scripture.

CONCLUSION

IN the course of our discussion of Theodore of Mopsuestia we have repeatedly found his theology proceeding from Scripture and his exegesis motivated by a theological purpose. In considering his theology and exegesis, it is extremely difficult, nay, impossible to determine which of the two comes first in logic or in time. The two are simply double aspects of the structure of thought discernible in Theodore's works—a structure thereby grounded solidly in the firm foundation of Scripture and reason. The important characteristics of this exegetical, theological structure are (1) a real sense of time, (2) a strong doctrine of God as the Creator, and yet of Christ as the *vinculum amicitiae* binding the Creator and the created into perfect communion, (3) a realization of the importance of human freedom to live the good life, both in Christ and in us, and (4) a reverence for the record of God and Christ recorded through history in the sacred writings of the Jewish and Christian people. For Theodore, theology is a rational description of the events in this age which culminate in the revelation of the Second Age in Christ. Thus, all doctrines are cast in terms of the history of God's providential *kêdemonia* or care for us His children. And still this providential care leaves us free to accept or reject it. Such acceptance and rejection is the prime theme of the sacred documents which nourish Theodore's thought.

To-day we are faced with a great theological task. In a sense it is the same task that has always confronted Christians, but with the accumulation of time and of interpretations of those events which lie at the heart of what we must say, the task has become increasingly difficult. Our theological systems have tended to become not only remote from those to whom we would preach the good news of Jesus Christ, but also remote from the Scripture adduced as the authority for our preaching. We are in the embarrassing position of preaching a Christ 'of two natures in one person' to people who may not even know that 'in Him dwelt all the fullness of God bodily' or that 'He was tempted at all points like unto us, yet without sin.' We know not what to do with our theology, and we cannot find a way of making the Bible understandable, save as a mysterious sanction for quaint and somewhat esoteric beliefs about a first century Jew. This contemporary problem has been approached

in one of two ways. That is, some have attempted to formulate a new theology by translating the old theology into the new philosophy. They have sought to interpret Christianity to our age by freeing traditional theology from its philosophical matrix and transplanting it into modern philosophy. The endeavour is a noble one, and has been at least as successful as attempts to perpetuate the traditional Christian formulæ, considering neither modern ignorance of their significance nor the fact that the milieu which produced the formulæ is quite different from the present one. On the other hand, some have abandoned the theological tradition in an attempt to interpret the Bible, first in terms of what it was meant to say, and second, in terms we moderns can understand. What this effort fails to consider is that it is wellnigh impossible to separate Scripture from the tradition of interpretation associated with it. To some extent, the Bible itself embodies a history of interpretation. The Old Testament constantly interprets the early traditions of Israel, and from one point of view, the New Testament is hardly more than a commentary upon the Old with specific reference to the man who made such an interpretation possible. Nor can the strictly Biblical critics avoid using some kind of philosophical presuppositions.

No one would suggest that Theodore answers our modern dilemma. Yet the issues involved in his thought are essentially the same issues confronting us—what to do with the Bible, and how to interpret it theologically. (Even the Christological problem remains the same. In a modern seminary it is relatively easy to begin a debate on Christology which will have all the characteristics of the fifth century controversies.) And in confronting these issues Theodore sought to construct a system based on a rational use of the Bible, and a Biblical use of reason. May not this be a guide-post for our own theological endeavour? Must not we seek to re-ally theology and Scripture, and use that alliance as the strong foundation of a preaching and teaching of Christ which will be not only faithful to the scriptural record, but also considerate of modern understanding or lack of understanding? For, unless we preach a Christ that can be understood (at least in part) by modern minds and felt by modern hearts, our beliefs must remain cold and remote indeed. And, such an understanding can come only when we choose to preach Christ from Scripture and tradition in such a way that His pilgrimage becomes definitive of our own.

APPENDED NOTE

THEODORE'S DEBT TO IRENAEUS AND ORIGEN

IN the preceding text little has been said with regard to the relationship between Theodore's thought and the traditions of patristic thought current in the fourth and fifth centuries. The reason for this is that to formulate an interpretation of those traditions would be a task really beyond the range of the modest purpose of the present volume. To be sure, something has been said of the Antiochene school of thought and exegesis to which Theodore belongs; and certain parallels with such writers as Nemesius, Theophilus, and Irenaeus were adduced in the course of the argument. But no real attempt was made to assign Theodore's place in the full history of patristic writing. It may not be out of place, however, for this writer to indicate in this appended note the lines along which he would proceed to the task just outlined. Generally speaking, it seems permissible to view the fourth century theological controversies as a series of clashes between two opposing theological traditions. (*Vide* the article by Brooks Otis, *Cappadocian Thought,* in volumes IX–X of the Dumbarton Oaks Papers.) If any names can be associated with the fountain heads of these two traditions, they are the names of Irenaeus and Origen. The 'Irenaean' tradition took an economic view of the Trinity, and thought of salvation in terms of a *theôsis*. The eternal principle of the *agenêtos* was thought to be introduced into humanity in such a way that *genesia* was stayed and mortality and corruptibility replaced by immortality and incorruptibility. This view of salvation finds classic expression in Athanasius' statement: 'God became man that man might be divinized.' In terms of Christology, the Irenaean tradition was forced by its general tenour and, specifically, its view of salvation, to think of the union of natures as a substantial one. This Irenæan tradition may be found not only in Irenaeus and Tertullian and the West, but also in the works of Athanasius, Marcellus of Ancyra, Apollinaris, and, of course, Cyril of Alexandria.

By the 'Origenist' tradition must not be meant the theological system of Origen, as such. Certain doctrines, such as that of the pre-existence of souls, never attained any kind of general acceptance. On the other hand, Origen's solution of the problem of how the Word was generated (*aiei genêtos*) was universally adopted. Rather than as any specific body of doctrine, the Origenist tradition must be taken to refer to the general spirit of Origen's thought as rescued for posterity by the Cappadocians. The notion of God's

providence, on the one hand, and of man's freedom, on the other hand, seem to this writer the two foundation stones of Origen's thought. Sin, salvation, and even the *anakatastasis* are thought of in terms of these two concepts. In particular, salvation tends to mean, for the Origenist tradition, the liberation of the soul from the prison-house of the body. Together with this essentially Platonic notion of salvation goes the ability to view the Godhead in a similarly Platonic way. Thus, for Origen, the mediatorial Logos is subordinate to the Father; and, for the Cappadocians, a more or less social view of the Trinity is possible. Of course, these brief descriptions of the two traditions are highly generalized. And yet, in terms of the history of the fourth century, they can be used as helpful *schemata*. The clash between the two is nowhere more clearly to be seen than in the Arian controversy. Marcellus of Ancyra, as the most logical exponent of the Irenaean, and Arius, of the Origenist tradition, represent the two poles of the controversy. The fact that Athanasius was thought by many to be a Marcellan and a Sabellian is a clear indication that in the East an Origenist tradition had been maintained even apart from the extreme Arians. The Cappadocians may be thought of as the great vindicators of that tradition, and yet as those who were able to accommodate the Origenist tradition to Athanasius' Trinitarian doctrine. In some sense, through the Cappadocians there may be seen a synthesis of the two traditions.

The question raised for the present writer from these rather hasty generalizations is: what relationship does Theodore bear to the two traditions. From one point of view, the two traditions are really beside the point so far as Theodore is concerned. That is, Theodore's thought seems to be deeply influenced by an Antiochene tradition, rather Semitic in character, which was pretty much independent of Irenaeus and Origen. Thus, the Antiochene position *vis-à-vis* the fourth century controversies was one which fought as hard against the Irenaean tradition as seen in Apollinaris as it did against the Origenist tradition as seen in Arius. Furthermore, Theodore's thought comes after the great Cappadocian synthesis. Thus, the strands of the two traditions have become so twined together as to make their separation difficult. However, despite the above considerations, there are certainly important ways in which Theodore's system is related both to the Irenaean and to the Origenist traditions. We may take Theodore's view of Christ's person as a case in point. Christ, for Theodore, is the perfect human expression of man's use of free will. He is also the culmination of God's providential governance of the world. God's grace and man's free will

are the two determining ideas in Theodore's view of Christ and, indeed, of the universal order of things. It is interesting to observe that these ideas at least carry the same labels as what we have called the foundation stones of the Origenist tradition. Further, it is necessary to observe that the notion of Christ as the culmination of God's providence is phrased by Theodore in language very like Irenaeus' doctrine of *anakephalaiôsis*, recapitulation. Theodore's use of the two traditions may be seen from this vantage point. First, let us examine his use of the Irenaean tradition and the *anakephalaiôsis* doctrine. Second, let us examine the relationship of Theodore's concept of grace and free will with Origen's notion of providence and free will. This dual examination should suggest the general way in which Theodore's system is thought by the present writer to be related to the whole body of patristic thought.

In considering Irenaeus' doctrine of the *anakephalaiôsis,* it is first necessary to show how the particular doctrine is related to the balance of the system and to the polemical point of view from which the system developed. It should be remembered that the very title of Irenaeus' work suggests that it is to be a comprehensive refutation of all erroneous presentations of Christianity. For Irenaeus, these errors took the form largely of what we call gnostic systems, in other words systems of theology based on the Platonic notions of an emanating Godhead and a rejection of matter. These systems involved taking the various qualities and operations of God and separating them into hierarchies. Thus, the Demiurge, that is, the Creator God of the Old Testament, was thought to be distinct from God Himself, and so forth. And this separation was carried into Christology as well. Irenaeus' refutation of the gnostics inevitably began with the assertion of God's unity, and with the statement that the God of the Old Testament is the same as the God of the New. (*Vide,* e.g., *Adv. Haer.* II, 30, 9.) This view of God, clearly designed to counteract the gnostic heresies, presents an almost monarchian, or at least an economic, view of the Trinity. The Word and the Holy Spirit are God's hands and in many passages are thought of largely as operations of the Godhead. The same monarchian tendency is to be found in Irenaeus' view of Christ. (*Vide,* e.g., *Adv. Haer.* III, 9, 3 and IV, 1, 3.) While it is true that Irenaeus' formulations are considerably earlier than the dogmatic definitions of the councils, nevertheless they do represent the source of the tradition found in Athanasius' insistence upon the unity of God and of Christ's person.

Into the context of this view of God and the world was set by Irenaeus the notion of Christ as recapitulating Adam, the *ana-*

kephalaiôsis. Let us first examine this view as found in Irenaeus, and then turn to the question of Theodore's debt to Irenaeus' presentation. Perhaps the *locus classicus* for the view is *Adv. Haer.* IV, 38, 1–3. There Irenaeus asks the question: why did God not create man 'perfect from the beginning.' The answer is that, while with God 'all things are possible,' nevertheless 'things created must be subordinate to the one who has made them.' And because they fall short of the perfect, they must be child-like (*nêpia*). But the imperfect creation is gradually educated into perfection through God's providence and by the agency of His Word. 'Our Lord in the last time came to us, recapitulating (*anakephalaiôsomenos*) all things in Himself. . . . as for children (*nêpiois*) the perfect bread of the Father furnished Himself as milk for us.' Christ is thus the culmination of what the Creator God has always been doing. The entire process of creation is summed up in Christ, and mankind thereby brought to perfection. This doctrine of *anakephalaiôsis* is expressed in almost exactly the same terms by Theophilus and Theodore, as well as Irenaeus. If Theodore is indebted to Irenaeus, he is also in the same debt to Theophilus.

There are at least two other thoughts associated with the *anakephalaiôsis* scheme as presented by Irenaeus. The first has to do with man's free will, the '*discretio contrariorum*.' *Vide, Adv. Haer.* IV, 39, 1:

'Moreover, man received the knowledge of good and evil. And it is good to obey God and believe in Him and keep His commandment; and this is the life of man. By the same token, to disobey God is evil; and this is the death of man. Therefore, because of God's great mercy, man knew both the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience: so that when the mind's eye had received experience of both, it might with judgment make the choice of the better, . . .'

This passage reads very much like passages by Theodore which make the same point. However, the other thought Irenaeus associates with the *anakephalaiôsis* is somewhat different from Theodore's presentation, and perhaps may be directly associated with the necessity he was under of combating the gnostic attempts to divide the Godhead and Christ. *Vide, Adv. Haer.* IV, 38, 3:

'And, therefore, God is first in rank of all things, and He alone is uncreate, and first of all, and the cause of the existence of everything. And everything else remains in subjective obedience (*hupotagêi*) to God. Now obedience to God is incorruptibility, and the persistence of incorruptibility is the glory of the uncreate.'

The salvation that the *anakephalaiôsis* has as its end is presented in terms of the Word-flesh soteriology which is at the heart of the Irenaean tradition, and which lies behind the fifth and sixth century Alexandrian platform. It is at this point that Theodore's affinity for Irenaeus comes to an end. It is doubtless because of this view of salvation that Irenaeus also presents the typology of Adam in terms of a restoration, a view found also in Tatian. (*Vide Adv. Haer.* III, 18, 1 and pages 22, 23 in this essay.) The conclusion of what has been said thus far is, first, that Theodore certainly borrows from Irenaeus and Theophilus the idea of the *anakephalaiôsis* viewed in terms of the typology of Adam as *nêpios*. For Theodore and sometimes for Irenaeus this view can be associated with human free will and the perfection of that will in terms of creation as a whole. However, the tendency of Theodore's soteriology, it seems to this writer, runs counter to the tendency of Irenaeus'. To be sure, each writer is somewhat inconsistent on this point; indeed, both writers state the Adam typology in the Tatian as well as the Theophilan way. But Irenaeus, who was writing against those who separated the Godhead and Christ, phrased his soteriology in terms of a quite literal fusing of the human into the divine. Theodore, on the other hand, opposed the Apollinarian drift of the Alexandrian school, and sought carefully to eschew a soteriology that would demand such a substantial union of God and man. To demonstrate the real difference between Irenaeus' and Theodore's soteriology, one would have only to cite passages from the *Adversus Haereses*. (*Vide,* e.g., III, 23, 1, V, 3, 3, and V, 12, 1.) Man's predicament is that he is caught up in the flux of corruptibility. Once his body is given life by the introduction of the uncreate, that corruptibility ceases. Thus, the Word must become flesh in some substantial sense. It is at this juncture that Theodore, great as his debt is, must part company with Irenaeus.

Something of the relationship between Theodore and Irenaeus has been set forth. We must now turn to the Origenist tradition. It has been asserted that the heart of Theodore's system is the idea that God's grace and man's free will are the two co-operating principles at the basis of reality. To Irenaeus, Theodore is indebted for much that is involved in his notion of God's providential grace as culminating in Christ. But rather than combining with that notion the Irenaean view of salvation as substantial, Theodore sets his statement of God's providential grace in the context of a notion of human free will not unlike Origen's, and of a view of salvation set down largely in terms of the communion and fellowship of God and man, rather than the substantial union of the two.

Origen's notion of divine providence and human free will is difficult to describe in brief, simple terms. However, the basic point seems to be that man is strongly asserted to be free of *heimarmené,* fate. Man has free choice, and he must exercise that choice under God's providence. Providence is to be thought of in terms, for example, of an image taken from the sun. (*Vide, De Principiis* III.) The sun shines steadily on; its effect may be good or bad, and may even involve breeding maggots in a dead animal. In order to achieve a good end, evil by-products must sometimes result. That is, a physician may use a knife in order to heal. (*Vide,* e.g., *Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, pages 193 and 195.) To some extent the eternal, unchanging providence of God does accommodate itself to temporal conditions; the solid food can be transformed to milk. (*Vide, Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 195.) And, in point of fact, there are places where Origen seems to imply that God (and, hence, His providence) is limited by the creation. In Book II of the *De Principiis* God is described as having created only 'as large a number of intelligent beings as he could control.' Thus, in accommodating itself to the creation, God's providence is somehow thought of as self-limiting, in the same sense that a carpenter must be limited by the materials with which he has to work. The free will that God gives to men is, at least in part, the source for evil. (*Vide,* e.g., *Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 280.) And yet, God's providence continually directs even the misuse of that free will. *Vide, Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 239:

'. . . while God preserves the free will of each man He makes use of the evil of bad men for the ordering of the whole, making them useful to the universe; yet such a man is none the less guilty, and as such he has been appointed to perform a function which is repulsive to the individual but beneficial to the whole.'

This view of Origen's is fundamentally the same as Theodore's, it seems to this writer. The only real difference is that Theodore tends to focus the idea upon the harmonious working of grace and free will in Christ's saving work, while Origen tends to wrestle with the vexing philosophical question of harmonizing an eternal, more or less omnipotent, providence with the evil results of free will. That is to say, Origen tends to be interested in theodicy; Theodore, in Christology. For this reason, Origen tends to look at providence and free will as two processes viewed from one point. Theodore, on the other hand, while less concerned with the philosophical problems involved, is able to view God's grace and man's free will as a single process, describable analytically from two points of view, one of which (viz., God's) is unable to be understood completely.

This basic similarity is discernible even in terms of the implications each system has for Christology and soteriology. The union between the human and the divine in Christ is described in similar terms. For Origen, the union comes before creation and is between the Logos and the pre-existent soul of Jesus. But the union is nonethe-less dependent upon the steadfast contemplation of the Logos by the soul of Jesus. Once Origen's Platonic scheme of a double creation is abandoned, the idea might well be thought of as the same as Theodore's notion of the union's depending not only on the eternal Logos, but also on the steadfastness of the *homo assumptus.* The following is one of a number of passages from Origen which tend to demonstrate this. *Vide, Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 74:

'. . . we do not separate the Son of God from Jesus. For after the incarnation the soul and body of Jesus became very closely united with the Logos of God. According to Paul's teaching "he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit," and every one who has understood what it means to be joined to the Lord and has actually been joined to him is one spirit with the Lord. If so, then how much more is it true that in a superior and more divine way that which was at one time a composite being in relation to the Logos of God is one with Him?"

Origen even uses the analogy of marriage to describe the union of the Word to Jesus. (*Vide, Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 364.) Moreover, the two natures are as carefully distinguished by Origen as by Theodore. *Vide,* e.g., *Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, pages 407 and 408:

'Indeed, the person and essence of the divine being in Jesus is quite a different matter from that of his human aspect.'

'It was he who dwelt in the apparently human Jesus who said that he was the resurrection when he taught "I am the resurrection." Furthermore, none of us is so idiotic as to say that the life died, or that the resurrection died.'

The second of these passages tends to deny the *communicatio idiomatum,* and one is certainly reminded of the Antiochene attitude toward the Alexandrian statement that the divine suffered 'impassibly,' *apathôs pathei.* One more passage from Origen may be cited. *Vide, Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 187:

'The power and divinity of God come to dwell among men through the man whom God wills to choose and in whom He finds

room without any changing from one place to another or leaving His former place empty and filling another.'

This sentence might well be a passage from Theodore describing the *homo assumptus.*

The similarities in Christology outlined above are due in part to the fact that Origen and Theodore share a sense of the importance of human free will exercised under providence. But they are also due, it would seem, to the soteriological position each adopts. Neither Theodore nor Origen follows the Irenaean soteriology; neither is prepared to accept the notion that the uncreate must, so to speak, be injected into man in order to stay the flux of mortality and corruptibility. Origen, on the contrary, seems to think of salvation as the liberation of the soul from the body. *Vide, Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 156:

'We affirm that his mortal body and the human soul in him received the greatest elevation not only by communion but by union and intermingling, so that by sharing in His divinity he was transformed into God. If any one should take offence because we say this even of his body, let him consider what is asserted by the Greeks about matter, that properly speaking it is without qualities, but is clothed with qualities such as the Creator wishes to give it, and that often it puts aside its former qualities and receives better and different ones. If this is right, why is it remarkable that by the providence of God's will the mortal quality of Jesus' body should have been changed into an ethereal and divine quality?'

In the first chapter of the present work, it was submitted that Theodore rejects, or at least modifies this Platonic notion of salvation. Theodore tends to deny both that salvation consists of injecting the uncreate into man and that salvation means the escape of the soul from the tomb of the body. Theodore tries, it was contended, to avoid the whole Stoic-Platonic way of looking at man, and to think of salvation in terms of Biblical notions such as Sonship. Of course, he does not succeed completely; and in so far as he fails and remains tied to a Platonic frame of reference, it would seem to this writer that he follows Origen rather than Irenaeus. Even in Origen's scheme of things salvation is not just *theôsis,* but is also *theôsis* through fellowship and communion rather than through simple, substantial divinization. *Vide, Contra Celsum,* ed. Chadwick, page 146:

'. . . Christians see that with Jesus human and divine nature began to be woven together, so that by fellowship with divinity

human nature might become divine, not only in Jesus, but also in all those who believe and go on to undertake the life which Jesus taught, the life which leads every one who lives according to Jesus' commandments to friendship with God and fellowship with Jesus.'

Theodore, then, despite the Biblical and mythopœic tendency of his thought, seems much closer to Origen than to Irenaeus in point of soteriology.

In conclusion, Theodore's general position has an affinity with the Origenist tradition chiefly with regard to the notion of providence and free will. The implications of this view, together with a certain similarity between Origen's and Theodore's soteriologies, results in a number of similarities in the two Christologies. However, Theodore departs from Origen's Platonism in a number of respects. The idea of a dual creation is abandoned, as is the explanation of sin as coming from *koros*, satiety. Furthermore, the characteristic intellectualism of Origen's thought is not to be found in Theodore's. Salvation is more than just intellectual attainment for the Antiochenes; nor is God exhaustible by the human mind, according to them. Salvation, moreover, tends to be described by Theodore in terms which modify Origen's Platonism. Finally, the mediatorial Logos (which was also thought of as subordinate) is an aspect of Origen's thought abandoned before Theodore's time.

It is true that Theodore, in some sense, follows in the two patristic traditions. He is an 'Irenaean' in that he uses the *anakephalaiôsis* doctrine; he is an 'Origenist' in that he agrees pretty much with Origen's notion of providence and free will, and in that his soteriology bears some affinity to Origen's. Thus, so far as the tradition goes, each school of thought contributes a formative element to what may certainly be described as the foundation not only of Theodore's Christology, but of his thought as a whole. However, Theodore's debt is not only to Origen and Irenaeus through the traditions associated with them. It is also to at least three more immediate influences, only two of which can be directly attributed to the two strands of patristic thought outlined above. First, Theodore is greatly indebted to the anti-Arian polemic of his master, Diodore of Tarsus. That polemic (*vide* pages 48–50 in text) takes a critical view of both the Irenaean (as in Apollinaris) and the Origenist (as in Arius) traditions. Second, Theodore is dependent to a great extent upon the Cappadocian synthesis. Certainly, at least so far as the Trinitarian dogmatic definition goes, Theodore follows the Cappadocians. And a case may be made for saying that he is indebted to their preservation of some part of the Origenist tradition. Finally, however, it is contended that Theodore's greatest

debt has nothing directly to do with either of these two chief patristic traditions, but rather with the sober exegetical tradition of Antioch. That tradition, it is submitted, is what gives Theodore's theology its unique perspective. And it is precisely because the present work is concerned in great measure with making this point that the subject of the relationship of Theodore to the patristic traditions that figured in the fourth century controversies has been relegated to this appended note.

R. A. GREER

NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS referred to in the notes and also in the bibliography are referred to in abbreviated form in the notes. The abbreviations are noted in the bibliography.

Translations of Theodore's works from the editions of Migne, Swete, Devreesse (*Psaumes*), Vosté, and the passages translated from Theophilus and from other volumes of Migne are the work of the present writer.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1 For a complete discussion of Theodore's anthropology, *vide* Norris, R. A., *The Anthropological Foundations of the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia.* Much of the discussion in this chapter is based upon this unpublished Master's thesis.
2 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, *The Dream of Scipio,* in *The Basic Works of Cicero,* Modern Library Edition, p. 163 and p. 168.
3 Athanasius, *De Incarnatione,* Library of Christian Classics, *The Christology of the Later Fathers,* p. 63 and p. 107.
4 WS V, pp. 58–9.
5 *Commentarius in Genesin,* Migne, vol. 66, p. 633 AB.
6 *In Epistolam ad Galatianos,* Swete, p. 27.
7 *In Epistolam ad Romanos,* Migne, vol. 66, p. 824 C.
8 WS V, p. 45.
9 *De Incarnatione,* Migne, vol. 66, p. 973 C.
10 Devreesse, *Essai,* p. 12.
11 *Vide,* also, *De Incarnatione,* Migne, vol. 66, pp. 991–2 AB.
12 *In Epistolam ad Romanos,* Migne, vol. 66, p. 824 C.
13 *In Epistolam ad Ephesianos,* Swete, p. 120.
14 Nemesius, Library of Christian Classics, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa,* p. 229.
15 Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses,* Library of Christian Classics, Early Christian Fathers, p. 387.
16 Cf. Daniélou, J., *Sacramentum Futuri,* chap. 1.
17 Theophilus of Antioch, *Trois Livres à Autolycus, Sources Chrétiennes,* p. 158 and p. 160.
18 Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses,* Migne, vol. 7, p. 1108 C.
19 WS VI, p. 21; *vide* also, WS V, pp. 20–1.
20 WS VI, pp. 55–6 and p. 59; *vide* also, *In Epistolam ad Galatianos,* Swete, p. 25.
21 WS V, p. 25 and p. 26.
22 WS V, p. 33.
23 *Vide* Tertullian, *Adversus Praxeam* 7 and *Adversus Hermogenem* 3.
24 Origen, *On First Principles,* ed. Butterworth, p. 23 and p. 24.
25 WS V, p. 32 and p. 31.
26 WS V, p. 28.
27 *Vide* Vosté, p. 23.
28 *Commentarius in Aggaei,* Migne, vol. 66, p. 485 A.

29 ibid., p. 484 C.
30 WS V, p. 111.
31 ibid., p. 109 and p. 110.

CHAPTER 2

1 *Vide* Devreesse, *Essai*, under Pelagianism and Theodore.
2 Cf. Theodore's views of the Theotokos, *De Incarnatione*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 992 BC.
3 Gibbon, E., *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, New York, Harper and Bros. (ed. Milman), 1850, vol. IV, p. 521.
4 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 2, vol. 3, pp. 25–6.
5 ibid., p. 197.
6 ibid., p. 229.
7 Nestorius, *Bazaar*, p. 218.
8 ibid., p. 162.
9 ibid., p. 211.
10 ibid., p. 26.
11 ibid., p. 212.
12 ibid., pp. 158–9.
13 ibid., p. 82.
14 ibid., p. 22.
15 ibid., p. 25.
16 ibid., p. 204.
17 ibid., p. 172.
18 ibid., p. 146.
19 ibid., p. 18.
20 ibid., pp. 208–9.
21 ibid., p. 15.
22 ibid., pp. 57–8.
23 ibid., pp. 59–60.
24 *Vide* also, ibid., p. 183.
25 ibid., pp. 218–19.
26 Gibbon, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 532–3.

CHAPTER 3

1 Sullivan, p. 162.
2 In point of fact, Theodore's Christology has great affinity with that of Diodore of Tarsus (his teacher), and perhaps even with earlier theologians such as Eustathios, Lucian, Paul of Samosata, and Theophilus. It seems quite doubtful that there was an Antiochene school in the sense of a real institution such as the Catechetical School of Alexandria. However, there is much to be said for the fact that Theodore was the product of a tradition, and one that had been formed to deal with the Arian and Apollinarian heresies.
3 WS V, p. 45. The last phrase is from pp. 49–50.
4 ibid., p. 53 and p. 87.
5 *De Incarnatione*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 969 B.
6 WS V, p. 60 and Migne, vol. 66, p. 977 AB.
7 Sullivan, p. 222.
8 *Vide* Norris, R. A., *The Christology of Paul of Samosata*.
9 *De Incarnatione*, Migne, vol. 66, 981 B.
10 *Vide* Sullivan, pp. 203ff.
11 WS V, p. 73.
12 *De Incarnatione*, Migne, vol. 66, pp. 969 C–970 A.
13 ibid., p. 981 C.

14 ibid., p. 972 B, ff. The discussion in this essay is a paraphrase of this section of the work.
15 ibid., p. 973 AB.
16 WS V, pp. 63–4; *De Incarnatione*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 976 BC.
17 WS V, pp. 85–6.
18 *De Incarnatione*, Migne, vol. 66, 981 AB.
19 Vosté, p. 119.
20 Library of Christian Classics, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*, p. 295.
21 WS V, pp. 63–4.
22 ibid., p. 91.
23 This idea was suggested to the writer by the Revd. W. Norman Pittenger.

CHAPTER 4

1 *In Epistolam ad Ephesianos*, Swete, pp. 128–31.
2 *In Epistolam I ad Corinthianos*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 888 C.
3 WS VI, pp. 26ff.
4 ibid., p. 27. The exorcists are described as the attorneys for us against Satan, p. 31.
5 ibid., pp. 28–9.
6 *Vide* especially chaps. II–III of WS VI.
7 WS VI, pp. 38–9.
8 ibid., p. 37.
9 *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 821 CD and p. 823 A.
10 Vosté, p. 26.
11 ibid., p. 32.
12 Cf. *De Incarnatione*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 976 BC.
13 *In Epistolam ad Galatianos*, Swete, p. 56.
14 *Commentarius in Genesin*, Migne, vol. 66, pp. 632 C–634 A.
15 Cf. *supra*, pp. 23–6 in this essay.
16 WS VI, pp. 19–20.
17 ibid., p. 22.
18 *In Epistolam ad Galatianos*, Swete, pp. 29–30; *In Epistolam II ad Thessalonicanos*, Swete, p. 59.
19 *In Epistolam ad Collossienses*, Swete, p. 273.
20 WS VI, pp. 19–20.
21 Daniélou, J., *Bible and Liturgy*, p. 13.
22 WS VI, pp. 23–4.
23 ibid., p. 84.
24 ibid., pp. 90–1.
25 ibid., p. 17.
26 ibid., p. 82.
27 ibid., p. 62.
28 ibid., p. 49.
29 ibid., p. 56.
30 ibid., p. 54.
31 ibid., pp. 56–7.
32 ibid., p. 57.
33 ibid., p. 58.
34 ibid., p. 46.
35 ibid., p. 66.
36 ibid., p. 74.
37 ibid., pp. 71–2.
38 ibid., p. 111.
39 ibid., p. 77.
40 ibid., p. 112.
41 ibid., pp. 74–5.

42 ibid., pp. 74–5.
43 ibid., p. 85.
44 ibid., p. 104 and p. 113.
45 ibid., p. 76.
46 ibid., p. 3.
47 ibid., chap. I.

CHAPTER 5

1 Gaster, T. H., *The Dead Sea Scriptures in English Translation*, p. 253.
2 *Vide* Farrar, F. W., *History of Interpretation*, p. 22.
3 Hanson, R. P. C., *Allegory and Event*, p. 53.
4 *Vide* e.g., Matthew 19: 8.
5 *Vide* e.g., Luke 4: 21.
6 Grant, R. M., *The Letter and the Spirit*, pp. 62–3.
7 *Vide* Kelly, J. N. D., *Early Christian Doctrines*, pp. 35–41.
8 *The Satirical Letters of S. Jerome*, Gateway Editions, p. 160.
9 Origen, *On First Principles*, ed. Butterworth, p. 267.
10 ibid., p. 294.
11 ibid., pp. 284–5.
12 *Vide* Norris, R. A., *The Christology of Paul of Samosata.*
13 Grant, R. M., op. cit., pp. 80–1.
14 Cited by Kelly, J. N. D., op. cit., pp. 76–7.
15 Woollcombe, H. J., *Essays on Typology*, p. 42.
16 Again the attempt has been made to use 'history' without implying the particular view of history embodied in nineteenth century thought. That is, the word here implies no scientific theory of historical writing, but rather means only the view that things are moving in a meaningful order toward a goal.
17 Isaiah 27: 1 and 51: 3.
18 Isaiah 51: 9–11a.
19 Hanson, R. P. C., op. cit., pp. 13–14.
20 *Commentarius in Job*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 697 C.
21 *Psaumes*, p. 49. The psalms are numbered according to the Septuagint scheme.
22 ibid., p. 93.
23 ibid., pp. 364–5.
24 *Commentary on Habakkuk*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 437 C.
25 Hanson, R. P. C., op. cit., pp. 162ff.
26 *Vide* introduction to the *Commentary on Hosea*, Migne, vol. 66, pp. 423 A–426 C.
27 *Psaumes*, p. 3.
28 Migne, vol. 66, pp. 474 D–475 C.
29 *Vide* Temple, W., *Nature, Man, and God*, Part One, Lecture One.
30 *Vide* the first passage quoted on p. 46 in this essay.
31 *Vide* Migne, vol. 66, p. 697 A.
32 Migne, vol. 66, pp. 124 B–125 A; pp. 245–6 A; and p. 233 A.
33 *Vide* Hanson, R. P. C., op. cit., p. 210ff.
34 Pages 19–20 of this essay. *Vide* also, *Commentary on Joel*, Migne, vol. 66, p. 229 BC.
35 Migne, vol. 66, p. 320 B and 328 D.
36 *In Epistolam ad Galatianos*, Swete, p. 73.
37 ibid., p. 79.
38 Migne, vol. 66, p. 317 C, p. 232 A, and p. 362 D.
39 ibid., p. 322 CD.
40 *Psaumes*, p. 121.

CHAPTER 6

1 Vosté, p. 2.
2 ibid., p. 2.
3 ibid., pp. 3–4.
4 ibid., p. 60 and p. 233.
5 ibid., pp. 244–5.
6 ibid., p. 39.
7 ibid., pp. 92–3.
8 ibid., pp. 180–1.
9 ibid., p. 168.
10 ibid., pp. 176–7 and p. 242.
11 ibid., p. 116.
12 ibid., p. 51.
13 ibid., p. 42.
14 ibid., pp. 12–13.
15 ibid., p. 58.
16 Origen, *Commentary on John*, vol. I, p. 12. The translation is Grant's, op. cit., p. 98.
17 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, pp. 3ff.
18 *Vide* ibid., vol. II, pp. 273–4.
19 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, p. 312.
20 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, pp. 97 and 123ff.
21 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, pp. 49–50.
22 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, p. 265 and vol. II, p. 124.
23 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, pp. 181ff.
24 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, p. 218.
25 *Vide* ibid., vol. I, p. 204.
26 *Vide* Farrar, op. cit., pp. 231–4.
27 Vosté, p. 55 and p. 153.
28 ibid., p. 52.
29 ibid., p. 15.
30 ibid., p. 11.
31 Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Opificio*, XVII.
32 Vosté, e.g., p. 14.
33 ibid., pp. 11–12.
34 ibid., p. 115.
35 ibid., p. 211.
36 ibid., p. 18.
37 ibid., p. 224.
38 ibid., p. 31.
39 ibid., p. 59.
40 ibid., p. 83.
41 ibid., p. 224.
42 ibid., p. 224.
43 ibid., p. 26.
44 ibid., p. 212.
45 ibid., p. 55.
46 ibid., p. 49.

CHAPTER 7

1 Vosté pp. 6–7.
2 Origen, *On First Principles*, ed. Butterworth, p. 109.
3 Vosté, p. 145.
4 ibid., p. 217.
5 ibid., pp. 81–2 and pp. 118–19.
6 ibid., p. 50.
7 ibid., p. 6.

8 John 7: 16, 14: 10, 14: 24, and 14: 28.
9 Vosté, p. 22 and p. 33.
10 ibid., p. 226.
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12 John 10: 36.
13 Vosté, p. 154.
14 ibid., pp. 74–5.
15 ibid., p. 23.
16 Cyril of Alexandria, *Commentary on John,* Migne, vol. 73, p. 162 B.
17 *Vide* e.g., John 1: 48–51, 2: 25, 4: 18–19, 4: 29, 6: 6, 6: 61, 6: 64, 6: 70–1, 8: 14, 11: 4, 11: 42, 12: 32–3, 13: 1–3, 14: 29.
18 Vosté, p. 36, p. 93, and p. 158.
19 ibid., p. 78.
20 ibid., p. 45.
21 ibid., p. 64.
22 ibid., pp. 192–3.
23 ibid., pp. 193–4.
24 ibid., pp. 152–3.
25 ibid., p. 82 and p. 163.
26 ibid., pp. 84–5.
27 ibid., p. 108, p. 18, and p. 193.
28 ibid., p. 63 and p. 50.
29 Dodd, C. H., *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel,* p. 295.

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